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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays, out of which the first two study the phenomenon
of worker mobility across occupations in the West German labor market. The first
essay studies the causal wage effects of mobility across firms and occupations among
graduates from apprenticeship training. Exploiting variation in regional labor market
characteristics the instrumental variables estimations indicate that occupation switches
within the training firm involve a career progression. For job switches the loss of
firm-specific human capital seems to dominate. However, the wage loss does not grow
when an occupation switch occurs simultaneously. In light of these results, the second
essay in this thesis studies patterns of occupational mobility in West Germany over the
period 1982–2008 separately within and across firms. Most importantly, occupational
mobility rates across firms have significantly increased since the early 1980s, while
within-firm occupational mobility rates have significantly decreased. The essay also
assesses potential explanations for these developments, such as demographic change
or the relationship between occupational mobility and unemployment. The third essay
in this thesis studies the relationship between product market deregulation and labor
market outcomes. It exploits the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code as a natural
experiment to study how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry may affect self-
employment and dependent employment. Since there are doubts regarding the validity
of the identifying assumptions, the results cannot be interpreted causally. Nevertheless,
the analysis at least partially corroborates the evidence for a positive reform effect
on self-employment documented elsewhere in the literature, while the reform seems
not to have had a positive effect on dependent employment in the deregulated crafts
occupations.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Aufsätze, von denen sich die ersten beiden mit dem
Phänomen der beruflichen Mobilität von Arbeitnehmern im westdeutschen Arbeitsmarkt
befassen. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht für Absolventen einer dualen Berufsausbildung
die kausalen Lohneffekte von Mobilität über Firmen und Berufe hinweg. Die Instru-
mentenvariablenschätzungen, welche exogene Variation in regionalen Arbeitsmarktcha-
rakteristika ausnutzen, zeigen, dass Berufswechsel innerhalb des Ausbildungsbetriebs
einen Karrierefortschritt darstellen. Bei Jobwechseln dominiert der Verlust von firmen-
spezifischem Humankapital. Allerdings nimmt der Lohnverlust nicht weiter zu, wenn
zusätzlich zur Firma auch der Beruf gewechselt wird. Angesichts dieser Ergebnisse
dokumentiert der zweite Aufsatz Muster von beruflicher Mobilität in Westdeutschland
über den Zeitraum 1982–2008 innerhalb von und zwischen Firmen. Die Häufigkeit
von beruflicher Mobilität hat seit 1982 zwischen Firmen signifikant zugenommen und
innerhalb von Firmen signifikant abgenommen. Die Analyse betrachtet zudem mögli-
che Erklärungsansätze für diese Entwicklungen, wie zum Beispiel den demografischen
Wandel oder den Zusammenhang zwischen beruflicher Mobilität und Arbeitslosigkeit.
Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Produktmarktderegulierung
und Arbeitsmarktergebnissen. Die Reform der deutschen Handwerksordnung von 2003
wird als natürliches Experiment genutzt, um mögliche Einflüsse der Abschaffung von
Markteintrittsbarrieren auf selbstständige und abhängige Beschäftigung zu untersuchen.
Da Zweifel an der Gültigkeit der identifizierenden Annahmen aufkommen, können
die Schätzergebnisse nicht kausal interpretiert werden. Dennoch legen die Ergebnisse
zumindest in Teilen nahe, dass der in der Literatur bereits dokumentierte positive Effekt
auf selbstständige Beschäftigung plausibel ist, wohingegen die Reform vermutlich
keinen Anstieg der abhängigen Beschäftigung in den deregulierten Berufen zur Folge
hatte.
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1 Introduction
Over the past centuries economists have discussed and repeatedly worried how technological
progress affects employment and the future of work (Mokyr et al. (2015)). The tasked-based
approach going back to Autor et al. (2003) contributes to this discussion by categorizing
the content of jobs into manual and cognitive, as well as routine and non-routine tasks.
This approach argues that while computerization substitutes for routine manual and routine
cognitive tasks, it actually complements non-routine cognitive tasks. Accordingly, the impact
of technological change on employment is heterogeneous: especially favoring non-routine
cognitive tasks, while leading to a decline in the demand for routine-intensive labor. This
has created a polarization of employment towards what Goos and Manning (2007) in their
study on job polarization in the UK term “lovely and lousy jobs” – a move of relative labor
demand away from the middle of the skill distribution towards non-routine manual (low-
skilled) jobs and non-routine cognitive (high-skilled) jobs. Despite the understanding that
technological progress may hurt parts of the workforce, in hindsight technological change
has not led to large-scale technological unemployment during the past centuries (Mokyr
et al. (2015)). However, the general perception of technological change has recently changed
again. Over the past few years the debate has grown more fearful of a further shift in the
relevance of production factors from labor towards capital, and of rising automation-induced
unemployment and increasing income inequality, as has been accurately summarized by The
Economist (2014). At the heart of this new, more widely-spread skepticism lies the realization
that recent technological advances, such as in the areas of machine learning and robotics,
have expanded the capabilities of software and machines in unexpected ways. In their widely
cited book, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) describe how within only a few years time
information technology has made enormous progress regarding key features, such as pattern
recognition and complex communication, which were long thought to mark the limits of
automation potentials. The authors provide a wide range of examples that reflect these recent
technological advances, such as the invention of autonomous vehicles, automatic language
translation services, and very flexible general-purpose robots that are initially trained by
taking hold of their wrist and guiding them through the required motions. Brynjolfsson
and McAfee (2014) argue that, now that computer technology has achieved certain key
capabilities, we are entering a “Second Machine Age” of accelerated technological progress
which will fundamentally transform the economy. While the authors argue that the resulting
transformation of the economy will be largely beneficial, they also predict that digitization
will have disruptive effects on employment. In another widely discussed paper, Frey and
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Osborne (2013) study how the computerization of non-routine manual and non-routine
cognitive tasks, which have long been thought to be largely exempt from automation, could
affect U.S. employment. Based on expert assessments they predict how likely certain
occupations are to become automated. They find that those occupations which are at high
risk of being computerized within the next two decades correspond to about 47% of total U.S.
employment. Furthermore, they predict that computerization will especially substitute for
low-skilled jobs. Apart from transportation and logistics, administrative and office jobs, as
well as occupations in production, they predict that service occupations will also be strongly
affected. Applying the occupation-specific computerization risks computed by Frey and
Osborne (2013) to German data, Brzeski and Burk (2015) predict that in Germany about
59% of jobs are in danger of being automated.
However, recent empirical results suggest that the future of work may not be as dark as it
has been painted by some over the past few years. In a recent paper, Arntz et al. (2016) argue
that most occupations should contain at least some task-components, such as for example
human face-to-face interactions, that are not easily automatable. They modify the approach
underlying Frey and Osborne (2013) by taking account of the heterogeneity of task-profiles
within occupations. Applying their approach to 21 OECD countries, their prediction of the
job loss potential through computerization is much less extreme. For the U.S. they predict
that about 9% of jobs are at high risk of being computerized. Their study also reveals a
large heterogeneity of computerization shares across countries, that range from about 6%
of jobs in Korea and Estonia to about 12% of jobs in Austria and Germany. Similar to
Frey and Osborne (2013) the authors predict that low-skilled jobs will be most affected by
automation. As Arntz et al. (2016) point out, their results for Germany are in line with the
results of two other recent studies. While Dengler and Matthes (2015) follow a different
approach to identifying the task-profiles of occupations, they find that about 15% of German
employment that is subject to social security contributions is at high risk of being automated.
In addition, recent employee survey data for Germany shows that on average about 13% of
German employees think it likely that their job will be replaced by machines within the next
decade (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2016)). This share is especially high
for the group of low-skilled employees (28%). Furthermore, Arntz et al. (2016) emphasize
that, while a significant share of jobs are at risk of computerization according to current
predictions, this risk will not necessarily fully translate into actual employment losses. Firstly,
new technologies may also create new demand for labor and, thus, new jobs. Secondly,
workers may be flexible and adapt to the introduction of new technologies by providing
new complementary skills. These very recent contributions therefore draw a less dramatic
picture of the effects of technological change and the upcoming wave of automation on
employment. However, even such more positive scenarios imply that workers will have to be
occupationally flexible for years to come. They will need to continuously adapt to changing
labor demands and new occupational requirements, and the pace at which these changes are
required may become even faster in the future. It is therefore important to better understand
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the potential of workers to be flexible regarding the type and the contents of their work, as
well as workers’ ability to switch occupations.
Over the past decade a small but growing strand of the economic literature has begun to
investigate the occupational mobility behavior of workers with the aim of answering the
following questions: Are workers occupationally flexible? If so, what individual labor market
consequences does occupational mobility have? Most empirical studies on occupational
mobility analyze the phenomenon based on individual-level data that contains information
on workers’ occupations according to a certain occupational classification. Occupational
mobility is then defined as a change in the reported (or assigned) occupational code – with
some studies applying further identification rules to increase the plausibility of the mobility
variables. Admittedly, as Arntz et al. (2016) point out, occupational classifications provide
a coarser measure of the contents of work than more detailed task-based measures do.
Nevertheless, at an aggregate level the study of mobility across occupations can provide
valuable insights into the occupational flexibility of workers. As Cortes (2016) shows,
occupational mobility can serve as a means for workers to react to task-specific changes in
labor demand that are induced by technological change. Furthermore, Berger and Frey (2015)
predict that, as a reaction to the new wave of technological progress and automation, human
workers will have to shift their professional activities towards more social and creative jobs.
If that comes true, occupation-based measures of worker mobility may become even more
relevant in the future.
Indeed, occupational mobility in the US and Western European economies is sizable
(compare Section 2.1), and there is empirical evidence that workers have become more occu-
pationally flexible over the past decades (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008); Moscarini and
Thomsson (2007); Parrado et al. (2007); Seibert (2007); Lalé (2012)). While occupational
mobility may allow workers to adjust to changes in labor demand, to the extent that the hu-
man capital obtained by workers through training and work experience is occupation-specific,
it may involve a partial loss of human capital and subsequent wage losses (Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009b); Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)). However, the economic literature
also provides a second, more positive perspective on the individual labor market effects of
occupational mobility: A switch of occupations does not necessarily have to be a perforce
reaction, but it can also serve as a way for workers to actively advance their careers and
realize wage gains (Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004); Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005); Longhi
and Brynin (2010); Fitzenberger et al. (2015); Groes et al. (2015)). Given these differing
views on occupational mobility and the heterogeneous labor market results of occupational
mobility documented in empirical studies, further investigation of the causal effects of
occupational mobility on individual labor market outcomes is required.
Against this background, Chaper 2 of my thesis contributes to the economic literature on
occupational mobility by providing evidence on the causal wage effects of mobility amongst
graduates from apprenticeship in Germany. In contrast to most other studies on occupational
mobility, the analysis carefully distinguishs between two different dimensions of worker
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mobility: mobility across firms, and mobility across occupations. Since selection into
mobility may create biased results, my coauthors and I exploit variation in local labor market
characteristics to implement an instrumental variables approach. Based on administrative
data provided by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) we find that pure firm changes and occupation-
and-job changes after graduation from apprenticeship result in average wage losses, whereas
occupational changes within the training firm result in persistent wage gains. We also
allow for heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the relative wage of the training
occupation. Our results indicate that occupation switches within the training firm involve
a career progression. In contrast to this, for job switches the loss of firm-specific human
capital seems to dominate. However, the wage loss does not grow when an occupation switch
occurs simultaneously. When we also take account of the direction of occupational switches,
we find that a significant proportion of switches are directed towards generally better paid
occupations. When firm-and-occupation switches are directed towards generally better paid
occupations, the switchers even realize average short-term wage gains. Overall, our results
suggest that the skills acquired through apprenticeship training in a certain occupation are,
on average, sufficiently general to be of further use after a switch of occupation occurred.
The research project presented in Chapter 2 builds on my Diploma thesis, which I submit-
ted to the University of Freiburg in 2010 under the title “Berufswechsel nach Abschluss der
Berufsausbildung: Eine empirische Analyse auf Basis der IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe.” In
comparison to this earlier work, my coauthors and I have substantially modified and extended
the scope of the analysis, the empirical design and the set of instrumental variables, as well
as the estimation approach underlying our empirical study.
Chapter 3 of my thesis further contributes to the economic literature on occupational
mobility by providing descriptive evidence on the extent and the evolution of occupational
mobility in the West German labor market over the period 1982–2008. The empirical study
contained in Chapter 3 thus adds to the small but growing number of studies that analyze
country-specific patterns of occupational mobility, and it contributes to the discussion of
whether workers have become more occupationally flexible over time. Since in Chapter 2
my coauthors and I observe significant differences between occupational mobility within
and across firms, the analysis in Chapter 3 also differentiates between across-firm and
within-firm occupational mobility. Based on administrative data provided by the Research
Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB), I calculate yearly occupational mobility rates and show how they have
evolved over time. Most importantly, I find that occupational mobility rates across firms have
significantly increased since the early 1980s, while within-firm occupational mobility rates
have significantly decreased. This chapter of my thesis also assesses potential explanations
for these developments, such as demographic change, changes in the occupational and the
industry structure of employment, as well as the relation between occupational mobility and
career episodes that are marked by unemployment. Most of the findings differ substantially
4
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
between across- and within-firm occupational mobility, which suggests that different factors
drive the decisions for across- and within-firm occupational mobility, respectively.
While Chapters 2 and 3 of my thesis both contribute to the literature on occupational
mobility, the empirical study contained in Chapter 4 of my thesis falls into a different area
of empirical labor economics. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the interdepen-
dencies between product market regulation and labor market outcomes. Over the past two
decades, developed economies all around the world have witnessed a substantial easing of
both economy-wide and, even more importantly, sector-specific product market regulations
(Conway et al. (2005); Wölfl et al. (2009); OECD (2014)). Such regulatory changes are
thought to be related to increased productivity and economic growth at the country level (e.g.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003); Djankov et al. (2006); Schiantarelli (2008)). At the same
time, economists have become increasingly aware of the role product market regulations may
play in explaining cross-country differences in labor market outcomes such as the evolution
of employment. Economic theory predicts that the lowering of barriers to firm entry should
lead to an increase in competition, and to a decrease in rents and, thus, the bargaining power
of workers. This should have a positive effect on entrepreneurship and employment at least
in the long run (Fonseca et al. (2001); Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003); Spector (2004)).
Cross-country comparison studies indeed document a positive relationship between the ease
of product market regulations, firm entry, and employment (compare Section 4.1). However,
these studies also reveal a strong link between the strictness of product market regulation
and country-specific characteristics such as the form of government, the extent of social and
legal standards, or the extent of corruption and the shadow economy (e.g. Djankov et al.
(2002); Dreher and Gassebner (2013)). Given the doubts this casts on the unbiasedness of
cross-country results, a more recent second strand of the economic literature focuses on the
evaluation of product market reforms within single countries to provide causal evidence on
the link between the lowering of barriers to firm entry and labor market outcomes.
Chaper 4 contributes to this second strand of the literature by providing an empirical
analysis of the labor market effects of deregulation of firm entry into the German skilled
crafts and trades. It exploits the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code as a natural
experiment to study how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry may affect self-employment
and dependent employment. The analysis uses data for the period 2000–2008 provided by
the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), survey data provided by the Research
Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the
German Federal States, as well as administrative data provided by the Research Data Center
of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB). Using a differences-in-differences design, my coauthor and I investigate the link
between the lowering of barriers to firm entry into crafts occupations and the number of
registered crafts establishments, self-employment, as well as dependent employment in
the German skilled crafts and trades. After the reform, the number of registered crafts
establishments as well as the number of self-employed craftsmen increased relatively more
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strongly in the deregulated occupations. The opposite holds for the number of dependently
employed craftsmen. Individual-level regressions suggest a positive effect on the probability
of being newly self-employed among all self-employed, and a negative effect on dependent
employment probabilities. Unfortunately, since a close investigation of the institutional
background and extensive empirical checks lead to doubts regarding the validity of the
identifying assumptions, we cannot interpret the empirical results causally. Nevertheless,
our estimation results at least partially corroborate the evidence for a positive reform effect
on entrepreneurship and self-employment already documented elsewhere in the literature,
while the reform seems not to have had a positive effect on dependent employment in the
deregulated crafts occupations.
All three subsequent chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. Chapter 2
is joint work with Bernd Fitzenberger and Stefanie Licklederer and has been published as
a research article in the peer-reviewed journal Labour Economics in 2015. Chapter 4 is
coauthored with Alexandra Spitz-Oener.
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2 Mobility Across Firms and
Occupations Among Graduates from
Apprenticeship
Legal Information
Please note that this chapter of my thesis has been published as a research article in Labour
Economics:
Fitzenberger, B., Licklederer, S. and Zwiener, H. (2015) Mobility across firms and occupa-
tions among graduates from apprenticeship, Labour Economics, 34, 138–151,
doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2015.03.008.
You can access the online version of the published research article at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2015.03.008.
In comparison to the research article published in Labour Economics, the text in Chapter 2
has been reformatted to fit the overall style of the dissertation. I have also updated some of the
references, and I have integrated the research article’s appendices, including the additional
online appendix, into the dissertation’s appendix.
2.1 Introduction
A large literature has documented sizeable mobility across firms and occupations in the
US and Western European labor markets.1 During the time period of 1979–2006 monthly
occupational mobility rates in the US were at about 3.5% of overall employment – even
higher than the 3.2% average rate of job mobility across firms (Moscarini and Thomsson
(2007)). For Denmark, Groes et al. (2015) report that the annual occupational mobility rate
lies close to 20%. While a large literature emphasizes the loss of firm-specific or occupation-
specific human capital (e.g. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008); Gathmann and Schönberg
(2010); von Wachter and Bender (2006); von Wachter et al. (2009)), mobility may very
1Among others, see for the US: Topel and Ward (1992); Neal (1999); Moscarini and Thomsson (2007);
Kambourov and Manovskii (2008, 2009a); for France: Lalé (2012); for Germany: Fitzenberger and Kunze
(2005), von Wachter and Bender (2006); von Wachter et al. (2009); Gathmann and Schönberg (2010); for
Denmark: Groes et al. (2015); and for Germany and the UK: Longhi and Brynin (2010).
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well be associated with career progression or job shopping in labor markets with frictions
(Topel and Ward (1992)), thus resulting in wage gains after mobility (Groes et al. (2015);
Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004); Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005)). Furthermore, mobility
across firms and occupations may be an important adjustment mechanism in a dynamic
labor market. For instance, the tasked-based approach introduced by Autor et al. (2003)
argues that there is a decline in the demand for routine intensive occupations, to which
workers may adjust through occupational mobility (Cortes (2016); Gathmann and Schönberg
(2010)). Most of the literature referred to so far is restricted to an analysis of either job
mobility or occupational mobility.2 Based on high-quality administrative data, our analysis
allows to distinguish the wage effects of job mobility and occupational mobility. In Germany,
vocational training in an apprenticeship involves a job in the training firm and training in a
specific occupation. Our analysis estimates the wage effects of mobility right after graduation
from an apprenticeship in Germany.
Graduates from apprenticeship constitute a large share of the German workforce, and the
apprenticeship combines practical training at the training firm with part-time school-based
training, thus involving both general and occupation-specific skills.3 Graduates may continue
to work as a regular employee in their training firm, possibly in their training occupation or
in another occupation. At graduation, there is no employment protection in the training firm.
Given the combination of firm-based and school-based training the skills acquired during
an apprenticeship are often thought to be largely transferable across jobs, thus allowing
for worker mobility after graduation from apprenticeship (Euwals and Winkelmann (2002,
2004); Clark and Fahr (2002)). Indeed, retention rates are only about 60–75% of all graduates
(Bougheas and Georgellis (2004); Euwals and Winkelmann (2004); von Wachter and Bender
(2006)). The high mobility after graduation is a particularly interesting case to analyze.
On the one hand, a change across firms involves the loss of the training investment for the
training firm (Wolter and Ryan (2011)) and a change of occupation (firm) may imply a loss
of the occupation- (firm-) specific human capital acquired through apprenticeship training
(Kambourov and Manovskii (2008); Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)). On the other hand,
firms may use the apprenticeship as a screening device for young workers, and they may
only retain those apprentices after graduation who perform well (Euwals and Winkelmann
(2002); Werwatz (2002); von Wachter and Bender (2006)). Graduates from apprenticeship
may search for better job offers as a form of career progression (Topel and Ward (1992);
von Wachter and Bender (2006); Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004)), and non-training firms
may make attractive job offers to well trained graduates from apprenticeship, i.e. there is
an incentive for poaching (Wolter and Ryan (2011)). A better match for the employee may
also involve working in a different occupation within the training firm, an issue which has
2Studies which investigate mobility across firms and occupations include Neal (1999); Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008); Longhi and Brynin (2010), or Mueller and Schweri (2015).
3For a detailed description of the German dual system of vocational training see e.g. Hoeckel and Schwartz
(2010). A graduate from apprenticeship obtains a certified degree in one out of 350 training occupations. In
2009 about 60% of German youths aged between 16 and 24 years entered vocational training (Gericke et al.
(2011)).
8
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY ACROSS FIRMS AND OCCUPATIONS AMONG GRADUATES FROM
APPRENTICESHIP
received little attention in the literature so far.
Several studies analyze the individual labor market effects of mobility after apprenticeship
– mainly for Germany and Switzerland. However, the existing studies typically do not
distinguish between a pure firm switch without occupation switch and a simultaneous switch
of firm and occupation (a complex switch according to Neal, 1999), and occupational
mobility within the training firm is typically ignored. von Wachter and Bender (2006)
estimate a large immediate negative causal wage effect of a switch of firm after graduation.
However, the negative effect vanishes five years afterwards. The study emphasizes that
OLS estimates of the wage effects after five years are severely downward biased due to the
negative selection of the firm switchers. In contrast, a negative wage effect of a firm switch
is found by Bougheas and Georgellis (2004) for a six year period after training, and other
studies find small positive wage effects of leaving the training firm (Euwals and Winkelmann
(2004); Göggel and Zwick (2012)). For Switzerland, Mueller and Schweri (2009, 2015) find
no wage differential between stayers and pure firm switchers one year after graduation from
apprenticeship. Göggel and Zwick (2012) find a small negative immediate wage effect of
a switch in occupation. Bougheas and Georgellis (2004) find a positive wage effect of a
switch in occupation without switch of firm relative to stayers during the first six years after
training. A simultaneous switch of occupation and firm is associated with wage losses both
in Germany (Bougheas and Georgellis (2004)) and in Switzerland (Mueller and Schweri
(2015)).
There exist some further studies considering mobility later during the career among prime-
aged German workers holding an apprenticeship degree that provide further insights into the
topic. Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) estimate the transferability of skills obtained through
apprenticeship training for a sample of male workers. The survey data contains information
provided by workers on how well they can apply skills obtained through apprenticeship
training in their current job. Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) estimate that relative to stayers,
pure firm switchers can apply 4.5% less of these skills in their current job. In their current
job within-firm occupation switchers can use 8.6% less of their skills obtained through
apprenticeship training, while across-firm occupation switchers can use up to 34% less
of these skills. These results suggest that occupational mobility is associated with large
losses in human capital, especially if a simultaneous firm change occurs. In contrast to
this, Clark and Fahr (2002) find that only changes across 1-digit occupations entail wage
losses while within 1-digit occupations the skills obtained through apprenticeship training
are transferable. Regarding the wage effects of occupational mobility among prime-aged
workers, other studies also draw a rather positive picture of occupation changes as they
find average wage gains (Werwatz (2002); Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004); Fitzenberger and
Kunze (2005)). Werwatz (2002) finds a negative wage effect of occupational mobility only
for the small group of occupation switchers who state that in their current job they can only
apply very little or none of the skills obtained through training. Similarly, Gathmann and
Schönberg (2010) find that the wage loss implied by a switch in occupation increases with
9
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the differences in task inputs between the source occupation and the target occupation.
Our study provides causal estimates of the wage effects of mobility across firms and
occupations among graduates from apprenticeship in Germany. Our data consist of about
14.200 male graduates who completed apprenticeship training during the period of 1992–
1997. We contribute both to the literature on the economic effects of occupational mobility as
well as to the literature on labor mobility among young workers. Apprenticeship graduates
are very likely selected into the different types of mobility based on unobservables, which
may bias OLS estimates. We therefore employ an instrumental variables approach exploiting
variation in regional labor market characteristics to estimate the causal short-term and long-
term effects of mobility after apprenticeship on wages. We show that local labor market
characteristics, such as the unemployment rate, labor market tightness and mobility behavior
of the local workforce, are significantly correlated to the incidence of different types of
mobility after graduation from apprenticeship.4 Our paper also contributes to the discussion
as to whether an apprenticeship, as part of the school-to-work transition, prepares well for a
successful entry into the labor market. This aspect has been the subject of an intensive debate
in several EU countries who are discussing reforms of vocational training in order to reduce
the high level of youth unemployment (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
(2012); The Economist (2013)).
We contribute to the literature on occupational mobility among young workers by carefully
distinguishing between two different dimensions of mobility: mobility across firms and
mobility across occupations. The literature on job mobility among young workers as well as
the literature on occupational mobility typically does not distinguish these two dimensions
and occupational mobility within the training firm is typically ignored.5 Studies on occupa-
tional change often only consider across-firm occupation changes as valid, while within-firm
occupation changes are perceived as “spurious” and stemming from coding errors (see e.g.
Lalé (2012), and Longhi and Brynin (2010)). In our analysis, we use high-quality German
administrative data. We can therefore distinguish four different mobility groups among
apprenticeship graduates: stayers, pure firm switchers, within-firm occupation switchers
and across-firm occupation switchers. Furthermore, we account for the heterogeneity of the
estimated wage effects with regard to the wage position of the training occupation.
4Other studies on the individual labor market effects of mobility after apprenticeship in Germany deal with
the endogeneity issue using a selection correction approach (Werwatz (2002); Bougheas and Georgellis
(2004); Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004); and Mueller and Schweri (2015) for Switzerland) or they consider
only displaced workers (Clark and Fahr (2002); Bougheas and Georgellis (2004); Göggel and Zwick (2012)).
von Wachter and Bender (2006) use differences in firm-specific retention rates as exogenous variation.
Neumark (2002) analyzes job mobility among young workers in the U.S. using local unemployment rates as
instruments.
5An exception are Seibert and Kleinert (2009) who provide a descriptive analysis of mobility at the transition
from apprenticeship training into the first job for Germany. Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) use mobility
groups similar to our definition to estimate the extent of transferability of human capital across firms and/or
occupations. Göggel and Zwick (2012) consider changes across employers and changes across occupations
after apprenticeship, but it remains unclear whether these two groups are defined truly exclusively. Mueller
and Schweri (2015) analyze occupational mobility after apprenticeship in Switzerland considering three
well-defined groups similar to our definition of stayers, firm switchers and across-firm occupation switchers.
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Our IV estimates imply that pure firm changes after graduation from apprenticeship lead to
average wage losses of about 3.3–4.2% relative to stayers, although the long-term wage losses
are reduced once we control for the training occupation. Regarding occupational mobility,
the results differ strongly by whether there is a firm change. On average, job-and-occupation
changes imply persistent wage losses of about 3.3–4.0% for a period of 7 years after entry
into the first job relative to stayers. An occupation change within the firm results in persistent
wage gains of about 12%. Within-firm occupation switchers are negatively selected and the
switch allows the employee to move to an occupation which matches the employee’s skills
in a better way. Allowing for heterogeneous wage effects, we find that firm switchers and
across-firm occupation switchers tends to lose less/benefit more with a lower relative wage
position of the training occupation. In contrast, the wage gain of within-firm occupation
switches increases in the relative wage of the training occupation. We further distinguish
whether the employee moves to an occupation with a higher relative wage (upgrading) or
to an occupation with a lower relative wage (downgrading). The results suggest that in the
majority of cases an occupational switch involves a career progression. In contrast, for job
switches the wage loss dominates – and the loss does not grow when there is an occupation
switch at the same time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses our identification
strategy and the estimation approach. Section 2.3 describes the data used. Section 2.4
contains the empirical results. We present descriptive results and discuss the performance
of the instrumental variables as well as the IV estimation results. Section 2.5 concludes.
The Appendix 5.1 provides complementary empirical results (Tables and Figures starting
with “A.”) and further background information, such as a description of the data cleaning
procedures and the matching of instrumental variables across spatial classifications.
2.2 Empirical Approach
2.2.1 Identification Strategy
We estimate the wage effects of mobility across firms and occupations up to seven years after
graduation from apprenticeship. There are four treatments (mobility groups): Stayers, who
do not switch neither their job nor their occupation, within-firm occupation switchers, job
switchers within occupation, and job-and-occupation switchers (Table A.2). A comparison of
average wages across the four mobility groups after controlling for observable characteristics
would ignore potential selection effects in mobility based on unobservables. On the one hand,
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and von Wachter and Bender (2006) find that job switchers are
a negative selection. During apprenticeship training firms screen the ability of an apprentice
and will only retain well-performing apprentices after graduation. By analogy, one would
expect a negative selection of occupational switchers. A switch in occupation should be
more rewarding for those graduates whose initial match with the training occupation was
11
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Table 2.1: Main Instrumental Variables
Instrumental variable Level of variation Data source
unemployment rate iabs-districts FEA
unemployment rate < 25 years iabs-districts IABS, FEA
vacancies/unemployed empl. agency FEA
mobility rates:
IABS
job switch
within-firm occ. switch iabs-districts,
job-and-occ. switch economic sector
exit into unemployment > 3 months
share of low-skilled workers
empl. agency FEA
share of high-skilled workers
Notes: FEA: Federal Employment Agency, IABS: IAB Employment Sample regional file 1975–2004; Dummies
for German federal states also included; Regarding the mobility rates, the set of instrumental variables further
contains dummy variables (and interactions thereof with the mobility groups) controlling for small cell size and
mobility rates of zero.
especially poor (Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004); Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)).
At the same time, to the extent that graduates choose to change their employer and/or
occupation as a form of career advancement, mobility is more likely to occur if it leads to
a wage increase relative to staying in the training firm and/or occupation (Topel and Ward
(1992)). If this is the case, future wage prospects feed back into the mobility decision. This
type of positive selection into mobility serves as another potential source of the endogeneity
of mobility decisions. Previous work for Germany finds a positive selection of occupation
switchers for older workers (Werwatz (2002); Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005)).
von Wachter and Bender (2006) point out that there is sorting into training occupations and
training firms. On the one hand, one would expect that training firms with a low retention rate
are attracting a worse pool of apprentices. On the other hand, able apprentices may choose a
training firm with a low retention rate if the training is particularly useful for their career.
von Wachter and Bender (2006) find that sorting into firms implies a negative selection of job
switchers. In contrast, Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) find that including firm fixed effects
leaves the regression estimates for the wage effect of mobility among graduates unchanged.
Thus, we only account for selection into training occupations by including 2-digit training
occupation fixed effects in the wage regressions.
To identify the causal effect of mobility after apprenticeship on wages, we use variation
in the local labor market situation in the year of graduation. Our instruments involve both
push and pull factors, such as indicators of the tightness of the local labor market and group
specific mobility rates.6 We argue that our instruments provide an exogenous variation in
6There are a number of studies which use similar instruments for mobility, see among others Neumark (2002);
Mueller and Schweri (2015); Werwatz (2002) and von Wachter and Bender (2006).
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mobility conditional on the sorting of apprentices by 2-digit training occupations, which we
account for by including occupation fixed effects.
Our analysis uses data on the graduation cohorts 1992–1997 in West Germany. By the end
of 1992 the reunification boom had come to a halt and the West German economy dropped
into a deep recession which was accompanied by a worsening of labor market conditions
and an increase in the unemployment rate. The recession was followed by a slow recovery
until the late 1990’s.7 Thus, in addition to the regional variation, the indicators of the local
labor market conditions used as instruments involve sizeable variation over time.
Table 2.1 summarizes the set of instrumental variables used. We use the aggregate local
unemployment rate and the ratio of vacancies per registered unemployed to account for
the business cycle in general. In addition, the unemployment rate for those below age 25
accounts specifically for the labor market changes for apprentices who are displaced by their
training firm. We also include the shares of high-skilled and low-skilled workers to capture
the educational background of the local workforce. The set of instruments also includes
dummies for the German federal states, which differ in aggregate labor market conditions.
Finally, as proxies for further local labor market characteristics that may affect mobility, we
use regional mobility rates and exit rates into unemployment for male workers aged 25–35,
where we exclude our apprenticeship graduates from the calculation.8 Similar to von Wachter
and Bender (2006), we use the mobility rates of other young workers as a proxy for local
labor market characteristics that may affect the mobility of graduates from apprenticeship.9
The instrumental variables are matched to the sample of graduates from apprenticeship
via the administrative district of the training firm and the year of graduation.10 The way local
labor market conditions affect mobility rates may differ across Germany, depending upon the
labor market conditions in adjacent administrative districts and mobility patterns between
different districts. Therefore, we allow the first stage regressions for the mobility dummies
to differ by 26 West German regions.
To justify our identification strategy, our instruments must have a significant impact on
mobility, and we need to discuss the necessary conditional exogeneity assumption. Pooled
OLS estimations at the national level reveal a statistical significance of the instruments on
the mobility dummies, see section 2.4.3 for details. For the time period under investigation,
the exogeneity of the instruments for wages in West Germany (conditional on time effects
accounting for the aggregate business cycle) is plausible because wages are basically de-
7For a detailed account, see (Sachverständigenrat, 1993, p. 3), (Sachverständigenrat, 1996, pp. 1 and 22), and
(Sachverständigenrat, 1998, pp. 84–87).
8The exit rates into unemployment, where the unemployment spell lasts at least 92 days, are calculated only for
workers who were full-time employees at the end of the previous year. Observations in years with at least
one apprenticeship training episode are excluded.
9The set of instrumental variables further contains dummy variables for a small cell size. Year-administrative
district-economic sector cells are small (n< 10 persons) for about 7.4% of all graduates. Furthermore, the
distributions of mobility rates show spikes at zero (these results are available upon request), for which we
also include dummy variables.
10For variables measured at the level of employment agencies, we constructed a key that allows us to match
employment agency districts to administrative districts (for details see Appendix 5.1.1).
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termined by collective wage bargaining between unions and employer associations at the
industry level, and coverage by industry-level wage agreements varies between 70% and 62%
of employment (Schnabel (2005)). Consistent with our line of argument, Mertens (2002)
finds that in West Germany wages are rigid at the level of federal states, and that regional
labor demand shocks have no significant effect on wages.
2.2.2 Estimation
We estimate the following pooled wage regressions separately for the time period 0–2 years
(short term) and the time period 3–7 years (long term) in employment after graduation from
apprenticeship:
log (wageit) =α+β1 · job_swi +β2 ·occ_swi +β3 ·occ_ job_swi + γ ·Xi
+∑
j
δ j ·occup j,i + ε · yogradi + ζ · yoemplit +η · yearit + uit
with the dummy variables job_swi, occ_swi, occ_ job_swi representing the three mobility
dummies. In addition, we control for the following set of covariates (Xi): age at the beginning
of the first job, diploma from upper track secondary schools (Abitur), non-German citizenship,
and citizenship missing. All specifications include a set of dummies for year of graduation
(yogradi). We also add a dummy for each 2-digit training occupation j (occup j,i) to control
for selection into training occupations. Furthermore, all regressions control for the year since
start of employment after graduation (yoemplit , t = 0, ...,7) and the calendar year (yearit).
Standard errors are clustered at the person level.
To increase efficiency of the estimator, our instrumental variables (IV) approach takes
account of the binary nature of the endogenous variables by estimating a Probit model
in the first stage and by adopting GMM estimation in the second stage (Angrist (2001);
(Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 21)). Specifically, we adapt Wooldridge’s Procedure 21.1 as
follows:
1. Estimate a Probit model separately for 26 regions for each mobility dummy controlling
for the exogenous covariates Xi and the local labor market characteristics IVi and
calculate the predicted probabilities Pˆi,mobtype:
Pˆi,mobtype = α+ γ ·Xi +∑
j
δ j ·occup j,i +λ · IVi + ε · yogradi + uit
2. Estimate optimal cluster-robust GMM11 using the three predicted probabilities Pˆi,mobtype
from step 1 as excluded instruments for the endogenous mobility dummies.
This two-step procedure allows to use the usual GMM standard errors and test statistics and
11We estimate optimal cluster-robust GMM using Stata command ivregress with clustered standard errors.
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it is robust against a misspecification in the Probit models (Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 21).
In a second set of results, we allow the mobility effects to differ by the relative wage
position of the training occupation. To obtain the relative wage position, we regress log-
wages on age, age2, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of occupation dummies (without
intercept) for full-time working males below age 30:
log (wagei) =∑
j
β j ·occup j,i +α1 ·age+α2 ·age2 +η · yearit + ui
where β j is the estimated relative wage position for occupation j. We define tw(occup)i =
∑ j β j ·occup j,i as the relative wage position of the training occupation of individual i, and
we calculate the average relative wage position within each mobility group, denoted by
twmobtype. The wage regression now includes both the three mobility dummies and three
interaction terms with the mobility dummy for mobtype times (tw(occup)i− twmobtype).
Adapting (Wooldridge, 2010, Procedure 21.2), the second-step GMM estimation now uses
both the three predicted probabilities Pˆi,mobtype and the three interaction terms Pˆi,mobtype ·
(tw(occup)i− twmobtype) as instruments. In addition, the set of instruments includes a third
order polynomial of the relative wage position. The normalization of the relative wage
position allows us to use the coefficient of the mobility dummy as the estimate of the average
wage effect of mobility among the corresponding mobility group (ATT: average effect of
treatment for the treated).
Based on the GMM estimates of the model with interaction effects, we calculate the
estimated heterogeneous mobility effects at different deciles (q j, with j = 1, ...,9) of the
relative wage of the training occupation as:
AT Tq j ,mobtype = coe fmobtype +(twq j ,mobtype− twmobtype) · coe f(tw(occup)i−twmobtype)·mobtype
where coe fmobtype is the coefficient of the mobility dummy and
coe f(tw(occup)i−twmobtype)·mobtype is the coefficient of the interaction effect. We also calculate
the treatment effects at different deciles of the entire sample.
2.3 Data
Our analysis is based on the IAB Employment Sample (IABS) regional file 1975–2004, a 2%
random sample of all employees paying social security taxes (see Drews (2008)). The basic
data involves employment spells and spells of unemployment benefit receipt. We restrict
our sample to full-time working men in West Germany who completed their vocational
training sometime during the period of 1992–1997 (Berlin is excluded). For employment
spells, we observe daily wages, indicators of full-time and part-time work, the three-digit
occupation code (about 130 occupations), and the industry. The dataset records a switch of
establishment, but we do not know if two employees work in the same establishment. This
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prevents us from estimating establishment fixed effects.
An ongoing apprenticeship is recorded as a regular employment spell with the status
information apprentice. To identify the completion of the first apprenticeship training, we use
the information about when there is change in the reported education to vocational training
degree. Because of potential misclassification problems, we implement a series of data
cleaning procedures and sampling conditions. A further complication stems from the fact
that there can be a time lag between completion of the vocational training degree and the fact
being recorded in the education variable in the IABS. Appendix 5.1.2 provides an overview
of the data cleaning procedures and detailed further data preparation steps.
We determine mobility after apprenticeship based on changes in the occupational code (oc-
cupation switch) and changes in the establishment ID (job switch) between the employment
spell recording the apprenticeship and the first job spell after graduation. Figure A.2 illus-
trates the timing of spells in a case with an employment interruption between apprenticeship
and first job after graduation.
There is a lot of concern in the literature about measurement error in occupational codes
when using survey data which is self-reported by the employee, see e.g. Neal (1999) for the
US. In fact, Longhi and Brynin (2010) argue that occupational switches within firms are
not well measured in household panel data of the SOEP for Germany and the BHPS for the
UK. Our administrative data involve occupational codes reported by the employer, for which
measurement error is likely to be very small (similar data are used by Fitzenberger and Kunze
(2005), and Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)). It is likely that employers report precisely the
occupation of the first regular job of an employee after graduation from apprenticeship. In
fact, our data show a sizeable number of occupational switches within firms, which we can
analyze in contrast to Longhi and Brynin (2010) .
We construct an unbalanced wage panel for full-time working males with a yearly fre-
quency (Table A.3). Starting with the wage in the year of the first employment spell after
graduation, we record the wage up to seven years after the year of the first employment
spell. Wages are averaged across all employment spells observed in one year. Since the
IABS data only contains information on daily wages, we only take full-time employment
spells into account. In case of parallel employment spells, we only use the spell with the
highest recorded wage. We drop records with zero wages and jobs where employees work
at home (Heimarbeit, typically part-time). Wages are deflated by the consumer price index
(2005=100) and measured in Euros.12 We impute top-coded wages based on a Tobit model,
for which we only know that the wage exceeds the social security contribution.
12The consumer price index is obtained from (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010, p. 214).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Four Groups of Apprenticeship Graduates
Variable All Mobility type
graduates stayers job switchers within-firm job-and-
occ. switch occ. switch
Total 14234 8316 2225 1198 2495
Share 1 0.58 0.16 0.08 0.18
Year of graduation
1992 2362 0.61 0.15 0.08 0.16
1993 2483 0.60 0.16 0.08 0.16
1994 2495 0.56 0.16 0.08 0.19
1995 2342 0.60 0.14 0.10 0.16
1996 2237 0.56 0.17 0.09 0.19
1997 2315 0.57 0.16 0.08 0.19
High school diploma 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.07
Foreign citizenship 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16
Citizenship missing 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Apprenticeship duration 1076 1071 1072 1096 1083
Distance between graduation 49 6 107 6 160
and first job (days)
Age at beginning of first job 20.83 20.72 21.08 20.77 21.01
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Results
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for the four mobility groups. Our sample consists of
about 14.200 male apprenticeship graduates. While the four mobility groups differ in size,
the sample shares do not vary a lot over the graduation years 1992 to 1997.13 The stayers,
i.e. those who stay with their training firm and their training occupation, form the largest
mobility group. They will also serve as the comparison group in all further econometric
analysis. Table 2.2 shows that, in comparison to stayers and job switchers, occupation
switchers less often hold an upper secondary school degree and more often are of foreign
citizenship. The average apprenticeship duration as well as the average age at the beginning
of the first job after graduation are fairly similar across the four mobility groups. However,
regarding the time it takes to start the first job, we observe strong differences between the
four mobility groups. Stayers and within-firm occupation switchers quickly start their first
job after graduation. In contrast, to start the first job after apprenticeship, it takes about 15
weeks for job switchers and 23 weeks for job-and-occupation switchers.
Figure 2.1, p. 18 displays the descriptive wage profiles for the four mobility groups
weighted by the individual length of employment spells. All mobility groups show average
wages that increase almost linearly with years of employment. However, wage levels differ
across mobility groups. Within-firm occupation switchers earn higher wages than stayers.
13The overall share of graduates leaving the training firm in our sample is similar to that reported by von
Wachter and Bender (2006) for the German apprenticeship graduation cohorts 1992–1994. The shares of
mobility groups in our sample are also roughly consistent with the ones reported for mobility among German
apprenticeship graduates in Seibert and Kleinert (2009).
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Figure 2.1: Wages after Graduation from Apprenticeship
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Notes: Observations weighted by length of employment spell.
The two groups of apprenticeship graduates who leave their training firm, job switchers and
across-firm occupation switchers do worse than the stayers.
2.4.2 OLS Results
Table 2.3 shows the estimated wage effects of mobility obtained by a Pooled OLS wage
regressions controlling for a set of socio-economic covariates. The results reported in
columns (1) and (3) imply that on average within-firm occupation switchers earn about 7.5%
higher wages than stayers in the short run (up to two years after entry into first job), and
about 6.9% higher wages in the long run (years three to seven after entry into first job). In
contrast, firm switchers do worse than stayers in terms of wages. Relative to stayers, wage
losses for job switchers amount to about 3.5% in the short run and about 3.8% in the long
run. Relative wage losses for job-and-occupation switchers are slightly more pronounced
with losses of about 4% in the short run and about 4.9% in the long run. A comparison of
short-run and long-run results suggests that wage differences are persistent and for both job
switchers and job-and-occupation switchers no catching up takes place over a seven-year
horizon after entry into the first job. However, as the results in Table 2.3 show, within each
time window on average wages tend to increase over years of employment.
In addition, the specifications in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.3 control for the 2-digit
training occupation to account for possible sorting of apprentices into training occupation.
The wage gains of within-firm occupation switches are stronger, both in the short and long
run, compared to the results without controlling for the 2-digit training occupations. This
suggests a negative selection regarding the training occupations of within-firm occupation
switchers. The relative wage losses of job switchers and job-and-occupation switchers are
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Table 2.3: Pooled OLS Estimates without Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.0346*** -0.0251*** -0.0378*** -0.0222***
[0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0066] [0.0063]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.0753*** 0.0841*** 0.0690*** 0.0734***
[0.0077] [0.0070] [0.0087] [0.0083]
Job-and-occ. switch -0.0404*** -0.0353*** -0.0492*** -0.0395***
[0.0061] [0.0059] [0.0069] [0.0068]
Age at job entrance 0.0105*** 0.0109*** 0.0124*** 0.00799***
[0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0016]
High school diploma 0.0388*** 0.0489*** 0.127*** 0.0973***
[0.0080] [0.0083] [0.0099] [0.0105]
Foreigner 0.0244*** 0.0106* 0.0270*** 0.0175**
[0.0065] [0.0059] [0.0075] [0.0072]
Foreigner missing -0.111*** -0.0942*** -0.124*** -0.0942***
[0.0137] [0.0128] [0.0166] [0.0165]
Year of employment 1 0.103*** 0.0983***
[0.0067] [0.0064]
Year of employment 2 0.192*** 0.180***
[0.0126] [0.0121]
Year of employment 4 0.0588*** 0.0517***
[0.0068] [0.0066]
Year of employment 5 0.114*** 0.100***
[0.0134] [0.0129]
Year of employment 6 0.165*** 0.144***
[0.0199] [0.0191]
Year of employment 7 0.214*** 0.186***
[0.0265] [0.0254]
Constant 4.182*** 3.932*** 4.274*** 3.991***
[0.0070] [0.0289] [0.0078] [0.0322]
Fixed effects
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
N 14225 14225 13378 13378
R-sq 0.060 0.192 0.067 0.134
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell.
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less pronounced after controlling for the 2-digit training occupation. This suggests that also
these two mobility groups are negatively selected with respect to their training occupations.
These results are similar to the findings of von Wachter and Bender (2006) regarding the
negative selection of firm switchers regarding the training firms.
2.4.3 First Stage of IV Estimation
We exploit exogenous variation in local labor market conditions to instrument the different
potentially endogenous mobility dummies. Our identification strategy is based on the
assumption that the local labor market situation in the year of graduation is significantly
correlated with graduates’ propensity to leave the training firm and/or to switch occupation.
From the first-step (stage zero) Probit regressions of the mobility decisions on the exogenous
covariates and the local labor market conditions described in subsection 2.2.2, we obtain
predicted probabilities Pˆ that then serve as the excluded instruments in the GMM estimation
approach. When checking the validity of the above-mentioned assumption, we thus have
to consider both the statistical relationship between the local labor market conditions (our
original instruments) and the mobility decisions as well as the relationship between the
predicted probabilities (our “constructed” instruments) and the mobility decisions.
As explained in subsection 2.2.2, in the first step of the IV procedures we also allow for
heterogeneity regarding the influence of local labor market conditions on mobility decisions
by estimating separate Probit regressions for 26 West German regions. We thus exploit the
fact that the broader economic environment of the larger regions may mediate the way in
which local labor market conditions (at the administrative district level) influence graduates’
mobility decisions.
To summarize the relationship between the local labor market conditions and the mobility
decisions, we run an OLS estimation at the national level for each of the three mobility groups.
More specifically, we regress the predicted probabilities Pˆ obtained from the respective 26
initial Probit regressions on the set of exogenous covariates Xi and the local labor market
conditions while pooling observations from all 26 regions:
Pˆi,mobtype = α+ γ ·Xi +λ · IVi + δ ·occupi + ε · yogradi + uit
The estimation results displayed in Table 2.4 show a statistically significant correlation
between the local labor market conditions and the three different mobility dummies. When
testing for joint statistical significance of the local labor market conditions, we obtain large F-
statistics with values above 25. Patterns of individual significance and the signs of coefficients
of local labor market conditions vary across the three regressions, thus showing that the
different kinds of mobility decisions are affected in a different way by the local labor market
conditions. The predicted probability of job switches within occupation appears to be driven
by push factors. Whenever and wherever the local labor market conditions are worsening
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression of Predicted Probabilities of Mobility on the Local Labor Market
Conditions at the National Level (Pooling 26 Regions)
Dependent variable: Job switch Within-firm Job-and-
Predicted probability of occ. switch occ. switch
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment rate 0.0346*** -0.00345 0.0278***
[0.0070] [0.0065] [0.0070]
Unemployment rate2 -0.00371*** 0.000582 -0.00198***
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007]
Unemployment rate3 0.000114*** -0.0000101 0.0000663***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Unemployment rate < 25 years 0.00565*** -0.00387*** -0.00379***
[0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008]
Labor market tightness -0.00180*** 0.00118*** 0.00130***
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005]
Labor market tightness2 0.0000492*** -0.0000300*** 0.00000746
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Labor market tightness3 -0.000000274*** 0.000000170*** -0.000000136**
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Share low qualified -0.000840** -0.000159 -0.0000146
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Share highly qualified 0.00295*** 0.000832** 0.00431***
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Mobility shares
Unemployment -0.000214 -0.00374*** 0.000407
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Job switch 0.00236*** -0.00163*** 0.00268***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Within-firm occ. switch -0.00277*** 0.00324*** 0.00188***
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Job-and-occ. switch 0.00190*** -0.00347*** 0.0000289
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
Further instrumental variables
Interaction effects indicating Yes Yes Yes
small cells for mobility shares
Interaction effects indicating Yes Yes Yes
mobility share zero
Fixed effects
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 14225
Adj. R-sq 0.280 0.212 0.295
F-test excl. IVs 25.78 42.01 32.36
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Other controls include age at job
entrance and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant;
Year and year of employment dummies are not required since only one observation per apprenticeship graduate
is included.
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(increasing unemployment rates, lower labor market tightness), the predicted probability of
firm change increases.14 The opposite seems to hold for within-firm occupation switches.
Here, an improving local labor market situation is correlated with a higher propensity to
change occupation within the training firm. For job-and-occupation switches the picture
is mixed. The predicted probability of job-and-occupation switches increases with higher
overall unemployment, but decreases with higher youth unemployment (< 25 years), and it
increases as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed improves. Thus, in the case of job-and-
occupation switches both push and pull factors are significant.
As a proxy for further unobserved local labor market conditions that affect mobility, we
have also included transition rates that vary at the local as well as the industry level for male
workers aged 25–35. Thus, similar to von Wachter and Bender (2006) we use the mobility
behavior of other young workers in the local labor market as a proxy for the individual
graduate’s propensity to change the firm and/or occupation. As Table 2.4 shows a certain
higher overall mobility rate of young workers is always significantly positively correlated
with the predicted probability of the respective mobility decision for apprenticeship graduates.
Very clearly, within-firm occupation switches are less likely to occur in an environment
with a higher exit rate into unemployment, with more job switches, or with more job-and-
occupation switches. Regarding the determinants of job switches and job-and-occupation
switches, the picture is somewhat mixed. Also, Table 2.4 implies that each type of mobility
is more likely to occur if the local workforce involves a higher share of highly qualified
employees and a lower share of employees with low qualifications.
Considering the statistical relationship between the predicted probabilities (our “con-
structed” instruments) and the mobility decisions, we find strong regional differences (Fig-
ures A.4-A.6). We exploit this variation in the instrumental variables approach and find
highly statistically significant F-statistics for the excluded instruments (the “constructed”
instruments) in the first stage of the GMM estimator (Table 2.5).
2.4.4 IV Estimates Without Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We cannot assume random assignment into the four mobility groups for our sample of
apprenticeship graduates conditional on the control variables considered in the OLS regres-
sions. There is very likely selection into mobility, and from a theoretical perspective, both
negative as well as positive selection effects could arise. Since an across-group comparison
of average wage levels is likely to results in a biased estimate of the wage effects of mobility,
we continue our analysis with estimating the causal effects of mobility after apprenticeship
using an instrumental variables approach.
Table 2.6 displays the estimation results of the IV procedure (GMM, Wooldridge Procedure
14Mertens and Haas (2006) find a similar average relationship between regional unemployment rates and job
mobility of workers for the period 1984–1999 in Germany. Furthermore, the workers were explicitly asked
whether the job change was voluntary or involuntary. The authors find that rising local unemployment rates
are related to higher involuntary job mobility and lower voluntary job mobility.
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Table 2.5: Key Performance Measures for First Stages of IV Estimates
F-Test excl. IVs Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Without Heterogeneous Treatment Effects:
Job switch 265.6 492.1 250.9 467.3
Within-firm occ.-switch 221.6 402.9 226.5 411.3
Job-and-occ. switch 227.3 408.0 222.8 388.8
B. With Heterogeneous Treatment Effects:
Job switch 158.3 271.5 140.7 250.7
Within-firm occ. switch 122.6 225.2 122.7 227.2
Job-and-occ. switch 125.6 215.2 120.4 205.3
(tw(occup)i− tw job_sw) · job_swi 239.9 222.6 226.1 236.2
(tw(occup)i− twocc_sw) ·occ_swi 60.3 89.9 65.2 89.9
(tw(occup)i− twocc_ job_sw) ·occ_ job_swi 180.0 142.9 165.9 134.7
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.6: Coefficient Estimates for IV Procedure without Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.109*** -0.0429*** -0.123*** -0.0373**
[0.0231] [0.0155] [0.0271] [0.0184]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.232*** 0.143*** 0.238*** 0.124***
[0.0233] [0.0179] [0.0285] [0.0219]
Job-and-occ. switch -0.0241 -0.0333* -0.0327 -0.0305
[0.0257] [0.0184] [0.0281] [0.0215]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 13378 13378
Adj. R-sq 0.011 0.186 0.026 0.131
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell; Other controls include age at job entrance
and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant.
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21.1) discussed in subsection 2.2.2. On average, wage losses due to job switches amount to
about 4.3% (column (2)) in the short run and are largely persistent over time. This suggests
that no catching up takes place relative to stayers, a result which differs from the results
obtained by von Wachter and Bender (2006) for all job switches. The negative wage effect
of a job switch is more pronounced than in the OLS regression (compare Table 2.3). This
suggests a positive selection of job switchers into mobility.
The IV estimates also imply a causal wage effect of within-firm occupation switches that
is much stronger than in the OLS regression. An occupation switch within the training firm
results in an average wage gain of about 14.3% in short run relative to stayers (column (2)).
These gains are largely persistent for a period of up to seven years after entry into the first job.
A comparison of IV and OLS estimation results suggests a negative selection of within-firm
occupation switchers.
Regarding the job-and-occupation switchers, the IV estimation results reveal a negative
causal wage effect of leaving both the training firm and the training occupation. However, the
effect is only statistically significant in the short run, amounting to an average wage loss of
about 3.3% relative to stayers (column (2)). Since the long-run estimate is insignificant, some
catching up relative to stayers may be possible in the long run (column (4)). The comparison
to OLS results tends to imply a negative selection of job-and-occupation switchers.15
While the OLS estimation results suggest that all three mobility groups are negatively
selected with respect to the 2-digit training occupation, comparison of IV specifications in
Table 2.6 with and without 2-digit training occupation fixed effects shows a different pattern
for job switchers. Here, job switchers are revealed to be positively selected into the training
occupation. The IV results still indicate that within-firm occupation switchers are negatively
selected with respect to the training occupation, while the results are somewhat inconclusive
for job-and-occupation switchers.
2.4.5 Overidentification Test and Reducing the Number of
Instruments
We use a large number of instruments when constructing the predicted probabilities Pˆi,mobtype.
This provides the opportunity to investigate the validity of the instruments by means of an
overidentification test.16 However, a standard overidentification test is not applicable for two
reasons. First, we implement a GMM estimation approach which is formally based on the
predicted probabilities as instruments. Thus, the GMM objective in the second stage can not
be used for an overidentification test, simply because formally we have an exactly identified
15As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model shown in Table 2.6 with different clustered standard errors.
We are grateful to a referee for this suggestion. Once we cluster the standard errors in the last step of the
GMM estimation at the region - interacted with year-of-graduation level, which is the level at which a number
of the instruments vary, instead of at the person level, standard errors do increase slightly. However, the
significance level of the estimated coefficients only changes in two cases (Table A.4). Thus, we conclude that
our results are basically robust to this change.
16We are grateful to one referee for suggesting to implement an overidentification test for our case.
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case. Second, even though our estimates are second stage GMM estimates building on the
weighting matrix estimated in the first stage, we argue that inference has to take account
of clustering at the individual level. This is because the weighting matrix estimated in the
first stage and used in the second stage does not account of clustering. Note further that our
instruments are assumed to affect the endogenous treatment dummies through the nonlinear
function yielding Pˆi,mobtype.
As a simple approach to implement an overidentification test, we extend the heteroscedas-
ticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions for the two-stage least squares estimator
suggested by (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 136) to our setting as follows. (i) We first run a panel
regression of all instruments on the three Pˆi,mobtype’s and on the exogenous regressors in
the wage equation. Denote the residuals from this auxiliary regression as rˆ2. (ii) Next, we
regress the estimated residuals of the wage regression (these residuals are based on the GMM
coefficient estimates and the actual treatment dummies plugged into the wage regression) on
the residual variation of the instruments rˆ2. (iii) We use the cluster robust Wald test statistic
for the joint significance of all instruments in the regression under (ii). Because we estimate
separate probit regressions by 26 regions to estimate Pˆi,mobtype, our instruments are fully
interacted with the regions. For this reasons, we implement the overidentification test (i)-(iii)
separately by the 26 regions. Furthermore, we weight all regressions by the employment
weight for each single wage observations. As a caveat, it should be noted that the auxiliary
regressions involve a linear approximation of the possibly nonlinear relationship between
the instruments and the error term in the wage regression.17 Furthermore, we differ from
(Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 6) by using all instruments in our auxiliary regressions in (i) and
(ii), simply because Pˆi,mobtype is not a linear function of the instruments and therefore the
matrix spanned by rˆ2 has full rank.
The benchmark specification discussed in table 2.6 is based on 22 instruments. The
overidentification test (see Table A.5, Panel 0) typically does not lead to a rejection at the 1%
significance level for a majority of regions, but depending on the case considered there are
between 5 and 13 rejections among 26 regions. The rejection rate is considerably higher than
the significance level of 1%, and also the joint test for the national level involves a rejection.
Thus, strictly speaking, our IV approach does not pass the overidentification test.
To address the problem in more detail, we now reduce sequentially the set of instruments
from 22 to 7 instruments, as described in the notes of Table A.5. The 7 core instruments
involve the general indicators of regional labor market conditions such as the unemployment
rate, the unemployment rate below age 25, and labor market tightness at the district level (as
well as powers of these variables). The 9 IV’s also involve the skill shares among employees.
And the 12 IV’s involve information on the mobility share regarding unemployment longer
than 3 months. For the 12 IV’s, we have excluded the information on mobility shares
regarding job switches and occupational switches whose effects we are estimating. Thus,
17Thus, a misspecification of the probit models for the treatment dummies may also cause a rejection of the
overidentification test even though the instruments may still be strictly exogenous.
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one might be most concerned about the validity of these group instruments. When we
reduce the number of instruments, the number of rejections of the overidentification test
falls dramatically. With 7 instruments there is no rejection any more for the long run with
occupation dummies and there are only between one to three rejections for the other case (for
all rejections the p-value lies around 0.005, except for one case with 0.0005). We take the
model with 7 instruments as basically passing the overidentification test. One could make a
similar argument for the model with 9 instruments. Regarding the number of rejections, the
model with 12 IV’s lies somewhere in between the model with 22 IV’s and the model with 9
IV’s.
Should we now use the model estimates based on 7 or 9 instruments as our benchmark
model? A comparison of the estimated treatment effects in table 2.7 suggests that the
variation of the set of instruments does not change the estimated treatment effects in a
considerable way.18 In particular, there is a striking qualitative similarity of the results (in
light of the estimated standard errors) for the estimates with fixed effects for the 2-Digit
training occupations). If the validity of the instruments were to be questioned, we would
expect that the estimated treatment effects would change strongly. However, that is not the
case. We rather think that the rejections suggest a slight misspecification of the probit model
used to construct the predicted treatment probabilities Pˆi,mobtype. Put differently, we do not
have a problem of endogenous instruments but rather the nonlinearity of the relationship
between the instruments and the treatment dummy variables may not be fully captured by
our probit model. This problem may be aggravated by the fact that our mobility shares are
noisy estimates and that we account for the fact that cell sizes are too small.
Because the IV approach suggested by (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 939), which we use in this
paper, explicitly allows for a misspecification of the Probit model, we stick to our benchmark
estimates with 22 instruments. Furthermore, the subsequent analysis will also be based on
the set of 22 instruments.
2.4.6 IV Results With Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The IV estimations presented so far estimate treatment effects that are homogeneous with
respect to the relative wage position of the training occupation. However, differences
in the relative wages of training occupations may reflect differences in the amount of
occupation-specific capital typically obtained trough training as well differences in the
occupation-specific ratio of labor supply and demand. In the following we will thus drop the
assumption of homogeneous starting conditions within mobility groups by taking account of
the relationship between the relative wage of the training occupation and the wage effects
of mobility. The IV procedure (Wooldridge Procedure 21.2) discussed in Subsection 2.2.2
estimates the ATT, taking account of the effect heterogeneity by the relative wage level of
18The strongest difference involves the absolute reduction in the negative wage effect of a job switch in the
models without fixed effects for the 2-Digit training occupations.
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Table 2.7: Comparison of Coefficient Estimates for IV Procedure without Heterogeneous
Treatment Effects for Various Sets of IVs
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. 12 IVs (instead of 22 as in Table 2.6)
Job switch -0.0702** -0.0303* -0.0745** -0.0212
[0.0276] [0.0176] [0.0325] [0.0206]
Within-firm occ. Switch 0.266*** 0.150*** 0.283*** 0.114***
[0.0297] [0.0205] [0.0351] [0.0263]
Job-and-occ. Switch 0.0170 -0.0198 -0.0171 -0.0261
[0.0302] [0.0209] [0.0338] [0.0245]
B. 9 IVs (instead of 22 as in Table 2.6)
Job switch -0.0421 -0.0322* -0.0579* -0.0248
[0.0296] [0.0182] [0.0347] [0.0215]
Within-firm occ. Switch 0.265*** 0.146*** 0.261*** 0.106***
[0.0323] [0.0227] [0.0373] [0.0281]
Job-and-occ. Switch 0.0393 -0.0215 0.00561 -0.0198
[0.0320] [0.0214] [0.0362] [0.0252]
C. 7 IVs (instead of 22 as in Table 2.6)
Job switch -0.0430 -0.0330* -0.0727** -0.0277
[0.0311] [0.0187] [0.0369] [0.0221]
Within-firm occ. Switch 0.229*** 0.124*** 0.233*** 0.0892***
[0.0334] [0.0234] [0.0390] [0.0292]
Job-and-occ. Switch 0.0199 -0.0314 -0.0181 -0.0284
[0.0335] [0.0221] [0.0382] [0.0261]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell; Other controls include age at job entrance
and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant.
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Table 2.8: Coefficient Estimates for IV Procedure with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.0317 -0.0354** -0.0522** -0.0270
[0.0204] [0.0150] [0.0253] [0.0179]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.203*** 0.122*** 0.211*** 0.116***
[0.0207] [0.0161] [0.0248] [0.0185]
Job-and-occ. switch -0.0106 -0.0399** -0.0155 -0.0362*
[0.0225] [0.0173] [0.0260] [0.0206]
(tw(occup)i− tw job_sw) · job_swi -0.100 0.00127 -0.160* -0.126
[0.0626] [0.0642] [0.0848] [0.0856]
(tw(occup)i− twocc_sw) ·occ_swi 0.300 0.484*** 0.513** 0.619***
[0.1953] [0.1827] [0.2432] [0.1965]
(tw(occup)i− twocc_ job_sw) ·occ_ job_swi -0.342*** -0.199* -0.291** -0.190
[0.1092] [0.1063] [0.1206] [0.1193]
tw(occup)i 0.989*** 0.839*** 0.893*** 0.742***
[0.0382] [0.0514] [0.0447] [0.0581]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14221 14221 13374 13374
Adj. R-sq 0.172 0.234 0.123 0.156
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Other controls include age at job
entrance and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant.
the training occupation.
The main mobility effects shown in Table 2.8 are calculated as average effects among the
corresponding mobility group. Regarding these average causal mobility effects the results do
not change much relative to the IV results without heterogeneous treatment effects. For job
switchers and within-firm occupation switchers the effects are a bit less pronounced than
before. For job-and-occupation switchers the negative long-term wage effect now becomes
statistically significant.
Regarding the relevance of the training occupation, Table 2.8 shows that on average the
relative wage of the training occupation tw(occup)i is positively related to current wages
both in the short and long run.19 This means that apprenticeship graduates from training
occupations with a higher relative wage also earn higher wages during the first seven years
of their labor market careers.
Most importantly, the interaction effects between the relative wage distance and the
mobility type reveal interesting results. Job-and-occupation switchers display negative
19The respective coefficients on tw(occup)i have to be interpreted as elasticities: On average a 1% higher wage
in the training occupation is associated with a β% higher wage after graduation.
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Figure 2.2: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated at Deciles of the Overall Distribution of
Wages in the Training Occupation (Showing 95% Confidence Bands)
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
decile
short-term, uncond.
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
decile
long-term, uncond.
within-firm occ. switch job switch job-and-occ. switch
Notes: Calculations based on results from 3-step IV estimation controlling for 2-digit training occupations.
interaction effects. For job switchers, the interaction effect is close to zero in the short
run, but becomes negative in the long run. Interestingly, the relationship is reversed for
within-firm occupation switchers. Here, we find a positive interaction effect.
To illustrate the meaning of these findings, Figure 2.2 shows the ATT at deciles of the
overall distribution of wages in the training occupation for each of the three treatment
groups.20 For job switchers and job-and-occupation switchers we find that those members
of the mobility group who have been trained in a low-wage training occupation suffer
relatively less from being mobile (relative to those having been trained in better-paid training
occupations). We cannot rule out, that for the most ill-positioned graduates the respective
mobility decision may even be neutral relative to stayers in terms of wages. Interestingly,
the ATTs for job switchers and job-and-occupation switchers are not statistically different
from each other. This suggests that additional to leaving the training firm a change of
occupation does not have any further negative wage effects for the apprenticeship graduate.
A change of occupation within the training firm is clearly beneficent for the apprenticeship
graduates. Those apprenticeship graduates who, regarding their choice of training occupation,
are already in a favorable initial position profit most from an occupational switch within
the training firm. Even the initially most ill-positioned graduates profit from a within-firm
occupation switch relative to stayers. 21
Note that Figure 2.2 shows very similar patterns both for the short-term and the long-term
20A conditional version of Figure 2.2, where we compute the ATT at deciles of the group-specific distribution of
wages in the training occupation, shows similar results (Figure A.7).
21Relative to the group of stayers, in the group of job-and-occupation switchers and even more so in the group
of job switchers weakly ranked training occupations are more frequent. The group of within-firm occupation
switchers is more dominant in the upper part of the ranking of training occupations (Figure A.8).
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Table 2.9: Pooled OLS Estimates with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0–2) Long term (3–7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.00510 -0.0147*** -0.0129** -0.0131**
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0063] [0.0064]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.0658*** 0.0668*** 0.0614*** 0.0585***
[0.0074] [0.0072] [0.0083] [0.0083]
Job-and-occ. switch -0.0279*** -0.0348*** -0.0370*** -0.0391***
[0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0068] [0.0068]
(tw(occup)i− tw job_sw) · job_swi -0.103** -0.0622 -0.121* -0.124*
[0.0470] [0.0476] [0.0692] [0.0703]
(tw(occup)i− twocc_sw) ·occ_swi 0.211* 0.170 0.272** 0.278**
[0.1168] [0.1193] [0.1370] [0.1320]
(tw(occup)i− twocc_ job_sw) ·occ_ job_swi -0.393*** -0.378*** -0.346*** -0.314***
[0.0725] [0.0730] [0.0835] [0.0846]
tw(occup)i 1.030*** 0.948*** 0.941*** 0.830***
[0.0298] [0.0427] [0.0343] [0.0480]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14221 14221 13374 13374
R-sq 0.200 0.240 0.148 0.161
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell; Other controls include age at job entrance
and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant.
results. Within-firm occupation switchers persistently perform better than stayers in terms of
wages. For job switchers and job-and-occupation switchers the treatment effects appear to
be largely persistent over time. However, one has to keep in mind that the average long-term
effect of pure firm changes reported above turns insignificant once we control for selection
into training occupations, so that for job switchers catching up relative to stayers could be
possible.
A comparison of the IV estimation results relative to the corresponding OLS results in Ta-
ble 2.9 shows similar selection patterns as discussed above in Section 2.4.4 for IV estimation
without heterogeneous treatment effects. The estimation results indicate a positive selection
of job switchers. Within-firm occupation switchers are negatively selected with respect to
unobservables. This result holds in particular in light of the differences in the corresponding
interaction effects between OLS and IV estimation with heterogeneous treatment effects.
However, the IV results imply that there is no significant selection on unobservables for job-
and-occupation switchers. A comparison of IV specifications in Table 2.8 with and without
2-digit training occupation fixed effects again suggests sorting into training occupations for
all mobility groups.
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2.4.7 Occupational Upgrading and Downgrading
Not only may the effects of occupational mobility depend on the initial occupational po-
sition of the apprenticeship graduates, but they may also be related to the direction of the
occupational move. We explore this aspect of occupational mobility by distinguishing be-
tween upward and downward switches. Based on relative wages, we ordinarily rank all
130 occupations observed in the IABS from lowest paid (1) to highest paid (130). For each
apprenticeship graduate we then compare the rank of his training occupation to the rank of his
occupation in the first job after graduation and thereby determine whether they performed an
upward or downward occupational switch. We find that in both mobility groups a significant
proportion of occupational switches is directed towards higher ranked occupations. About
60% of within-firm occupation changes are upward. Surprisingly, even in the group of
job-and-occupation switchers about 48% of all cases are associated with an upward move.
In light of these results, we estimate a modified version of the IV procedure without
heterogeneous treatment effects that distinguishes between upward and downward occupa-
tion switches. As Table A.7 shows, the wage effects of occupational mobility are indeed
heterogeneous with respect to the direction of the occupational move.22 For within-firm
occupation switchers we find that even those apprenticeship graduates who move towards
a lower ranked occupation on average still realize significant relative wage gains of about
6.6% that largely persist over a seven year period after graduation.
Most importantly, we find that an occupation switch across firms does not necessarily
cause a negative wage effect. Those job-and-occupation switchers who move towards a
higher ranked occupation do not suffer wage losses on average. In the short run, they even
realize significant average wage gains of about 6.7% relative to the stayers. In the long run,
upward job-and-occupation switches appear to be at least wage neutral. These effects are
strongest when we include fixed effects for the 2-digit training occupation and, thus, only
compare job-and-occupation switchers moving away from the same initial 2-digit training
occupation.
2.5 Conclusions
Distinguishing carefully between mobility across firms and across occupations, this study pro-
vides causal estimates of the wage effects of mobility among graduates from apprenticeship
in Germany during the first seven years after starting the first regular job after graduation. Our
analysis distinguishes between pure firm switchers, within-firm occupation switchers, and
across-firm occupation switchers. Mobility across firms and occupations may be associated
with a loss of human capital implying a wage loss or with finding a better job match implying
22The corresponding OLS estimation results can be found in Table A.6. Table A.8 provides results on the
correlation between the local labor market conditions and upward/downward occupational mobility. Table A.9
shows the F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage of the GMM estimation.
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a wage gain. Due to the likely presence of selection based on unobservables, OLS estimates
are likely to be biased and we employ an instrumental variables approach exploiting variation
in regional labor market characteristics. We show that local labor market conditions, such as
the unemployment rate, labor market tightness and mobility behavior of the local workforce,
are significantly correlated with mobility after graduation from apprenticeship. Our analysis
accounts for the heterogeneity of the estimated wage effects with regard to the wage position
of the training occupation.
Our IV estimates imply that pure firm changes after graduation from apprenticeship lead
to average wage losses of about 3.3–4.2% relative to stayers, although the long-term wage
losses are reduced once we control for the training occupation. Job switchers are positively
selected into mobility with respect to unobservable characteristics relative to stayers.
Regarding occupational mobility, the results differ strongly by whether there is a firm
change. On average, job-and-occupation switches imply persistent wage losses of about
3.3–4.0% for a period of 7 years after entry into the first job relative to stayers. An occupation
switch within the training firm results in persistent wage gains of about 12%. Our results
indicate that Across-firm occupation switchers basically show no selection on unobservables,
while within-firm occupation switchers are negatively selected. During the training period
the employer can observe the apprentice’s ability and then decide, whether the employee
should switch to an occupation which matches the employee’s skills in a better way. This
occurs in particular when the initial match with the training occupation was poor.
Allowing for heterogeneous wage effects, we find that job switchers and across-firm
occupation switchers tend to lose less/benefit more with a lower relative wage position of the
training occupation. In contrast, the wage gain of within-firm occupation switchers increases
in the relative wage of the training occupation. Furthermore, we find that the wage effects of
occupational mobility differ by the direction of the move. Occupational upgrading across
firms, which comprises 48% of all job-and-occupation switches, actually causes an average
wage gain of 6.7%.
While our results indicate that pure firm changes after apprenticeship lead to wage losses,
our conclusions regarding the wage effects of occupational mobility after apprenticeship are
somewhat more positive. Occupational mobility within the training firm can be interpreted as
a career progression involving persistent wage gains. The positive wage effects of occupation
switches within the firm and occupational upgrading across firms suggest that for the majority
of cases a change of occupation involves a career progression. In contrast, for job switches
the loss of firm-specific human capital seems to dominate – and the loss does not grow
when there is an occupation switch at the same time. At a more general level, our results
suggest that the skills acquired through apprenticeship training in a specific occupation are
sufficiently general to be useful when working in another occupation.
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3 Occupational Mobility in the West
German Labor Market
3.1 Introduction
Over the past decade there has been a growing awareness of the economic significance of
worker mobility across the occupational dimension. It has been argued that the perception
of increased economic turbulence in the US labor market could actually be reflecting the
increase in occupational mobility which has been observed since the 1970s (Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008)). From the point of view of an individual worker such an increase in
occupational mobility could be economically harmful since the returns to occupational tenure
are significant (e.g. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b); Groes (2010)) and occupational
switches should entail a loss of occupation-specific human capital (Gathmann and Schönberg
(2010)). However, occupational mobility could also serve as a means for workers to improve
the quality of their individual worker-job-match in a frictional labor market, and could then
be interpreted as a form of career progression that results in wage gains (Fitzenberger and
Spitz (2004); Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005); Longhi and Brynin (2010); Fitzenberger et al.
(2015); Groes et al. (2015)).
At a broader level, occupational mobility is thought to be related to patterns of overall
wage inequality (Kambourov and Manovskii (2009a); Cortes (2016)). It may allow workers
to adjust to task-specific changes in labor demand induced by technological change (Cortes
(2016)). This aspect of occupational mobility is especially important given that we are
apparently witnessing the onset of a new period of accelerated technological change, which
has been put into motion by the recent development of key technological capabilities that
will most likely allow for the automation of non-routine tasks in the near future (e.g. Frey
and Osborne (2013); Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014)). Furthermore, occupational switches
can have a polarizing tendency in the sense that highly-paid workers within an occupation
tend to switch to even better paid occupations, while the reverse holds for the low earners
within an occupation (Groes et al. (2015)).
Against this background, this paper contributes to the literature on worker mobility by
providing a comprehensive overview of patterns of occupational mobility in the West German
labor market for the period 1982–2008. In contrast to most related studies, it explicitly
differentiates between across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility, and describes how
both phenomena have evolved over time. The paper also assesses potential explanations for
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the observed patterns of occupational mobility.
While interest in worker mobility across occupations is growing among economists,
empirical evidence on the overall extent and the dynamics of occupational mobility in the
labor markets of developed economies is still relatively scarce. Several papers analyze
the extent of and trends in occupational mobility in the United States. Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008) document a wide range of key findings on occupational mobility in the
US labor market over the period 1986–1997. They estimate that the annual rate of 3-digit
occupational mobility of male workers rose from 16% in the early 1970s to about 20%
in the mid 1990s. Amongst other results, they find that patterns of occupational mobility
vary by age and education. Their analysis suggests that, had the demographic structure
of employment not changed since 1980, the increase in occupational mobility rates would
have been even more pronounced. Additionally their analysis of net flows of workers
across occupations suggests that the observed increase in occupational mobility could be
the result of an increase in the variation of occupation-specific labor demand. The finding
that occupational mobility increased from the 1970s to the mid 1990s is also corroborated by
Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), who report that during the time period 1979–2006 monthly
occupational mobility rates in the US were at about 3.5% of overall employment. However,
they find that after the mid 1990s monthly occupational mobility rates decreased sharply.
Parrado et al. (2007) report annual occupational mobility rates at the 1-digit level in the US
that rose from 15–20% in the years 1969–1980 to 20–25% during the period 1981–1993 for
male workers, and from 10–15% to 15–20% for female workers. The authors also consider
sociodemographic determinants of occupational mobility and find that occupational mobility
is lower for female than for male workers, and it is decreasing in age. In a more recent
paper on France, Lalé (2012) finds an average occupational mobility rate of 7.4% at the
3-digit level with no overall trend over the observation period. However, after correcting
for aspects of demographic change such as the aging of the French population, the author
finds significantly higher occupational mobility rates that strongly increased over the period
1982–2009. Longhi and Brynin (2010) report that in Britain over the period 1991–2006 the
average occupational mobility rate at the two-digit level amounts to 29.4%, but reduces to
8.6% if only occupational changes accompanied by a reported job change are considered.
Furthermore, they show that the probability of an occupational switch across employers
increases if workers are over-qualified for the current job. Occupational mobility across
employers is associated with higher wage growth and improved job satisfaction relative to
immobile workers. For Denmark, Groes et al. (2015) report that every year about 20% of
workers change their occupation.
Empirical evidence on the overall patterns and the dynamics of occupational mobility
in Germany is likewise scarce. Based on data on West Germany from the German So-
cioeconomic Panel Longhi and Brynin (2010) report an average occupational mobility rate
of 11.8% at the 2-digit level over the period 1984–2006, which reduces to 3.2% if only
occupational changes accompanied by a reported job change (which involves a change of
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employer in about 70% of cases) are taken into account. The authors focus on the analysis
of the individual-level determinants and labor market outcomes of occupational switches
across employers. They show that the probability of an occupational switch across employ-
ers increases if workers are either over- or under-qualified for the current job. They find
that occupational mobility across employers is associated with higher wage growth and
improved job satisfaction relative to immobile workers as well as relative to job changes
that do not involve an occupational switch. Isaoglu (2010b) also provides an analysis of the
individual-level determinants of occupational switches in West Germany based on data from
the German Socioeconomic Panel. According to the data-cleaning procedures described in a
supplementary paper (Isaoglu (2010a)), the author considers a measure of overall occupa-
tional mobility that includes both occupational switches within and across employers as long
as they are associated with a reported change in job status. Interestingly, Isaoglu (2010b)
finds that the probability of an occupational switch is negatively related to having switched
occupations in the previous year, as well as to increases in the local unemployment rate.
Additionally, the author describes patterns in overall 4-digit occupational mobility over the
period 1984–2004. Over the period of observation the overall annual 4-digit occupational
mobility rate in West Germany averages about 5% when only employment-to-employment
transitions are considered. If non-employment-to-employment transitions are considered
as well, the average overall occupational mobility rate is higher (Isaoglu (2010a)). In line
with the negative correlation between the unemployment rate and occupational switches,
overall occupational mobility is pro-cyclical, but the author observes no trend in overall
occupational mobility over the period of observation.
Bachmann and Burda (2007) use administrative data provided by the Research Data
Centre of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) to analyze sectoral transformation and labor market dynamics in West Germany
over the period 1975–2001. While their analysis focuses on worker reallocation across
industries, they also provide results on overall 3-digit occupational mobility rates, that
comprise occupational switches both within and across establishments. The authors show
that sectoral and occupational turbulence as measured by Lilien indices increased in the
mid 1990s in West Germany. They document that over the period 1980–2000 the average
annual overall 3-digit occupational mobility rate pertaining to employment-to-employment
transitions is about 6% for male workers aged 16–29. Interestingly, Bachmann and Burda
(2007) show that average overall occupational mobility rates are higher if they consider
non-employment-to-employment transitions and even higher if they consider unemployment-
to-employment transitions (11% and about 59% for young male workers, respectively).
The authors find that gross overall 3-digit occupational mobility involving employment-to-
employment transitions is pro-cyclical. The probability of occupational mobility conditional
on leaving unemployment has increased over time, which the authors interpret as a sign
that West German unemployed have grown occupationally more mobile over the period
1980–2000.
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Also regarding the evolution of occupational mobility over time, Seibert (2007) documents
patterns of occupational mobility for young workers in the specific context of labor market
entry after graduation from an apprenticeship. Comparing the training occupation and the
occupation in the first job based on IAB administrative data, he reports that overall 3-digit
level occupational mobility rates for male graduates of the German apprenticeship system
rose from about 18% in the 1970s to about 26% in 2004, while for female graduates the
rates declined from 18.6% in 1977 to about 16.3% in 2004. At the 3-digit level within-firm
occupational mobility rates are much lower (about 10–15%) than across-firm occupational
mobility rates (about 25–50%). Female graduates exhibit less occupational mobility than
male graduates – a result which has also been documented by Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005).
Seibert (2007) also shows that in both groups occupational mobility is highest if leaving the
training firm is accompanied by an unemployment spell. Furthermore, Seibert (2007) finds
that occupational mobility rates vary by training occupation, and training occupation-specific
occupational mobility rates have changed over time.
Given the growing awareness regarding the economic significance of occupational mo-
bility, this empirical study contributes to the literature on worker mobility by providing a
comprehensive overview of occupational mobility in the West German labor market over
a 27-year-period. Based on a large administrative data set provided by the Research Data
Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB), this analysis provides results on patterns of occupational mobility for a major group
of West German workers, that is for those in full-time and part-time employment subject to
social security contributions during the period 1982–2008. The paper also addresses potential
explanations for the observed patterns of occupational mobility and presents descriptive
evidence to assess the relevance of these explanations. Administrative data is generally
thought to be very reliable, which reduces concerns regarding the quality of the occupational
information. A further advantage of the data set used in this analysis is that it allows me
to observe intermittent spells of non-employment, and I can therefore analyze patterns of
occupational mobility in the context of more unstable career episodes marked by either
(long-term) unemployment or long-term absence of workers from the data set.
Furthermore, the existence of firm-internal labor markets suggests that workers’ occupa-
tional mobility behavior may differ in the firm-internal context. Indeed, those studies that
explicitly report results on within-firm occupational mobility tend to find that within-firm
occupational mobility rates are sizable, but are generally lower than across-firm occupa-
tional mobility rates (Groes et al. (2015); Moscarini and Thomsson (2007); Seibert (2007);
Zangelidis (2008)).1 Correspondingly, in a recent study on occupational mobility right
1For Denmark Groes et al. (2015) find that the average probability of an occupational switch is higher for
firm-switchers than for those who stay with the firm. Nevertheless, they report that within-firm occupational
mobility rates are of significant size. The authors’ main finding that the probability of occupational mobility
is u-shaped, and that occupational mobility is directional, applies to both types of mobility behavior. Also,
Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) note that in the US over the period 1994–2006 about 40% of occupational
switches occur while remaining with the current employer. Zangelidis (2008) reports that in Britain over
the period 1991–2001 about 55% of workers have at least once switched occupations across firms, while
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after graduation from apprenticeship based on German administrative data, Fitzenberger
et al. (2015) show that amongst graduates the share of firm-and-occupation switchers is
about twice as high as that of within-firm occupation switchers. Also, the causal wage
effects of occupational mobility are very heterogeneous across groups. On the one hand,
occupational switches within the training firm lead to large and persistent wage gains, and
thus reflect a form of career progression. On the other hand, across-firm occupation switches
at entry into the first job after graduation result in average wage losses. However, for those
firm-and-occupation switches that are directed towards relatively better paid occupations, the
wage effect is actually positive in the short run. Also, compared to pure firm switches there
is no additional wage decrease due to an occupational switch across firms. Furthermore,
Fitzenberger et al. (2015) show that the relation between occupational mobility and local
labor market characteristics differs across the two types of occupational mobility. Within-
firm occupational switches are related to push factors (e.g. high labor market tightness),
while across-firm occupational switches are also related to push factors (e.g. high local
unemployment rate). Overall, these findings corroborate the conjecture that across-firm and
within-firm occupational mobility behavior may be driven by different factors, and may
therefore exhibit different overall patterns.
Apart from the above-mentioned studies, to the best of my knowledge occupational swit-
ches within firms have so far received no explicit attention in the literature on occupational
mobility.2 Many studies that document patterns of occupational mobility either exclude
occupational mobility within firms from the analysis or they include it in an overall occupa-
tional mobility measure.3 This paper therefore further contributes to the literature on worker
mobility by investigating patterns of occupational mobility separately across firms and within
firms. Indeed, the analysis reveals strong differences between patterns of across-firm and
within-firm occupational mobility.
The main results on the patterns of across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility in
the West German labor market during the period 1982–2008 are as follows:
1. Across-firm occupational mobility in the West German labor market is high, with
nearly half of all moves across establishments being accompanied by a simultaneous
switch in the 3-digit occupation. On average, about one third of all across-firm
only about 51% have at least once switched occupations while staying with their employer. Interestingly, the
results provided at the 3-digit level in Lalé (2012) imply that in France on average over the period 1982–2009
occupational mobility within employers was higher than occupational mobility across employers – see Lalé
(2012) Table 2, p. 380.
2At the time this chapter of my doctoral thesis was last revised, I was supervising a Master thesis that was meant
to analyze occupational mobility across and within firms based on data from the German Socioeconomic
Panel. However, at the time of the last revision, the Master thesis was not yet available to me.
3For example, Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), Parrado et al. (2007), Kambourov and Manovskii (2008),
Bachmann and Burda (2007) and Isaoglu (2010a,b) use an overall measure of occupational mobility, which
contains occupational switches both across and within firms. Lalé (2012) uses an overall measure of
occupational mobility that includes occupational switches with the same employer at the 3-digit level (as
long as the job classification changes), but explicitly excludes within-firm occupation changes at the 1- and
2-digit levels of the analysis. Longhi and Brynin (2010) only consider across-employer occupational mobility
in the main part of their analysis.
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occupational switches occur across presumably large distances between four broad
occupational groups. Within-firm occupational mobility rates are lower than across-
firm mobility rates. On average, about 29% of all observed 3-digit occupational
switches happen within firms.
2. Across-firm occupational mobility rates have significantly increased over the period
1982–2008 and exhibit a pro-cyclical pattern. Within-firm occupational mobility rates
have significantly decreased over the observation period. They do not follow a clear
cyclical pattern.
3. About 52% of all across-firm occupational switches constitute a change towards a
generally better paid occupation. In the case of within-firm occupational switches the
share of upward switches is even a bit higher (about 55%).
4. Patterns of across-firm occupational mobility vary across demographic subgroups.
Most importantly, across-firm occupational mobility is decreasing in age. A thought
experiment holding the demographic composition of employment fixed at its 1982
structure suggests that demographic change, especially the aging of the workforce,
has worked against the positive trend in across-firm occupational mobility. In contrast
to this, patterns of within-firm occupational mobility are fairly homogeneous across
demographic subgroups. Correspondingly, no clear relationship between demographic
change and within-firm occupational mobility patterns emerges.
5. Both the occupational composition as well as the industry composition of employment
have changed since 1982 in a way that seems to have favored occupational mobility
across firms. An analysis of the relation between changes in the occupational compo-
sition of the workforce and within-firm occupational mobility yields no clear results.
However, the analysis suggests that the industry structure of employment has changed
in a way that has dampened within-firm occupational mobility rates.
6. Overall gross occupational mobility rates are much larger than net occupational
mobility rates, which suggests that in the West German labor market occupational
mobility is more related to worker-job-mismatch than to changes in occupation-specific
labor demand. In Western Germany net occupational mobility has not increased over
time, which suggests that the observed increase in across-firm occupational mobility
cannot be explained by increasing variation in occupation-specific labor demands over
time.
7. Differentiating between different types of career episodes reveals that there is a
positive relation between the incidence of unemployment and across-firm occupational
switches. Surprisingly, even in long-term unemployment episodes about 48% of across-
firm occupational switches are directed towards on average better paid occupations.
Within-firm occupational mobility rates are relatively higher in the case of episodes
marked by long-term absence from the data set. This could, for example, reflect cases
in which firms send their employees abroad for an extended period, or cases in which
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employees obtain extensive further vocational training. Across all types of career
episodes, more than half of all occupational switches within firms are directed toward
generally better paid occupations.
8. Patterns of across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility differ in many respects.
While many of the results on across-firm occupational mobility are in line with
what has been found for other countries, the documented patterns of within-firm
occupational mobility are novel to the extent that the phenomenon has received little
explicit attention in the literature so far.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data, the
sampling procedures and the quality of the occupational information. Section 3.3 describes
the empirical approach and contains the main results of the analysis. These are supplemented
by results on several potential explanations for the observed patterns of occupational mobility.
Section 3.4 concludes. The Appendix 5.2 contains additional tables and figures (Tables and
Figures starting with “A.”), as well as further information regarding the robustness of the
main results of the analysis.
3.2 Empirical Design and Data
3.2.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies
(SIAB) Scientific Use File (Regional file 7508) provided by the Research Data Center of the
German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). This
is an administrative data set based on social security records which contains a large random
sample of German employees and workers who worked at least once in a job subject to
social insurance contributions sometime during the period 1975–2008. The data set contains
the employment histories of about 1.5 million individuals, supplemented by data on their
benefits receipt. Employment spells include information on the worker’s current occupation
and daily wages.4 From the entirety of labor market biographies contained in the SIAB I
draw a sample of employment spells at the 30th of June of each year. I thereby construct a
worker-year panel that spans the period of 1981–2008.5 This allows me to compare each
worker’s employment status and occupation between the current and the previous job.
Furthermore, I classify the person-year observations in the data set into different types of
career episodes. Specifically, I perceive each person-year observation as marking the end of a
career episode that began after the most recent 30th of June on which a worker was registered
as being in employment. For each person-year observation I calculate the total number of
days that have passed since the most recent person-year observation (i.e. the most recent
4See Dorner et al. (2011) for further information on the SIAB SUF Regional file 7508.
5According to the SIAB Handbook the benefit receipt records up to 1980 are incomplete (Dorner et al. (2011),
p. 29), thus I discard all spells from the period 1975–1980 from the data set.
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employment spell on a 30th of June).6 This time gap has, by definition, a minimum length of
365 days, but it may also span several years. For the intermittent period (since the last 30th
of June spent in employment) leading up to the respective person-year observation I also
record the number of days spent in intermittent employment in a West German establishment,
or in unemployment (benefits receipt), as well as the number of days the respective worker
was temporarily missing from the data set (e.g. due to self-employment, further education,
working abroad, etc.). I also record the number of days spent in intermittent employment in
an East German establishment.
Table A.11 describes the different types of career episodes that I can identify based on
the obtained information. The majority of person-year observations in the data set mark
the end of a regular employment episode in West Germany with a length of one year and
no intermittent unemployment as well as no intermittent employment in an East German
establishment. Additionally, I can identify career episodes that are employment-dominated
with less than a total of 365 days spent in unemployment, as well as career episodes that are
dominated either by unemployment or by the worker’s disappearance form the data set. I
also classify a set of career episodes that involve intermittent employment in East German
establishments, which will be excluded from the main sample of analysis.
3.2.2 Sample
The analysis focuses on full- and part-time workers in West Germany during the period 1982–
2008.7 Specifically, the main sample includes all types of career episodes that do not contain
any intermittent employment in an East German establishment. This allows me to consider
occupational mobility rates during different phases of a worker’s labor market career, such
as, for example, in the context of an episode of intermittent extensive unemployment. As
mentioned above, the person-year panel is constructed in a way that a time gap between two
person-year observations may span several years. I exclude from the analysis the complete
career histories of all workers that contain at least one time gap longer than five years.8
The main sample contains both male and female prime-aged workers (20–60 years)
working in the private sector. The SIAB contains no information on officials, but it contains
information on workers employed in the public sector. However, the respective sectors are
difficult to identify due to the aggregation of industries at the 2-digit level, so I only exclude
those 2-digit industries that are most likely public.9 Overall, these sampling criteria leave me
6For this, I split all spells covering the 30th of June into two spells: one that ends on the 30th of June and one
that starts on the 1st of July.
7Appendix 5.2.1 provides selected results separately for full-time and part-time employment. The main results
of the analysis are largely robust to excluding part-time employment from the sample.
8This sampling rule still leaves me with about 99% of person-year-observations and about 87% of workers at
that step of sample reduction. It allows me to focus on a more homogeneous group of workers.
9I exclude the following 2-digit industries from the main sample: asylums, hospitals and education (“Heime,
Krankenhäuser, Erziehung”), (street) cleaning, associations and organizations (“(Straßen)Reinigung, Ver-
bände, Organisationen”), as well as public administration and social security (“Öffentliche Verwaltung,
Sozialversicherung”).
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with a main sample of about 6.387.000 person-year observations, which corresponds to the
careers of about 581.000 workers and an average number of about 235.000 observations per
year.
3.2.3 Measuring Occupational Mobility
In Germany, employers have to register all employees subject to social security contributions
with the social insurance agencies. The social insurance agencies also have to be notified
of subsequent changes in the employment status. The information reported to the social
insurance agencies also includes information on the worker’s occupation, which the employer
has to identify using a 3-digit occupational code in accordance with the 1988 “Classification
of Occupations. Systematic and Alphabetical Directory of Job Titles” published by the
Federal Employment Agency. Thus, for each worker contained in the data set I can observe
his occupational career as long as it took place in employment subject to social security
contributions.
Employment spells in the SIAB SUF contain occupational information in the form of
120 different 3-digit codes10, which correspond to 29 broader occupational categories at the
2-digit-level and 4 large occupational groups at the 1-digit-level, respectively. Table A.12
gives an overview of the occupational classifications used at the 1- and 2-digit levels. I
identify occupational mobility by comparing the occupational codes of the current and the
previous job. Furthermore, I can identify whether in his current job a worker is employed at
a different establishment than in his previous job. This allows me to differentiate between
occupational mobility across and occupational mobility within establishments.11
3.2.4 Quality of Occupational Information
A widespread concern in the study of occupational mobility is the extent of measurement
error. Most importantly, do changes in occupational codes truly reflect changes in the set of
tasks performed by a certain worker or are they just a result of imprecise coding?
Some scholars perceive changes in occupational codes that occur within the same firm
(with the same employer) as relatively unreliable (see e.g. Longhi and Brynin (2010), Lalé
(2012)). However, while most of the related studies on occupational mobility typically use
survey data, the SIAB is an administrative data set which is generally thought to be very
reliable. The occupational code is not the core component of the information reported by the
employer to the social insurance agencies, since it is not directly relevant to the calculation of
social security contributions and pension payments. Nevertheless employers are required to
10In the SIAB Scientific Use File the original 3-digit occupational codes have been aggregated into 120 3-digit
occupations for reasons of anonymization.
11In a slight abuse of notation, I use the terms “firm” and “establishment” interchangeably, although the SIAB
data actually only contains information at the establishment level. Thus, the SIAB allows me to identify
mobility across establishments, which need not always imply mobility across firms.
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fill in the respective forms diligently and truthfully. The employer has full information on the
kind of job his employee performs, and therefore miscoding of occupations is presumably
less likely than in the case of survey-based data collection. Furthermore, as long as a worker
stays with a certain employer, occupations are, in a sense, dependently coded12 and in the
SIAB miscoding should be especially unlikely for within-firm occupational mobility. Against
this background, in this paper I view changes in occupational codes that occur within an
establishment as valuable information and I do not discard within-firm occupational changes
as spurious. In the empirical analysis I differentiate between two kinds of occupational
mobility: within firms and across firms.
If anything, it is more plausible that occupational mobility could be under-reported within
firms. As Bachmann and Burda (2007), p. 6 point out, some occupational switches with
the same employer (those where only the occupational affiliation changes), only have to
be reported to the social insurance agencies as part of a mandatory notification at the end
of the year. As I compare the occupational information available on the 30th of June of
each year, this means that some of the within-firm occupational switches that occur within
the second half of the intermittent twelve months might not be captured by the within-firm
occupational mobility measure. However, as long as the respective workers do not reverse
the occupational change over the following few months, such unreported switches should
at least be captured by the within-firm occupational mobility measure in the subsequent
year. Another concern could be that measures of within-firm occupational mobility could be
affected by firm-specific singular events such as personnel turnover in the human resources
department of firms or the introduction of administration software used to digitize the
reporting process. There is indeed anecdotal evidence of such singular events that result in
spikes in occupational mobility rates within single firms. Unfortunately, the data used in this
study does not allow for the identification of firms (or firm-fixed effects), to correct for such
events. However, as long as these events are unsystematic, this should not affect the main
results of this study. This holds especially in light of the fact that I observe a decrease, not an
increase in within-firm occupational mobility rates over the period of observation.
To further assess the quality of the occupational information in the SIAB data, I check the
incidence of missings in the occupational code variable, and I check whether the share of
missing occupational information has changed over time. As Table A.13 shows, the average
share of missings in the occupation variable is about 1.68% for the raw data containing only
employment spells. When I draw the person-year-panel and then gradually apply sampling
rules, the share of missings decreases. If I apply the full set of sampling rules used for the
12Several studies on occupational mobility emphasize the advantages of dependently coded occupations relative
to independently coded ones. Both Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) and Parrado et al. (2007) are based on
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) covering the 1970s to 1990s. The main problem of the data lies
in a structural break in occupational coding procedures. Mobility rates are found to be lower when based on
retrospective coding in contrast to the original (independent) coding procedure. Moscarini and Thomsson
(2007) use monthly CPS data for 1979–2006. They rely on dependent coding and identification of atypical
career (mobility) patterns for dealing with the problem of measurement error. Using the French Labor Force
Survey Lalé (2012) also limits the analysis to workers with dependently coded occupations.
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main analysis, except those rules that are related to missings in the occupation variable, the
average share of missings in the occupation variable reduces to about 0.17%. Furthermore, as
Figure A.11 illustrates, the yearly share of missings in the occupation variable has increased
over the period 1982–2008. When I apply all sampling rules except those that are related to
missings in the occupation variable, I find lower shares of missing occupational information,
but the positive trend does not vanish.
A concern might be that the increase in the share of missing occupational information
may indicate that employers have over time become less careful with reporting their workers’
3-digit occupational code, so that additional to the increase in missing information also the
accuracy of the reported occupational codes has decreased over time. While I cannot test this
directly, it is reassuring that the main patterns of occupational mobility documented in the
paper pertain to the broad 1-digit-level as well as to the more detailed 2- and 3-digit levels.
Occupational changes at the 1-digit-level should be most robust to measurement error, since
they imply drastic changes in occupation, and coding errors should more likely pertain to the
occupational details than to the broad occupational category.
To alleviate the concern that the main results regarding trends in occupational mobility
could be related to the increasing share of missings in the occupation variable, in Section 3.3.3
I perform a set of robustness checks. These show that even if all missings in the occupation
variable (which translate into missings in the occupational mobility indicators) are imputed
as occupational changes (or, in contrast, as the occupation remaining stable), the main results
regarding the time trends in occupational mobility rates do not change qualitatively.
3.3 Occupational Mobility in the West German Labor
Market
In this section I present the main results on the patterns of occupational mobility in the
West German labor market for the period 1982–2008, including a set of robustness checks
regarding the increasing share of missings in the occupation variable. I also consider how my
results relate to other empirical studies both for Germany and internationally. I then continue
by discussing several potential explanations for the observed trends in occupational mobility,
and I provide descriptive results to assess the relevance of these potential explanations.
3.3.1 Empirical Approach
To assess the extent of occupational mobility in the West German labor market I estimate
yearly gross mobility rates separately for within- and across-firm occupational mobility using
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Specifically, I create two dummy indicators Iacrosst
and Iwithint that are equal to 1 if a person in a given year switched occupations compared to
her most recent person-year observation in the sample and at the same time left the previous
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establishment (across-firm occupational mobility) or stayed with the employer (within-firm
occupational mobility), respectively. I also create a dummy indicator I f irmswitchit that is
equal to 1 if a person switched firms compared to the most recent person-year observation,
irrespective of whether an occupational change occurred simultaneously.
To obtain yearly mobility rates I then separately regress each dummy indicator on a full
set of year dummies (without a constant):
Iacrossit = β0 · year1982 + ...+β27 · year2008 + uit
Iwithinit = β0 · year1982 + ...+β27 · year2008 + uit
I f irmswitchit = β0 · year1982 + ...+β27 · year2008 + uit
Thus, each estimated coefficient can be interpreted as a yearly mobility rate that gives the
share of workers in overall employment in a given year who were mobile along the defined
dimensions relative to their most recent person-year observation. To obtain detailed mobility
rates for subgroups, e.g. by gender or education, I interact the respective sets of dummy
indicators with the year dummies in the OLS regressions. Furthermore, to obtain trends in
the time series of occupational mobility rates, I regress the time series of log-occupational
mobility rates on a constant and a linear trend variable.
Note that if a person-year observation cannot be used for the analysis due to the sampling
rules, the subsequent person-year observation is also not contained in the final sample on
which the estimations are performed. That is, if a person-year observation in t-2 had to be
excluded from the analysis (e.g. due to a missing in the occupation variable, employment
in the public sector, etc.), the next observation in t-1 also has to be excluded from the
analysis. Or phrased differently, a person has to be observed for at least one period after an
observation had to be removed from the sample, before it (re-)enters the sample. However,
the information in t-1 can still be used to code the mobility indicators in t. That is, the
dummy indicators are actually coded before the sampling rules are applied to minimize the
overall number of missings in the occupational mobility variables.
To assess whether West German workers tend to move towards better or worse paid
occupations, I estimate occupation-year-specific average wages by running OLS regressions
on a sample of West German full-time workers for the period 1982–2008. Separately for each
of the 120 3-digit occupations, I regress workers’ real wages on a full set of year dummies
(no constant included). The coefficients on the year-dummies reflect the average wages
by occupation in the respective year. Within each year I then rank all 3-digit occupations
ordinally according to their average wage from lowest (rank 1) to highest (rank 120). I
differentiate between upward and downward occupational switches by checking whether the
rank of the new 3-digit occupation in the current period is above or below the rank of the
original occupation in the previous period. This approach to comparing occupational ranks
over time leaves me with a small number of observations where no change in the ordinal rank
occurs. Specifically, 0.86% of across-firm occupational switches and 0.83% of within-firm
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Figure 3.1: Occupational Mobility over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
occupational switches cannot be classified as either upward or downward, but are in a sense
“flat”. Because these shares are very low and very similar for the two different types of
occupational mobility, I omit them from the figures and from the discussion in the results
section.
3.3.2 Main Results
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of estimated occupational mobility rates within and across
firms in West Germany. Table 3.1, Panel A, p. 46 reports average mobility rates across the
period 1982–2008. At the 3-digit level across-firm occupational mobility rates rose from
about 3.2% in 1982 to about 7% in 2008, with an average of about 5.6%. At the 2- and
1-digit levels the respective averages are about 4.4% and 1.9%. So about one third of all
across-firm occupational switches occur across presumably large distances between four
broad occupational groups. As Figure A.12 shows, overall mobility across establishments
(irrespective of occupational changes) has also increased from about 7.3% in 1982 to about
13.8% in 2008 with an average rate of 11.8%. Thus, on average nearly half of all switches
across establishments (47%) are accompanied by a switch in the 3-digit occupation.
Turning to occupational mobility within firms, Figure 3.1 provides a very different picture.
At the 3-digit level within-firm occupational mobility rates have decreased from about 3.4%
in 1982 to about 1.3% in 2008, with an average of about 2.2%. At the 2- and 1-digit levels the
respective averages are about 1.6% and about 0.7%, respectively. That is, a bit less than one
third of all within-firm occupational switches occur across four broad occupational groups.
Even if one adds up across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility rates to make the
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Table 3.1: Average Yearly Mobility Rates (%) over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
occupational mobility mobility across firms net occupational mobility
across firms within firms
A. Main analysis
1-digit 1.90 0.68 0.46
2-digit 4.36 1.61 0.77
3-digit 5.55 2.23 1.15
11.75
B. Hypothetical mobility rates: demographic change (base = 1982)
1-digit 1.97 0.69
2-digit 4.42 1.64
3-digit 5.53 2.24
11.56
C. Hypothetical mobility rates: occupational composition (base = 1982)
1-digit 1.84 0.68
2-digit 4.25 1.63
3-digit 5.42 2.24
11.42
D. Hypothetical mobility rates: industry composition (base = 1982)
1-digit 1.82 0.71
2-digit 4.17 1.66
3-digit 5.29 2.27
11.20
results more comparable to the measure of overall occupational mobility employed in other
studies, it is apparent that the rates of occupational mobility in West Germany reported above
are much lower than what has been found by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) for the US,
and also lower than what Longhi and Brynin (2010) report for Britain. It seems that the
magnitude of occupational mobility rates in West Germany is more similar to what has been
found by Lalé (2012) for France. For West Germany, Bachmann and Burda (2007), Longhi
and Brynin (2010), and Isaoglu (2010a,b) tend to find lower rates of overall occupational
mobility than this study does, but compared to the results on the US and Britain, the results
on West Germany are all in the same range of magnitude. However, one has to keep in
mind, that a comparison of the extent of occupational mobility across studies, and even
more so across countries, is inherently difficult, since these studies differ with respect to the
underlying institutional framework, the data generating process, the sampling restrictions,
the nature of the occupational classification used in the analysis, and the construction of the
occupational mobility variables.
Inspection of Figure 3.1 indicates that while across-firm and within-firm occupational
mobility rates were at similar levels in 1982, they have evolved contrarily over the subsequent
27-year period. Table 3.2, Panel A shows the linear trends in log mobility rates. I find a
statistically significant positive time trend for across-firm occupational mobility rates, while
rates of occupational mobility within firms have statistically significantly decreased over
time. At the 3-digit level the across-firm occupational mobility rate has increased by an
average 1.7% per year, with even slightly larger average growth at the 1- and 2-digit levels.
During the same period, at the 3-digit level the within-firm occupational mobility rate has
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Table 3.2: Trends in Log Mobility Rates over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
occupational mobility mobility across firms
across firms within firms
A. Main analysis
1-digit 0.0222*** -0.0233***
2-digit 0.0189*** -0.0246***
3-digit 0.0170*** -0.0276***
0.0180***
B. Hypothetical mobility rates: demographic change (base = 1982)
1-digit 0.0292*** -0.0224***
2-digit 0.0246*** -0.0232***
3-digit 0.0215*** -0.0268***
0.0207***
C. Hypothetical mobility rates: occupational composition (base = 1982)
1-digit 0.0186*** -0.0246***
2-digit 0.0159*** -0.0246***
3-digit 0.0144*** -0.0273***
0.0155***
D. Hypothetical mobility rates: industry composition (base = 1982)
1-digit 0.0180*** -0.0205***
2-digit 0.0144*** -0.0223***
3-digit 0.0123*** -0.0258***
0.0137***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of log(yearly mobility rates). Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated
coefficients need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
decreased by an average 2.8% per year. Here, the decrease is a bit less pronounced at the
1- and 2-digit levels. All trend estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. In
addition, Table A.14, Panel B shows the trend estimates in the case of an alternative quadratic
trend specification, while for ease of comparison Panel A repeats the linear trend estimates
from Table 3.2, Panel A. While the quadratic term is statistically insignificant in the trend
regressions for within-firm occupational mobility, it is small but statistically significant in
the case of across-firm occupational mobility. While in these regressions the linear term is
even more pronounced, it appears that the increase in across-firm occupational mobility has
slowed down a bit over time. This also holds for the results on pure job-to-job mobility. Most
importantly however, the main results of an increase in across-firm occupational mobility and
a decrease in within-firm occupational mobility are robust to these alternative specifications.
As shown in Appendix 5.2.1, these main results also hold if we exclude part-time workers
from the analysis as a further robustness check. An increase in overall occupational mobility
(comprising across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility) has also been found for the
US (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008); Parrado et al. (2007); Moscarini and Thomsson
(2007)) and – once the author corrects for the dampening influence of the aging of the French
workforce – also by Lalé (2012) for France. Isaoglu (2010a,b) observes no trend in overall
occupational mobility over the period 1984–2004 in West Germany based on data from the
German Socioeconomic Panel, but also provides no trend estimation results. Bachmann
and Burda (2007), p. 15 state that they observe no long-run trend in overall occupational
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mobility over the period 1980–2000, but inspection of Figure A.4 in Bachmann and Burda
(2007), p. 31 actually suggests that the fraction of employment-to-employment transitions
that involved a 3-digit occupational switch has risen since the early 1980s.
While a detailed analysis of the cyclicality of occupational mobility rates in the West
German labor market is beyond the scope of this paper, Figure 3.1 gives an impression
of the cyclical pattern of across-firm occupational mobility rates. For a basic assessment,
Figure A.13 plots the 3-digit across-firm occupational mobility rate as well as GDP growth.
Graphical inspection suggests that across-firm occupational mobility is pro-cyclical (with a
lag of about one year). Pro-cyclical patterns of an overall measure of occupational mobility
have been documented for the US by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Moscarini and
Thomsson (2007), and by Moscarini and Vella (2008), for France by Lalé (2012), as well
as for West Germany by Isaoglu (2010a,b).13 Also for West Germany, Bachmann and
Burda (2007) observe that gross overall occupational mobility involving an employment-to-
employment transition is pro-cyclical. As Figure A.14 shows, overall firm-to-firm mobility
also appears to be pro-cyclical. Meanwhile, according to Figure A.15 the 3-digit within-firm
occupational mobility rate shows no clear cyclical pattern.
From a theoretical point of view the individual wage effects of occupational mobility
are ambiguous, and empirical studies have found contrasting empirical evidence for both
positive and negative wage effects of occupational mobility, suggesting that the wage effect of
occupational mobility depends on the context of the mobility decision. The focus of this paper
is to provide an overview of patterns of occupational mobility in West Germany, and I do not
estimate the causal wage effects of occupational mobility. Still, the following descriptive
analysis may provide us with an impression of the typical direction of occupational switches.
As described in section 3.3.2, I rank occupations according to their average wages, and then
differentiate between upward- and downward mobility accordingly.
On average over the period 1982–2008 about 52.3% of across-firm occupation changers
move towards a higher ranked occupation, while within firms about 55% are upward changes.
The result that a large proportion of occupational switches is directed towards relatively
better paid occupations fits well with Longhi and Brynin (2010)’s finding that in Germany
occupational mobility across employers is associated with an increase in wage growth and
job satisfaction. In another study based on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel
Nisic and Trübswetter (2012) report that about 52% of 2-digit occupational switches over
the period 1994–2008 are voluntary (e.g. having been promoted, having switched jobs out of
own accord, etc.), and that the respective occupational switches are associated with average
wage gains. Interestingly, the share of voluntary occupational switches documented in Nisic
and Trübswetter (2012) is quite similar in magnitude to the shares of upward occupational
mobility reported above. Furthermore, a similar pattern emerges for Denmark, where
Groes et al. (2015) show that both within and across firms a relatively higher proportion of
13While Lalé (2012) uses an overall measure of occupational mobility, the author reports that the cyclical pattern
of occupational mobility is mostly driven by occupational mobility across employers.
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Figure 3.2: Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level and Shares of Upward Mobility
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Occupational mobility at 3-digit level in West Germany
occupational switches are directed towards on average better paid occupations.14
Figure 3.2 shows the development of the share of upward moves in across-firm occupa-
tional mobility as well as the share of upward moves in within-firm occupational mobility
over the observation period. In the case of across-firm occupational mobility the share of
upward moves follows a roughly pro-cyclical pattern. As discussed above, the within-firm
mobility rate shows no cyclical pattern. However, the share of upward moves in within-firm
occupational mobility exhibits a roughly pro-cyclical pattern. Figure 3.2 thus suggests that
during economic upswings workers are, on average, more likely to move towards better paid
occupations. This observation pertains both to the West German labor market as well as to
the internal labor markets of West German establishments.
3.3.3 Robustness of Trend Estimates
In this section I present robustness checks to alleviate the concern that the main results
regarding trends in occupational mobility could be related to the increasing share of missings
in the occupation variable. When I draw the person-year-panel and then apply the full set of
sampling rules used for the main analysis, except those rules that are related to missings in the
occupation variable, the average yearly share of missings in the occupation variable is about
0.17%. These missings in the occupation variable translate into missings in the occupational
mobility indicators, since every time a missing in the occupation variable occurs, the mobility
indicators in the respective, as well as in the subsequent period, cannot be computed.
As a robustness check, I create two benchmark scenarios for 3-digit occupational mobility.
14Compare the fractions of firm stayers and firm switchers moving upward or downward, respectively, in Groes
et al. (2015), Table A2.
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Table 3.3: Robustness Check: Average Mobility Rates and Trends in Log Mobility Rates
at the 3-digit Level over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany when Making
Different Assumptions on the Meaning of Missings in the Occupation Variable
occupational mobility
across firms within firms
A. Main results: Missings excluded
average rate 5.55 2.23
time trend 0.0170 *** -0.0276 ***
B. Upper benchmark: Missings counted as mobility
average rate 5.62 2.38
time trend 0.0183 *** - 0.0192 ***
C. Lower benchmark: Missings NOT counted as mobility
average rate 5.53 2.22
time trend 0.0167 *** -0.0278 ***
Trend estimates: Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions
performed on time series of log(yearly mobility rates) for the person-year panel with full set of sampling rules
(except in Panels B and C sampling rules related to missing in the occupation variable not applied). Statistical
significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01.
For the upper benchmark I impute all missings in the occupational mobility indicators as
mobility (i.e. setting the indicator to “1”). The imputation also takes account of whether
a change of establishment occurred at the same time. That is, if the occupational mobility
indicators contain a missing, and the firm-to-firm mobility indicator indicates a firm switch,
I recode the across-firm mobility indicator to “1”, and at the same time set the within-firm
occupational mobility indicator to “0”. Furthermore, I create a lower benchmark case where
all missings in both occupational mobility indicators are imputed as zero mobility. I then
compute yearly occupational mobility rates both for the upper benchmark case and the lower
benchmark case, which I plot in Figures A.16 and A.17. Finally, I estimate the linear time
trends of these time series.
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results and allows us to compare the two benchmark
scenarios to the main results presented in Section 3.3.2. The main results are based on a
sample from which cases with missing occupational codes and missings in the occupational
mobility indicators have been excluded. According to Table 3.3, Panel B, if the missings
in the mobility indicators would be interpreted as actual cases of occupational mobility,
the linear trend in across-firm occupational mobility would be more pronounced, while the
decline in within-firm occupational mobility would be smaller. In contrast, if we interpret all
missings in the occupation variable as if no occupational mobility had occurred, the trend
coefficients change only slightly relative to the main results presented in Panel A. Most
importantly, the results in Table 3.3 illustrate that the main insights gained from the linear
trend estimations are qualitatively robust to this imputation experiment at the 3-digit level.
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3.3.4 Demographics and Occupational Mobility
The results presented in Section 3.3.2 show that in the West German labor market occu-
pational mobility rates across firms have significantly increased since the beginning of the
1980s, while within-firm occupational mobility rates have significantly decreased over the
same period. In the following I show how these patterns translate to certain subgroups of
the workforce, and I show how the observed patterns of occupational mobility are related to
changes in the demographic structure of employment. Indeed, other studies on occupational
mobility for the US and France indicate that the demographic change which has occurred
in Western economies over the past decades seems to have dampened the evolution of
occupational mobility rates (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Lalé (2012)).
Demographic Subgroups
In the following I plot occupational mobility rates for certain subgroups of West German
workers. These results are supplemented by Table A.15 which shows average yearly occupa-
tional mobility rates by demographic subgroup, as well as by Tables A.16–A.18 which show
the respective trend estimates at the 3-digit level.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4, p. 52 show the evolution of 3-digit-level occupational mobility
rates by the highest educational degree obtained. Across firms low-skilled workers have
been less occupationally mobile at the beginning of the observation period, but the gap
relative to medium- and high-skilled workers has closed over time. Interestingly, medium-
and high-skilled workers exhibit very similar patterns of across-firm occupational mobility
until the spike for high-skilled workers occurs around the year 2000. For a measure of
overall occupational mobility Isaoglu (2010a) also finds that higher educational attainment
is associated with higher rates of occupational mobility in West Germany. In the case of
within-firm occupational mobility the picture is less clear. Except for a few spikes in the
within-firm occupational mobility rate of high-skilled workers the patterns for all three
education groups are very similar (and not statistically different from each other).
Figures A.18 and A.19 show occupational mobility rates at the 3-digit-level for gender-
education-cells. In the case of across-firm occupational mobility male and female workers
show quite similar dynamic patterns of occupational mobility. Highly educated female
workers show a bit higher occupational mobility rates than their male counterparts – while
the opposite holds for low- and medium-skilled female workers. Figure A.19 shows that
within firms low- and medium-skilled female workers tend to be less likely to change their
occupation relative to male workers. Both genders show parallel decreasing trends in time,
though. Isaoglu (2010a) finds that in West Germany overall occupational mobility rates are a
bit higher for female workers once non-employment-to-employment transitions are also taken
into account, but the study unfortunately does not provide results for gender-education-cells.
In contrast to this, Bachmann and Burda (2007) report that overall occupational mobility in
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Figure 3.3: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree
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in West Germany
Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Figure 3.4: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree
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West Germany is a bit lower among female workers relative to male workers.
Figures A.20 and A.21 show occupational mobility rates at the 3-digit-level for age-
education-cells. According to Figure A.20 the across-firm occupational mobility is decreasing
in age. This negative relationship has also been documented for a measure of overall
occupational mobility by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Parrado et al. (2007), Bachmann
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and Burda (2007), Isaoglu (2010a,b) and Lalé (2012). Interestingly, Figure A.21 reveals
almost no difference in within-firm occupational mobility across age groups.
The described differences in the patterns of occupational mobility across demographic
subgroups of workers are consistent with the average yearly occupational mobility rates
at the detailed level of gender-education-age-group cells provided in Table A.15 as well
as the trend estimates provided at the 3-digit level in Tables A.16 and A.17. While the
trend estimates vary across subgroups, the main result of a statistically significant increase
in across-firm occupational mobility and a statistically significant decrease in within-firm
occupational mobility during the period 1982–2008 holds across all demographic subgroups
of workers (with the trends in across-firm occupational mobility in the relatively small group
of female workers aged 55–60 being the exception). Also, as Table A.18 shows, firm-to-firm
mobility has statistically significantly increased over time in all subgroups.
Inspection of Figures A.18-A.21 reveals that within-firm mobility patterns appear to be
much more homogeneous across subgroups than in the case of across-firm occupational
mobility. This difference between within- and across-firm occupational mobility suggests
that different factors drive the occupational mobility behavior of workers depending on
whether the occupational switch takes place within the current establishment or not.
Demographic Composition
I continue the analysis of the relationship between the demographic structure of employment
and patterns of occupational mobility in the West German labor market by turning to the role
of demographic change. Holding the demographic structure of employment fixed at its 1980
values, Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) find that without demographic change the increase
in occupational mobility would ceteris paribus have been even more pronounced in the US.
For France Lalé (2012) finds a positive trend in across-firm occupational mobility only once
he corrects for the demographic change that occurred since the 1980s. The author shows
that occupational mobility is decreasing in age, and identifies the natural aging of the French
workforce as the main driver of demographic composition effects. Following Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008) and Lalé (2012) I pose a similar question for Germany: What if the
demographic composition of employment had remained constant since the year 1982?
Table 3.4, p. 54 illustrates how the demographic composition of the main sample has
changed over the period 1982–2008 with respect to age, gender as well as the educational
achievements of the workforce. The share of female workers has increased by about 12%
since 1982. While over the period of observation the average age of the workers in the
sample has not changed much, the share of young workers has decreased and the share of
middle-aged workers has increased. Table 3.4 also shows the educational upgrading that has
taken place since 1982.
For each gender-education-age-group cell I calculate its yearly weight as the share of the
respective worker group in overall employment. I then calculate hypothetical mobility rates
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Table 3.4: Demographic Composition of Employment over the Period 1982–2008 in West
Germany (Shares in %)
1982 1980s 1990s 2000s
female 29.72 30.51 32.87 33.29
age group
20–24 8.93 9.81 6.70 4.77
25–34 24.58 26.03 30.60 24.90
35–44 29.22 25.82 27.60 33.42
45–54 27.20 28.50 24.43 27.37
55–60 10.07 9.84 10.68 9.55
mean age (years) 40.09 39.72 39.63 40.66
highest educational degree
no degree/high school only 22.05 18.03 12.79 10.04
vocational training 73.41 76.60 79.91 79.17
technical college/university 4.54 5.37 7.30 10.79
Descriptive statistics are calculated as averages over the respective years mentioned in column title (exception:
1980s based on years 1983–1989 only).
as a weighted average of cell-specific mobility rates using the demographic shares of the
gender-education-age-group cells in 1982 as weights. Based on the hypothetical mobility
rates (base = 1982), I calculate average yearly mobility rates and I estimate the linear trends
in hypothetical occupational mobility rates. For further illustration I follow Lalé (2012) in
calculating indices which allow me to visualize the differences between the hypothetical
mobility rates that are based on the year 1982’s demographic structure and the actual mobility
rates:
Imrt =
mractualt −mrbase=1982t
mractualt
with mr indicating the respective occupational mobility rate. Based on these indices Fig-
ures 3.5-3.6 illustrate the ceteris paribus relationship between changes in the demographic
composition and occupational mobility rates.15
According to Table 3.1, Panel B the hypothetical average yearly mobility rates over the
period 1982–2008 are very similar to the actual ones. As Table 3.2, Panel B shows, this
also holds for the hypothetical linear trend estimates in the case of within-firm occupational
mobility. However, the hypothetical linear trends are more pronounced than the actual ones
in the case of across-firm occupational mobility.
Figure 3.5 suggests that by 2008 the 3-digit across-firm occupational mobility rate would
have been about 8% higher if the overall demographic structure had not changed since
1982. Considering indices that are calculated separately for changes in the age (gender,
education) composition, it appears that the gender composition has been neutral in this
overall development. The change in the educational composition has actually been favorable
to across-firm occupational mobility for most of the period, while since the late 1990s the
15It makes little difference whether I choose the year 1982 or the 1980s as base period, and the conclusions do
not change qualitatively if I use the 1990s or 2000s as an alternative base period.
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Figure 3.5: Demographic Composition and Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit
Level
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Figure 3.6: Demographic Composition and Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit
Level
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change in the age structure of employment seems to have dampened across-firm occupational
mobility. According to Figure 3.5, across-firm occupational mobility would have been
about 10% higher in 2008 had the aging of the workforce not taken place since the 1970s.
Considering across-firm occupational mobility at the 1-digit and 2-digit levels, the results are
even more pronounced. By 2008 the 1-digit (2-digit) across-firm occupational mobility rate
would have been about 15% (13%) higher if the overall demographic structure of employment
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had not changed since 1982.
Regarding the relation between demographic change and 3-digit within-firm occupational
mobility the picture provided by Figure 3.6 is not clear, since the indices are very volatile.
It seems that within firms changes in the gender composition have not been neutral in the
overall development, but are rather related to a dampening of occupational mobility. Changes
in the age structure seem to have been partly favorable for within-firm occupational mobility.
If I consider 1-digit and 2-digit within-firm occupational mobility, the results are similar. The
fact that no clear picture emerges for the composite index is consistent with the result that
patterns of within-firm occupational mobility are very homogeneous across demographic
subgroups. Again, this suggests that occupational mobility behavior is driven by different
factors depending on whether it takes place within the firm or across firms.
Overall, the results on the relation between the demographic composition of employment
and occupational mobility in the German labor market suggest that the observed trends
in occupational mobility rates since the beginning of the 1980s have not been driven by
demographic change – especially in the case of across-firm occupational mobility.
3.3.5 Changes in Occupational and Industry Structure
Apart from demographic change the composition of West German employment could also
have changed along other dimensions which could be associated with the observed trends in
occupational mobility rates. Both the occupational composition and the industry composition
of employment could have changed since the beginning of the 1980s in ways that favor
(or dampen) occupational mobility. For example, Seibert (2007) finds that in Germany
occupational mobility rates at first labor market entry after graduation from apprenticeship
vary by training occupation. He also reports that training-occupation-specific occupational
mobility rates have changed over time, with occupational mobility out of some training
occupations increasing, and out of others decreasing over the period 1977–2004. Furthermore,
Bachmann and Burda (2007) argue that sectoral and occupational turbulence as measured by
Lilien indices increased in the mid 1990s in West Germany. They also report that on average
over the period 1976–2000 more than half of all sectoral switches were accompanied by an
occupational switch at the 3-digit level. In the remainder of this section, I therefore explore
the relation between the occupation/industry composition of employment and patterns of
occupational mobility.
To analyze the relationship between occupational mobility and the occupation structure of
employment, as well as the industry structure of employment, I conduct a thought experiment
similar to the one described in Section 3.3.4 for the case of demographic change. That is, I
keep the occupational (industry) composition of employment fixed to the base period 1982
and then construct hypothetical mobility rates which reflect how occupational mobility rates
had evolved ceteris paribus had the composition of employment remained constant since
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Figure 3.7: Occupational/Industry Composition and Across-firm Occupational Mobility at
the 3-digit Level
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the year 1982.16 Again, I calculate average yearly mobility rates and I estimate the linear
trends in hypothetical occupational mobility rates. I also calculate indices which allow me to
visualize the differences between the hypothetical mobility rates that are based on the year
1982’s occupation (industry) employment structure and the actual mobility rates.
Regarding the occupational composition of employment, according to Table 3.1, Panel
C the hypothetical average yearly mobility rates over the period 1982–2008 are lower than
the actual ones in case of across-firm occupational mobility, but rather similar in the case
of within-firm occupational mobility. As Table 3.2, Panel C shows, this also holds for the
hypothetical linear trend estimates in the case of across-firm occupational mobility. Within
firms the hypothetical negative linear trends are more pronounced than the actual ones at the
1-digit level, but less pronounced at the 3-digit level.
Figure 3.7 suggests that by 2008 the 3-digit across-firm occupational mobility rate would
have been about 5% lower had the occupational structure of employment not changed since
1982. At the 1-digit (2-digit) level the hypothetical gap in 2008 is even higher with 8%
(7%). This suggests that since the beginning of the 1980s the occupational composition of
employment in the West German labor market has changed in a way that favors across-firm
occupational mobility.
Turning to within-firm occupational mobility the picture provided in Figure 3.8, p. 58 is,
as in Section 3.3.4, less clear, since the index is again very volatile. By 2008 the 3-digit
within-firm occupational mobility rate would have been about 2% higher had the occupational
16Again, it makes little difference whether I choose the year 1982 or the 1980s as base period. Also, the main
conclusions do not change qualitatively if I use the 1990s or 2000s as an alternative base period.
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Figure 3.8: Occupational/Industry Composition and Within-firm Occupational Mobility at
the 3-digit Level
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structure of employment not changed since 1982, but the index actually remains below zero
for most of the period leading up to 2008. The results are similarly inconclusive at the 1-digit
and 2-digit level.
Interestingly, I obtain a much clearer picture for the relation between changes in the
industry composition of employment and occupational mobility rates. As Table 3.1, Panel D
shows the hypothetical average yearly mobility rates over the period 1982–2008 are lower
than the actual ones in case of across-firm occupational mobility, but they are higher than the
actual ones in the case of within-firm occupational mobility. Also Table 3.2, Panel D shows
that the hypothetical linear trend estimates are less pronounced than the actual ones both in
the case of across-firm as well as in the case of within-firm occupational mobility.
Accordingly, Figure 3.7 suggests that by 2008 the 3-digit across-firm occupational mobility
rate would have been about 10% lower had the industry structure of employment not changed
since 1982. I obtain similar results for the 1-digit and 2-digit levels. In contrast to this, Figure
3.8 suggests that by 2008 the 3-digit within-firm occupational mobility rate would have been
about 2% higher had the industry structure of employment not changed since 1982. The gap
is even larger for most of the period since the mid 1990s, and it is also larger at the 1-digit
and 2-digit levels (4% and 3% in 2008, respectively). This suggests that since the beginning
of the 1980s the industry composition of employment in the West German labor market has
changed in a way that has favored across-firm occupational mobility, but at the same time
has dampened within-firm occupational mobility.
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Figure 3.9: Gross and Net Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level
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3.3.6 Net Occupational Mobility
The main results described in Section 3.3.2 of this paper are based on gross occupational
mobility rates. In addition to this, we can also gain insights into the factors driving the
patterns of occupational mobility by considering net flows of workers across occupations.
To assess the extent of variation in the employment shares of occupations at the 3-digit
level, I calculate a yearly measure of net occupational mobility following Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008):
net mobilityt =
1
2 ∑m |sm,t − sm,t−1|
with sm,t being the share of employment in 3-digit occupation m in overall employment in
year t. This measure reflects the extent of changes in the relative size of occupations.
According to Table 3.1, Panel A the average net occupational mobility rate over the
period 1982–2008 was about 1.2% at the 3-digit level. Figure 3.9 shows the development
of both overall gross and net occupational mobility at the 3-digit level. The extent of net
occupational mobility has been rather stable over the period 1982–2008. A trend regression
for log net occupational mobility at the 3-digit level yields a very small positive (0.0052),
but statistically insignificant linear trend estimate. The trend regressions at the 1-digit and
2-digit level also yield small statistically insignificant estimates. Additionally, Figure A.22
shows that net occupational mobility exhibits a cyclical pattern at all digit levels.
As Figure 3.9 shows, the overall gross occupational mobility rate (the sum of across-
firm and within-firm occupational mobility rates) is much higher than the net occupational
mobility rate. That is, we observe a lot of mobility across occupation cells, and these
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flows can at best be only partially attributed to average changes in the relative employment
shares of occupations over time. Similar observations have been made by Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008) for the US, by Lalé (2012) for France, and by Isaoglu (2010b) for West
Germany. According to Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990)’s reasoning regarding worker mobility
across industries, and according to what Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) summarize in the
context of occupational mobility, such a ratio of gross and net occupational mobility suggests
that the occupational mobility which we observe rather stems from the worker-occupation
matching process than from shifts in occupation-specific labor demand. The results on net
occupational mobility found in the above-mentioned studies imply that so-called “churning”
(the difference between gross and net occupational mobility) amounts to about 40% of gross
occupational mobility at the 3-digit level in the US17, and to about two thirds in France
(see Lalé (2012)). For Western Germany, based on data from the German Socioeconomic
Panel, Isaoglu (2010b) reports that annual gross occupational mobility at the 4-digit level
averages about 5%, while net occupational mobility averages about 2.7% over the period
1984–2004. The results in Isaoglu (2010b) imply that churning amounts to about 46%
of gross occupational mobility.18 Based on IAB administrative data, I find an even more
pronounced result. At the 3-digit level occupational churning (at a rate of 6.6%) corresponds
to about 85% of overall gross occupational mobility.
The view that in the West German labor market occupational mobility could be a result of
worker-occupation-mismatch is also in line with Longhi and Brynin (2010)’s finding that
in West Germany the probability of an occupational switch across employers is positively
related to workers being either over- or under-qualified for the current job. Interestingly, since
in Western Germany net occupational mobility has not increased over time, this suggests
that the observed increase in across-firm occupational mobility cannot be explained by
increasing variation in occupation-specific labor demands over time. This contrasts with
what Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) conclude for the US.
3.3.7 Occupational Mobility and Unemployment
The literature on occupational mobility stresses the relevance of the labor market context
in which the occupational switch occurs. Some authors differentiate between voluntary
switches, which are interpreted as a way to improve the worker-job-match, or a form of career
progression, and involuntary switches due to a worker being (or becoming) unemployed
(see e.g Longhi and Brynin (2010), Nisic and Trübswetter (2012)). Given the pro-cyclical
pattern of across-firm occupational mobility described in Section 3.3.2, it appears plausible
that at least the patterns of across-firm occupational mobility in the West German labor
market should be related to the incidence of unemployment. Furthermore, the findings in
17For Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) I calculate the respective share based on the gross and net occupational
mobility rates reported in the paper.
18Isaoglu (2010b), p. 11 states that churning “accounts for about one quarter of the total reallocation.” However,
given the average numbers on gross and net occupational mobility cited above, I do not understand how the
author arrives at this result.
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Table 3.5: Average Yearly Mobility Rates (%) by Type of Career Episode and Average Share
of Career Episodes in Main Sample (%) over the Period 1982–2008 in West
Germany
occupational mobility mobility across firms share in sample
across firms within firms
A. Employment in West Germany without interm. unemployment
1-digit 1.02 0.68
2-digit 2.43 1.61
3-digit 3.20 2.22
8.36 93.76
B. Employment in West Germany with interm. unemployment
1-digit 13.65 0.47
2-digit 31.51 1.13
3-digit 39.42 1.61
63.35 3.91
C. Intermittent days in unemployment >= 365 days
1-digit 28.07 0.84
2-digit 57.83 1.50
3-digit 69.06 1.97
91.47 0.62
D. Intermittent days missing from data set >= 365 days
1-digit 14.36 1.23
2-digit 29.69 3.08
3-digit 35.35 4.15
52.43 1.80
Bachmann and Burda (2007) and Isaoglu (2010a) show that labor market episodes that
involve unemployment, and even more so unemployment-to-employment transitions involve
relatively higher rates of overall occupational mobility. In this section, I therefore explore the
relation between the incidence of unemployment during career episodes and the associated
patterns of occupational mobility.
As described in Section 3.2.1, I can identify different types of career episodes that may
occur throughout a worker’s career. As shown in Table 3.5 the main sample contains four
types of career episodes:
• About 93.8% of person-year observations in the sample mark the end of a regular
employment episode in West Germany with a length of typically one year and no
intermittent unemployment (and less than one year of absence from the data set).
• Additionally, I identify career episodes that are employment-dominated with less than a
total of 365 days spent in unemployment, which I refer to as short-term unemployment
episodes. These constitute about 3.9% of person-year observations in the sample.
• The sample also contains career episodes that are dominated either by unemployment
of a total length of more than 365 days (long-term unemployment episodes), or by the
workers absence from the data set for a total of more than 365 days (long-term missing
episodes). About 0.6% of person-year observations mark the end of a long-term
unemployment episode, while about 1.8% of person-year observations mark the end of
a long-term missing episode.
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Figure 3.10: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Type of Career
Episode
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Remember that the main sample contains only career episodes without any intermittent
employment in an East German establishment. Note also, that employment episodes typically
have a length of one year (about 97% of employment episodes), and an average length of
1.03 years. About 66% of short-term unemployment episodes have a length of one year, and
the average length of this type of career episode is 1.4 years. The other two types of career
episodes can have a length of two to five years.19 Long-term unemployment episodes have an
average length of 3.20 years, whereas long-term missing episodes haven an average length
of 2.96 years.
While the composition of the main sample is dominated by the large share of employment
episodes, Table 3.5 reveals the heterogeneity of average occupational mobility rates across
different types of career episodes. Most importantly, as Figure 3.10 clearly illustrates,
average across-firm occupational mobility rates differ strongly across career episode types.
For regular employment episodes the respective average mobility rates are lower than the
overall values presented in Section 3.3.2 at all digit levels. In contrast to this, all other types
of career episodes exhibit very high levels of across-firm occupational mobility. At the 3-digit
level on average about 39% of short-term unemployment episodes entail an occupational
switch across firms. In the case of long-term unemployment episodes the average across-firm
occupational mobility rate even amounts to about 69%. Finally, on average long-term missing
episodes entail an across-firm occupational switch in about 35% of cases. Of course, the
exit from unemployment need not always entail an occupational switch, but these results
19As has been explained in Section 3.2.2, the full career histories of workers with at least one career episode
longer than five years have been dropped from the sample. This allows me to focus on a more homogeneous
group of workers.
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Figure 3.11: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Type of Career
Episode
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
indicate that there exists a plausible positive relation between the incidence of (long-term)
unemployment and across-firm occupational switches.20 The observation that occupational
mobility rates are higher if intermittent unemployment is allowed for in the sample has also
been documented for the US by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) and for West Germany
by Isaoglu (2010a). My results are also in line with Bachmann and Burda (2007), who
also use IAB administrative data and show that relative to employment-to-employment
transitions overall occupational mobility rates over the period 1980–2000 are higher if they
consider non-employment-to-employment transitions, and are especially high if they consider
unemployment-to-employment transitions. Additionally, Table 3.5 shows that pure firm-
to-firm mobility rates are also relatively higher for unemployment episodes and long-term
missing episodes.
Turning to patterns of within-firm occupational mobility for different types of career episo-
des as shown in Figure 3.11, we observe a more homogeneous picture. The average within-
firm occupational mobility rates computed for employment episodes are very close to the
overall values presented in Section 3.3.2, and the average within-firm occupational mobility
rates computed for short-term unemployment episodes and long-term unemployment episodes
20Note that when an occupational change is recorded at the end of, for example, a long-term unemployment
episode, this does not necessarily imply that the exit from unemployment occurred simultaneously with the
switch of occupation. For example, the unemployed may have exited unemployment by taking up work in his
original occupation, and then later during the career episode may have switched to a new occupation (before
the 30.6. of the respective year), that would then be recorded at the end of the respective career episode.
However, given the strong heterogeneity of average across-firm occupational mobility rates across career
episode types, the positive relationship between unstable career episodes and the incidence of occupational
mobility is striking.
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also do not differ much from the overall results. Interestingly, within-firm occupational
mobility rates are relatively higher in the case of long-term missing episodes. This could, for
example, reflect cases in which firms send their employees abroad for an extended period, or
cases in which employees obtain extensive further vocational training or a master’s degree.
Does the heterogeneity in average mobility rates across different types of career episodes,
especially in the case of across-firm occupational mobility, also translate into differences in
the evolution of mobility rates over the period 1982–2008? When I estimate the linear trends
in log mobility rates by type of career episode as shown in Table A.19, I find that the main
result of a positive trend in across-firm occupational mobility as well as a negative trend
in within-firm occupational mobility is robust to focusing solely on the dominant group of
employment episodes (see Panel A). Actually, the trends are even a bit more pronounced
than those reported in Section 3.3.2. This observation holds at all digit levels of occupational
mobility.
In the case of across-firm occupational mobility, Table A.19 reveals that the positive trend
estimates are comparably smaller for short-term unemployment episodes. This is even more
apparent in the case of long-term unemployment episodes, where the trend estimate amounts
to a yearly growth of only 0.4% at the 3-digit level. However, the positive trend estimates for
long-term missing episodes are more pronounced than the results presented in Section 3.3.2
for the overall sample.21 There is also some heterogeneity in trend estimates for within-firm
occupational mobility. The negative trend estimates are comparably much less pronounced
in the case of short-term unemployment episodes, and also less pronounced in the case of
long-term missing episodes. However, in the case of long-term unemployment episodes the
negative trend estimates are more pronounced than the results presented in Section 3.3.2 for
the overall sample.
Could the overall trends in occupational mobility documented in Section 3.3.2 be driven
by changes in the share of unemployment episodes and missing episodes in the sample? The
fact that the main results regarding the trends in occupational mobility are robust to limiting
the analysis to employment episodes already suggests that this is not the case. In addition
to this, I regress the log yearly sample share by type of career episode on a trend variable
and a constant. I find no trends in the share of all four types of career episodes contained
in the main sample.22 That is, on average the composition of the sample has not changed
with respect to the type of career episodes. This shows that the positive trend in across-firm
occupational mobility is not driven by an increased presence of long-term unemployment
21Graphical evidence provided in Figure A.4 in Bachmann and Burda (2007), p. 31 shows that the rate of
occupational mobility conditional on leaving unemployment increased over the period 1980–2000, while the
same does not hold when one conditions on employment-to-employment transitions instead. Note, however,
that the empirical approach taken in Bachmann and Burda (2007) differs from my approach in several
ways. For example, the authors exploit the spell-structure of the data to identify employment transitions
cumulatively. That is, they cumulatively capture most of a worker’s employment transitions within a year,
whereas I compare information on workers between the 30th of June of each year. Furthermore, Bachmann
and Burda (2007) explicitly study transitions out of employment or unemployment, whereas I partly consider
career episodes that contain employment mixed with intermittent episodes of unemployment.
22Detailed estimation results are not reported, but are available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.6: Average Yearly Share of Occupational Switches (%) by Direction and Type of
Career Episode at the 3-digit Level over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
occupational mobility occupational mobility
across firms within firms
A. Employment in West Germany without interm. unemployment
upward 54.68 55.09
downward 44.48 44.08
B. Employment in West Germany with interm. unemployment
upward 48.86 51.34
downward 50.28 47.62
C. Intermittent days in unemployment >= 365 days
upward 47.97 60.37
downward 51.07 39.23
D. Intermittent days missing from data set >= 365 days
upward 53.32 55.00
downward 45.71 44.25
episodes in the data, neither does it seem to be driven by an increased presence of long-term
missing episodes in the data. A similar conclusion applies to the overall trend in within-firm
occupational mobility.
Taking account of different types of career episodes has revealed a heterogeneity in the
average rates of occupational mobility, especially in the case of across-firm occupational
switches. In the following final step of the analysis, I further analyze the economic context
of occupational mobility behavior by considering whether workers tend to switch towards
on average better or worse paid occupations. As Table 3.6, Panel A shows, when we focus
on regular employment episodes the shares of upward mobility are very similar for both
across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility – both upward shares amount to about
55%.
I have shown that across-firm occupational mobility rates are very high in short-term
unemployment episodes and long-term missing episodes. At the first glance, this suggests that
the respective occupational mobility decisions occur under difficult individual circumstances.
Under such conditions individuals may be more inclined to leave their original occupation and
accept work in a relatively worse-paid occupation. In contrast to this conjecture, Table 3.6,
Panel C shows that even in the case of long-term unemployment episodes about 48% of
the across-firm occupational switches are still directed towards on average better paid
occupations. The respective shares are even a bit higher for short-term unemployment
episodes and long-term missing episodes. This is a surprising result which paints a much
more positive picture of the relation between less stable career episodes and across-firm
occupational switches. This interpretation is also in line with Longhi and Brynin (2010)’s
finding that in Germany occupational mobility across employers is associated with an increase
in wage growth and job satisfaction – even if times out of employment of up to one year are
allowed for and cases of involuntary job switches are included in the sample. It needs to
be mentioned, however, that as Figure A.23 shows, the yearly share of upward across-firm
occupational switches in long-term unemployment episodes has strongly decreased since the
65
Hanna Sarah Zwiener
beginning of the 1990s and was at about 37% in 2008. For all other types of career episodes,
including short-term unemployment episodes the share of upward across-firm occupational
switches exhibits no apparent time trend.
When considering occupational mobility within firms, across all types of career episodes
more than half of all occupational switches are directed towards generally better paid
occupations. This is in line with the view that on the firm-internal labor market occupational
switches may reflect promotions. The share of upward switches is especially high in the
case of long-term unemployment episodes, but this should not be over-interpreted. The
corresponding number of person-year-observations is rather small and as Figure A.24 shows
the respective yearly share is very volatile.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper adds to the literature on worker mobility by providing a comprehensive overview
of the extent and the dynamics of occupational mobility in the West German labor market
over the period 1982–2008. Using a large administrative data set I differentiate between
across-firm occupational mobility and within-firm occupational mobility. The analysis of
mobility patterns yields contrasting results for these two types of occupational mobility.
Across-firm occupational mobility in the West German labor market is high, and a bit
more than half of all across-firm occupational switches constitute a change towards an on
average better paid occupation. Across-firm occupational mobility rates have significantly
increased over the observation period and exhibit a pro-cyclical pattern. Regarding potential
explanation of the observed mobility patterns, the analysis suggests that demographic change,
especially the aging of the workforce, has worked against the positive trend in across-firm
occupational mobility. In contrast to this, both the occupational composition as well as
the industry composition of employment have changed since 1982 in a way that seems to
have favored occupational mobility across firm. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a positive
relation between the incidence of unemployment and across-firm occupational switches,
which, however, cannot explain the positive trend in across-firm occupational mobility.
Surprisingly, even in episodes marked by long-term unemployment an average of about 48%
of across-firm occupational switches are directed towards on average better paid occupations.
The fact that gross occupational mobility rates are much larger than net occupational mobility
rates suggests that in the West German labor market occupational mobility is more related to
worker-job-mismatch than to changes in occupation-specific labor demand. Net occupational
mobility has not increased over time, which suggests that the observed increase in across-firm
occupational mobility cannot be explained by increasing variation in occupation-specific
labor demands over time.
For within-firm occupational mobility the empirical analysis provides a very different
picture. Although across-firm and within-firm occupational mobility rates were at similar
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levels in 1982, they have evolved contrarily afterwards. Within-firm occupational mobility
rates have significantly decreased over the period 1982–2008, and they do not follow a clear
cyclical pattern. About 55% of all within-firm occupational switches constitute changes
towards on average better paid occupations. Patterns of within-firm occupational mobility
are fairly homogeneous across demographic subgroups, and no clear relationship between
demographic change and within-firm occupational mobility emerges. The relation between
the occupational composition of the workforce and within-firm occupational mobility remains
similarly unclear. However, the industry structure of employment seems to have changed
in a way that has dampened within-firm occupational mobility rates. Furthermore, within-
firm occupational mobility rates are relatively higher in episodes containing a long-term
absence from the data set. This could, for example, reflect cases in which firms send their
employees abroad for an extended period, or cases in which employees obtain extensive
further vocational training.
A comparison of the extent of occupational mobility across studies, and even more so
across countries, is inherently difficult, since studies differ with respect to the institutional
framework, the data generating process, sampling restrictions and the exact nature of the
occupational classification used in the analysis. However, one can compare overall patterns
and trends, and many of the above-described results on across-firm occupational mobility in
the West German labor market are in line with what other studies have found for Germany and
other western economies. For example, a significant increase in occupational mobility has
also been found for the US and France. Previous studies on West Germany that use measures
of overall occupational mobility have not reported a positive trend in overall occupational
mobility, but its pro-cyclical pattern has been documented for the US, France and West
Germany. It is also a common finding that overall occupational mobility is decreasing in age,
and demographic change has been found to have had a dampening relation to occupational
mobility rates both in the US and France.
The finding that within-firm occupational mobility rates are lower than across-firm occu-
pational mobility rates has also been reported in related studies for Germany and for other
countries such as Denmark, Britain, and the US. Apart from this observation, the findings
for within-firm occupational mobility presented in this paper are mostly novel in the sense
that this phenomenon has received little explicit attention in the literature on occupational
mobility so far. This paper assesses some potential explanations for the observed patterns
of occupational mobility, and especially for the observed time trends. However, the chosen
potential explanations such as, for example, changes in the demographic, occupation or
industry composition of employment seem to fit the observed patterns of across-firm occu-
pational mobility much better than the patterns of within-firm occupational mobility. The
observed differences between across- and within-firm occupational mobility suggest that
different factors drive these two types of occupational mobility behavior. This conclusion
calls for further investigation of the two phenomena – and especially of the latter one.
A promising approach to further deepen our understanding of occupational mobility within
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firms could be to investigate whether the occupational variety within firms has decreased
over time so that the potential for occupational switches within firms has decreased as well.
For example, this development could be the result of an increase in outsourcing of certain
business units (also affecting the mobility behavior of high-skilled employees) or of non-
focal services such as the operation of firm canteens, facility management, cleaning services,
etc. (most likely affecting the mobility behavior of low-skilled employees). Indeed, in a
recent study for Germany Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) find that domestic outsourcing
of services in the areas of security, logistics, and cleaning as well as of food services has
significantly increased over the period 1975–2008. However, such a more detailed analysis
on the links between within-firm occupational variety and within-firm occupational mobility
would require the use of linked employer-employee data.
The use of linked employer-employee data would also be conducive to the study of
within-firm occupational mobility in an additional way. It would allow to check and, if
indeed necessary, to correct for firm-specific spikes in occupational mobility caused by
firm-specific singular events such as personnel turnover in the human ressources department
or the introduction of new administration software. However, the additional use of linked
employer-employee data is beyond the scope of this paper and should be conducted in a
future research project.
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4 Product Market Deregulation and
Labor Market Outcomes in the
German Skilled Crafts and Trades
4.1 Introduction
In the economic literature, cross-country differences in the evolution of employment have
often been explained by differences in labor market regulation.1 More recently, economic re-
search points to product market regulation and limited product market competition as another
important institutional factor that influences labor market outcomes such as employment.
This view goes as far back as Krueger and Pischke (1997), who in their analysis of the U.S.
employment miracle emphasize the relevance of product market regulations for the evolution
of employment in developed economies. According to economic theory, product market
regulations can create barriers to firm entry, which deter new firms from entering the market.
This can have distorting effects on competition, price levels, and labor market outcomes
such as wages and employment. Several papers argue that product market deregulation
should have positive long-run effects on entrepreneurship and employment or, likewise,
negative effects on unemployment. Fonseca et al. (2001) stress that start-up costs are an
impediment to entrepreneurship. Modeling the choice between becoming an entrepreneur
or a worker, they show that lower start-up costs should be associated with a higher number
of entrepreneurs and, correspondingly, higher job creation rates and lower unemployment.
Taking account of both product and labor market regulation in a general equilibrium model of
the economy, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that through increased competition among
firms, and a corresponding decrease in economic rents, product market deregulation has
positive long-term effects on overall employment and wages. Spector (2004) also highlights
the link between a higher degree of product market competition and higher employment,
but points out that wages may be persistently lower. Ebell and Haefke (2009) rationalize a
negative effect of product market deregulation on unemployment rates within a matching
framework with frictions.
One strand of the economic literature that empirically analyzes the effects of product
market regulation on labor market outcomes is based on cross-country comparisons.2 In
1For an overview of the respective literature see Blau and Kahn (1999), as well as Nickell and Layard (1999)
and Boeri (2011).
2For a less recent, but extensive overview of the cross-country evidence see also Schiantarelli (2008).
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their widely-cited empirical study, Djankov et al. (2002) compare the degree of start-up
entry regulations across 85 countries. They find that countries with stricter entry regulations
exhibit more corruption, a larger shadow economy, and lower compliance with product
quality rules and social standards. Lower levels of firm entry regulation are associated with
more democratic forms of government, and generally better governance. Empirical studies
with a focus on entrepreneurship show that stricter firm entry regulations are associated with
reduced entry of new firms (Klapper et al. (2006); Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007); Dreher
and Gassebner (2013); Klapper and Love (2014)), larger size of entrants (Klapper et al.
(2006)), and slower growth in value added per employee of new firms (Klapper et al. (2006)).
Stricter entry regulations are associated with higher within-industry concentration, and they
also affect industry dynamics. Industries with stricter entry regulations react to growth
opportunities through an increase in the size of existing firms, while less regulated industries
tend to react through the entry of new firms (Fisman and Allende (2010)). In addition,
cross-country studies with a focus on employment outcomes find that stricter product market
regulations are associated with lower employment rates (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005);
Feldmann (2008); Fiori et al. (2012)) and higher unemployment rates (Feldmann (2008);
Freund and Rijkers (2014)). Countries with less strict business regulations are also more likely
to undergo periods of sustained reductions in unemployment (Freund and Rijkers (2014)).
Several studies show that the employment effects of product market deregulation interact
with, and actually may get reinforced by the current degree of labor market regulations within
a country (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005); Griffith et al. (2007); Fiori et al. (2012)).
That is, product market deregulation is associated with larger positive (negative) effects on
employment (unemployment) if labor market regulations are tight.3 Furthermore, Griffith
et al. (2007) find that product market deregulation and the resulting increase in competition
is also associated with higher real wages.
While the above-mentioned cross-country studies undertake steps to neutralize potentially
biasing influences, the concern remains that the countries under comparison may systemati-
cally differ with respect to characteristics that are not captured by the respective research
designs. This concern is, for example, corroborated by Djankov et al. (2002)’s finding that
stricter product market regulation is more common in countries with less democratic forms of
government, worse governance, as well as higher levels of corruption. The country-level link
between the prevalence of corruption and the existence of stricter product market regulations
is also highlighted by Dreher and Gassebner (2013), who show that corruption may be a
means to mitigate the effectiveness of barriers to firm entry in practice. It is therefore plausi-
ble that countries may systematically differ with respect to other unobserved characteristics
which are related to the outcomes of interest. This may then bias the estimated labor market
effects of product market (de-)regulation in cross-country studies. Against this background,
over the past decade a new strand of empirical literature has developed which uses micro
3See Fiori et al. (2012) for a more extensive overview of the literature on the interaction effects between product
and labor market regulations.
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data to analyze the causal effects of regulatory changes pertaining to the product markets of
single countries. While these studies have the potential to overcome the above-mentioned
concerns, their number is still relatively small.
Our study contributes to this second strand of the empirical literature that evaluates the
labor market effects of regulatory changes in the product markets of single countries based
on micro data. We consider the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code to study how
the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into a substantial number of the German skilled
crafts and trades affected the number of registered crafts businesses, self-employment, as
well as dependent employment outcomes in the respective markets. The German system of
skilled crafts and trades has deep historical roots and covers a wide range of occupations
in areas such as construction, vehicle maintenance, food production, and health services.
The skilled crafts cover a significant share of the German workforce. In 2015, there existed
about one million registered crafts establishments in Germany (equivalent to about 27.7%
of German firms), which employed about 5.36 million employees. This corresponds to
about 12.5% of overall employment in Germany (Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks
(2016)). Until the end of 2003, a total of 93 skilled crafts were subject to the so-called master
craftsman requirement, according to which only certified master craftsmen can set up and run
a legally independent business in one of the regulated markets. To obtain a master craftsman
certificate, individuals have to undergo several years of basic occupational training, collect
work experience, participate in preparatory courses, and pass several examinations.4 Apart
from the time investment, there are also course and examination fees which can amount to up
to 10,000 Euros in total (Schmidt (2015)). These requirements create a substantial barrier to
firm entry into the regulated markets. Accordingly, the German Monopolies Commission has
repeatedly criticized the master craftsman requirement as a barrier to firm entry which distorts
competition, prices and employment in the German skilled crafts (Monopolkommission
(1998, 2002)).5 In the years leading up to the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code, it was
a widely held view that the German skilled crafts were economically stagnating, and that the
regulatory framework was in need of modernization. In March 2003 the German government
announced its plans to deregulate firm entry into a large number of crafts occupations as
part of the Agenda 2010. In 2004, the master craftsman requirement was fully abolished
for 53 out of the 93 initially regulated crafts occupations. Proponents of deregulation of
firm entry into crafts occupations argued that the abolishment of barriers to firm entry would
boost entrepreneurship, competition, and employment in the German skilled crafts. Indeed,
the descriptive evidence is promising. As Figure 4.1 shows based on data provided by the
4If individuals want to obtain their master craftsman certificate in an occupation other than their training
occupation, they require 3–4 years of occupational experience in the occupation in which they want to obtain
the master craftsman certificate. Otherwise, no occupational experience apart from vocational training is
required.
5As Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009), p. 772 point out, the master craftsman requirement is not a form of
occupational licensing, but rather constitutes a barrier to firm entry into the regulated skilled crafts and trades.
In contrast to regulations that govern firm entry, occupational licensing is more general and determines which
individuals are allowed to work in a certain occupation.
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Figure 4.1: Total Number of Establishments in Crafts Occupations over the Period 1998–
2010
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Data source: ZDH, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the overall number of establishments in
the treatment group and the control group in levels (1,000s).
German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), at the first glance the reform seems to have
been successful in fostering entrepreneurship in the skilled crafts. In 2004, the year in which
the reform came into force, the number of registered establishments started rising in the
deregulated occupations, and by 2010 it had more than doubled relative to its pre-reform
level. Against this background, the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code is an interesting
natural experiment, which, as suggested by Figure 4.1, may have had substantial economic
effects.
As we have mentioned above, our paper is related to a relatively small but growing number
of studies that provide empirical evidence on the labor market effects of product market
deregulation based on micro data.6 More specifically, one group of papers analyzes the effects
of zoning or licensing regulations. In their seminal study on the labor market effects of the
“Loi Royer” implemented in the early 1970s in France, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) provide
causal evidence that stricter zoning regulations for large retail stores led to significantly lower
retail employment. Their results indicate that this effect was not simply due to a redistribution
of employment across sectors. The authors also find that stricter entry regulation in the food
retail sector increased food retailer concentration as well as food retailer prices. Changes in
market concentration and prices are two specific channels through which entry regulations
pertaining to large retail stores may have negatively affected retail employment. Bertrand and
6Most of the empirical studies mentioned below use a differences-in-differences approach to evaluate the effects
of the respective product market reforms. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) provide causal evidence based on an
instrumental variables approach.
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Kramarz (2002) also study the employment effects for certain subgroups of the workforce.
Their findings suggest that stricter entry regulation may have favored the employment of
male relative to female workers. Furthermore, they show that stricter regulation of entry for
large retail stores indeed caused the share of small retail stores to remain relatively higher.
Along a similar line, Viviano (2008) studies the effects of entry regulation for large retail
stores in Italy. The study provides evidence that the lowering of barriers to entry for large
retail stores led to a significant increase in employment in the retail sector, which is mainly
driven by employment growth in large retail stores. While there is no significant effect on the
share of employment in small retail stores, through the increase in competition the reform
negatively affected the share of solo self-employed shopkeepers. In another related paper,
Aghion et al. (2008) study the economic effects of the abolishment of industrial licensing
in the registered manufacturing sector in 1985 and 1991 in India. Specifically, the authors
analyze how the effects of product market deregulation interact with labor market regulations
that vary across Indian states. They find that the abolishment of industrial licensing led to a
significant increase in the number of factories in the respective industries, and that the effects
of product market deregulation were mitigated by the state-specific strictness of labor market
regulations. Both real output, total employment and fixed capital in the respective industries
grew more strongly in states with pro-employer labor market regulations relative to states
with more protective labor market regulations.
Other related papers study the effects of product market reforms that directly reduced
the extent of procedures and, thus, the time and expenditures required for creating business
start-ups. Several studies evaluate the labor market effects of product market deregulation in
Mexico (Bruhn (2011, 2013); Kaplan et al. (2011)). Starting in 2002, Mexican municipalities
began to strongly simplify and speed up local business registration procedures. The intro-
duction of the so-called “Rapid Business Opening System” led to a statistically significant
increase in firm entries (Bruhn (2011); Kaplan et al. (2011)) – although the studies differ
in their assessment of the economic significance of the effect. The empirical evidence also
indicates a positive effect on employment, but the analysis in Bruhn (2011) shows that this
was mainly due to a redistribution of workers, so overall employment was not affected. The
lowering of barriers to firm entry also led to a decrease in prices (Bruhn (2011)). Bruhn
(2013) finds that the lowering of barriers to firm entry also affected the behavior of informal
business owners in Mexico. For informal business owners with characteristics similar to
those of wage workers the reform increased the probability to leave self-employment and
become wage workers. For a subgroup of informal business owners with characteristics
similar to those of official business owners, the author finds an increase in the probability to
officially register the existing informal business. Branstetter et al. (2013) study the effects of
the “On the post firm” program, which was introduced in Portugal in 2005 and substantially
simplified and sped up the registration of business start-ups. They find that the reform had
statistically significant positive effects on firm entry and job creation in new firms, but that
the economic significance of the effects was relatively small due to the nature of the newly
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created firms. Branstetter et al. (2013) find that the reform mainly led to the creation of
so-called “marginal firms”. The respective firms are small and have lower survival rates. In
addition, the new entrepreneurs are “marginal” in the sense that they are typically former
dependent employees. They are also older and less well educated than the comparison group.
A more distantly related paper is Bertrand et al. (2007), which evaluates the 1985 dereg-
ulation of the French banking system. The authors show that along with reform-induced
changes in the capital structure and banks’ lending behavior, the reform also had an impact
on real economic outcomes. The authors find that the reform led to increased firm turnover
(through higher entry of new firms, and higher exit of incumbent firms) and lower industry
concentration. At the same time, the reform also led to a statistically significant increase in
employment and lower wage growth at the industry level.
Of course, we are not the first to study the economic consequences of the regulatory
framework which applies to the skilled crafts and trades in Germany. Prantl and Spitz-
Oener (2009) exploit the German reunification in 1990 as a natural experiment to study the
differential effects of the regulatory barriers imposed by the German Crafts Code between
two very different economic contexts: that of the mature West German economy, and that
of the transitional East German economy. The analysis covers the 1980s and 1990s, that is
the period leading up to the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code. The authors find that
entry regulation hampered self-employment and the occupational mobility of workers after
reunification more in regulated occupations in East Germany than in regulated occupations
in West Germany. Thus, in the economic environment of East Germany after reunification,
where high degrees of flexibility were required from all labor market participants to facilitate
economic transition, the barriers to market entry created by the German Crafts Code proved
to be especially limiting. Prantl (2012) uses a similar identification strategy to analyze the
effects of firm entry regulation on sustained entry into self-employment, as well as on the
performance of long-living entrants based on data covering the 1990s. After reunification,
due to firm entry regulations the probability of sustained self-employment with a duration
of at least five years was significantly lower in East than in West Germany. This effect was
not compensated by better performance of newly created long-living firms, which leads
the author to conclude that barriers to firm entry may have negative long-term effects on
outcomes such as economic growth and technological progress.
Based on individual-level survey data from the Microcensus wave of 2006, Bol (2014)
analyzes whether regulation of entry into self-employment in crafts occupations is associated
with economic rents. The author compares the wage differential between self-employed
and dependently employed craftsmen in regulated relative to deregulated crafts occupations.
As the analysis only uses the survey wave 2006, it does not evaluate the effects of the
2003 reform of the German crafts code, but it exploits the regulatory differences created
by the 2003 reform. The linear regressions include occupation-level controls that capture
the demographic composition and occupation-specific skill requirements obtained from the
BIBB-BAuA Workforce survey. Bol (2014) finds that overall employment in the regulated
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occupations is not associated with higher wages relative to the deregulated occupations, but
that self-employed craftsmen in regulated occupations earn about 13% higher wages than
those in deregulated occupations. According to the author, this suggests that the barriers
to entry imposed by the German Crafts Code indeed create economic rents for incumbent
self-employed craftsmen. Against this background, Damelang et al. (2016) study the effects
of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code on wages of prime-aged full-time employees
in the crafts occupations based on the administrative data set SIAB for the period 2000–2008.
They argue that the deregulation of entry into crafts occupations led to increased competition
and, thus, to a lowering of economic rents. In turn, this should lead to lower average wages in
the deregulated crafts occupations. Using a differences-in-differences design, Damelang et al.
(2016) find that deregulation had a negative effect on wage growth, with post-reform wages
in deregulated occupations growing about 0.5% less than those in regulated occupations. The
effect was more pronounced for unskilled employees relative to skilled employees, while
highly skilled master craftsmen realized relatively higher wage growth. For young workers
the reform was wage-neutral, and the overall negative wage effects were driven by older
workers. The authors argue that this effect heterogeneity is due to differences in bargaining
power. Younger or more highly skilled employees have higher bargaining power due to
higher fluctuation costs incurred by the employer as well as due to the existence of a credible
outside option: they could leave their current employer and found their own business start-up.
In addition to this, Rostam-Afschar (2014) studies how the 2003 reform of the German
Crafts Code affected self-employment based on individual-level survey data from the Micro-
census for the period 2002–2009. The author applies a differences-in-differences approach
with one control and three treatment groups. Apart from the set of fully deregulated oc-
cupations, the author analyzes two additional treatment groups, which remained subject
to the entry regulations, but for which possible exemptions from the master craftsman re-
quirement were introduced. As a control group, Rostam-Afschar (2014) only considers
the small subgroup of continuously regulated occupations for which hardly any regulatory
changes occurred through the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code. The author studies
how the reform affected the probability of being self-employed, as well as entry and exit
probabilities. For the group of fully deregulated crafts occupations, Rostam-Afschar (2014)
estimates that the abolishment of barriers to entry led to an increase in the probability of
being self-employed by about 40%. For the respective treatment group, this corresponds to
an increase in the probability of entry into self-employment by about 60%, while the author
finds that exit rates were unaffected by the reform. The other two treatment groups exhibit
qualitatively similar, but quantitatively less pronounced results. As part of the robustness
checks, the author shows that his results are neither confounded by the EU expansion to
the East nor are they confounded by the the introduction of start-up subsidies. Further-
more, the author finds that the positive reform effect on entry probabilities was driven by
male craftsmen and by untrained workers. However, given that he finds no reform effect
on exit rates, the author nevertheless states that “more sustainable business entries could
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be established after the deregulation” (Rostam-Afschar, 2014, p. 1088). In a very recent
paper, Runst et al. (2016) conduct a replication study of Rostam-Afschar (2014). Using a
different approach to identifying crafts occupations in the Microcensus data, and based on a
differences-in-differences design with two instead of three treatment groups, the findings
in Runst et al. (2016) basically corroborate the evidence of a positive reform effect on the
probability of being self-employed and on the probability of entry into self-employment.7
In contrast to Rostam-Afschar (2014), the authors find that the reform also significantly in-
creased the probability of exit from self-employment in the deregulated occupations by about
1.5 percentage points. This effect on exit probabilities emerges if Runst et al. (2016) do not
control for educational attainment in the differences-in-differences estimations. The authors
therefore conclude that the increase in exit probabilities is mainly due to the relatively lower
educational attainment of new entrepreneurs. This is also in line with Runst et al. (2016)’s
observation that, according to firm registry data provided by the German Confederation of
Skilled Crafts (ZDH), in the deregulated crafts occupations average measures of educational
attainment of entrepreneurs have deteriorated relative to the pre-reform period.
Our study exploits the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code as a natural experiment to
study the effects of product market deregulation on labor market outcomes. We implement
a differences-in-differences approach using data sets provided by three different sources:
data provided by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts, survey data provided by the
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Microcensus), as well as administrative data provided
by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for
Employment Research (SIAB). Our study aims at analyzing how the abolishment of barriers
to firm entry into a substantial number of the German skilled crafts affected the number of
registered crafts businesses, self-employment, as well as dependent employment outcomes in
the respective markets. Regarding the focus on employment outcomes, our study is closely
related to Rostam-Afschar (2014) and Runst et al. (2016). However, it is important to notice
that our aim was never to perform a replication of the former study. Our empirical design
fundamentally differs from that of Rostam-Afschar (2014) and Runst et al. (2016) along
several important dimensions. Most importantly, we only consider one treatment group
instead of three (or two, as in the case of Runst et al. (2016)), and we choose different sets of
treatment and control occupations. Regarding the empirical design, our study is thus much
more similar to the approach taken by Damelang et al. (2016), although they focus on other
outcome variables. In addition, we expand on the analysis conducted in Rostam-Afschar
(2014) and Runst et al. (2016) by providing differences-in-differences results on dependent
employment outcomes. The above-cited related literature mostly focuses on the effects of
7Runst et al. (2016) report that according to firm registry data, the treatment occupation building cleaners
underwent a singularly positive development during the post-reform period, which is not reflected in the
Microcensus data. Since their research indicates that this specific crafts occupation might not be properly
identified in the Microcensus data, they exclude it from the main estimation samples. In contrast to Runst
et al. (2016), our estimation samples contain the occupation building cleaners. However, our robustness
checks, which involve sequentially dropping single occupations from the estimation samples, indicate that
our results are not driven by this specific treatment occupation.
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product market deregulation on self-employment, and the papers typically only provide
limited results on dependent employment effects. However, as the theoretical literature
indicates, the effects of product market deregulation on dependent employment could be
substantial. We therefore provide a detailed regression analysis of dependent employment
outcomes.
Until the reform came into force in the beginning of 2004, all crafts occupations in
the treatment and the control group were subject to the same regulatory framework that
strictly regulated firm entry into the respective skilled crafts through the master craftsman
requirement. This initially led us to expect that treatment and control occupations should
be fairly comparable. We therefore use a differences-in-differences design to study the
labor market effects of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code. Unfortunately, a closer
investigation of the institutional background and extensive empirical checks cast doubts on
the validity of the identifying assumptions. This leads us to conclude that the assumption
of common trends is not fully plausible, and that there are significant differences not only
in the levels, but also in the pre-reform evolution of some of the outcome variables. The
view that regulated and deregulated crafts occupations are not sufficiently comparable is
also in line with a very recent paper by Müller (2016). We therefore cannot view our
estimation results as reflecting the causal effects of product market regulation on labor
market outcomes. This paper therefore mainly documents our analysis of the reform, and we
are very careful with the overall interpretation of our results. We find that after the reform, the
number of registered crafts establishments as well as the number of self-employed craftsmen
increased more strongly in the deregulated crafts occupations relative to the regulated ones.
The opposite holds for the number of dependently employed craftsmen. Individual-level
regressions suggest a positive effect on the probability of being newly self-employed among
all self-employed, and negative effects on dependent employment probabilities. While we
cannot interpret the empirical results causally, the analysis at least partially corroborates the
evidence for a positive reform effect on entrepreneurship and self-employment documented
elsewhere in the literature (Rostam-Afschar (2014); Runst et al. (2016)), while the reform
seems not to have had a positive effect on dependent employment in the deregulated markets.
These conclusions are also in line with Müller (2016), who in a very recent study assesses
the economic effects of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code based on a wide range
of descriptive statistics that reach as far as the year 2014. The author provides graphical
evidence and descriptive statistics which suggest that the abolishment of barriers to firm
entry indeed fostered entrepreneurship in the deregulated markets. However, he also reports
that the newly founded businesses in the deregulated occupations tended to be relatively
small and had lower survival rates. The share of solo-entrepreneur businesses reached
about 61% in the deregulated occupations in 2012, and the five-year firm survival rates in
the deregulated occupations dropped from 69% in early 2000s to below 50% in the post-
reform period. Since the reform, the number of master craftsman examinations as well as
apprenticeship training rates decreased more strongly in the deregulated occupations relative
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to the regulated occupations. Furthermore, graphical evidence in Müller (2016) suggests that
until 2012 dependent employment did not increase in the deregulated occupations relative to
the regulated ones.8 Additionally, the author reports that a substantial share of employment
growth (about 60%) in the deregulated occupations occurred through growth in part-time
employment. Regarding the effects of the reform on entrepreneurship, employment, prices,
and human capital creation in the German skilled crafts and trades, the author concludes that
“the proponents’ high hopes were not fulfilled” (Müller, 2016, p. 21).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the institutional
background. Section 4.3 describes the empirical approach, the data and sampling rules. It
also discusses the plausibility of the common trends assumption and potential confounding
factors. In Section 4.4 we present and discuss our main empirical results. Section 4.5
concludes. The Appendix 5.3 contains additional tables and figures (Tables and Figures
starting with “A.”) and further background information, such as detailed information on the
variables and samples used in our analysis, as well as summaries of test results regarding the
plausibility of the common trends assumption.
4.2 Institutional Background
There is a long tradition of strict regulation of firm entry into the skilled crafts and trades
in Germany. After World War II, in 1953 German parliament passed a new Crafts Code
(“Handwerksordnung”) that continued to support strong entry regulations. According to
this law, only master craftsmen were allowed to start and operate a legally independent
crafts enterprise (principle of “Großer Befähigungsnachweis”). In a reform of the crafts
law in 1998, the number of registered crafts occupations was reduced by grouping related
occupations to allow crafts enterprises to offer a broader range of services. However, the
requirement of a master craftsman certificate for starting and operating a crafts enterprise
remained in place (Brenke (2008)).
In the late 1990s the German Monopolies Commission (“Monopolkommission”) criticized
the barriers to entry created by the German Crafts Code and the resulting negative economic
consequences such as a high price level, negative employment effects, and increased black la-
bor ((Monopolkommission, 1998, pp. 16—17)). It repeatedly recommended the abolishment
of the master craftsman requirement (Monopolkommission (1998), Monopolkommission
(2002)). At the same time, the process of European integration put further pressure on
German politicians to modernize the German Crafts Code (see Brenke (2008) for further
details). Against this background, as part of the Agenda 2010 reforms, in March 2003 the
8According to Figure 5 Müller (2016), p. 11, dependent employment grew relatively more strongly in the
deregulated occupations over the period 2010–2012 if one includes the deregulated occupation building
cleaners in the sample. However, the author argues that the economic performance of this specific crafts
occupation was exceptional and very likely driven by factors independent of the 2003 reform of the German
Crafts Code. If one excludes the occupation building cleaners from the sample, the observed differences
during the period 2010–2012 vanish.
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German government announced its plans for a major reform of the German Crafts Code with
the aim of boosting entrepreneurship in crafts occupations (Müller (2006)). The first draft
of the bill was presented to the German Bundestag on 24. June 2003. It contained, among
others, the following major alteration to the German Crafts Code (Deutscher Bundestag
(2003b)): The number of crafts occupations subject to the master craftsman requirement
(listed in appendix A of the Crafts Code) was to be reduced from 94 to 29 occupations. Only
risky (“gefahrengeneigt”) crafts occupations, that were related to potentially serious health
and safety risks for customers, should remain subject to the master craftsman requirement.
In 2003 all major political parties agreed on the need for modernizing the German Crafts
Code to create a regulatory framework that would allow for a more dynamic development of
entrepreneurship in the crafts occupations. However, there was dissent on the exact nature of
the required reforms (Deutscher Bundestag (2003a,c,d)). The government saw the master
craftsman requirement as a significant barrier to firm entry into crafts occupations and as a
significant impairment of competition. Accordingly, the main argument put forward by the
proponents of the reform was that the abolishment of barriers to firm entry would promote
competition among enterprises in the respective craft occupations, which would lead to lower
prices, increased market entry and higher employment. Only crafts occupations that were
related to potentially serious health and safety risks for customers should remain subject to
the master craftsman requirement. However, craftsmen working in deregulated occupations
may still choose to earn a master craftsman certificate to signal a level of high occupational
qualification, which should then be rewarded through the market mechanism.
The German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH) and the political opposition strongly
opposed the abolishment of the master craftsman requirement based on several arguments.
Firstly, they argued that rather than being a barrier to entry, the master craftsman degree
should be seen as an educational attainment crucial to running a crafts business successfully.
They argued that the deregulation of crafts occupations would lead to a decrease in service
and product quality, a decrease in customer safety and higher bankruptcy rates among newly
created crafts enterprises. Secondly, deregulation would impair incumbents’ economic
performance through increased competition and would, thus, negatively affect employment
in the skilled crafts. Furthermore, crafts enterprises would no longer have an incentive to train
apprentices, leading to a strong decrease in the availability of apprenticeship training positions
and an increase in youth unemployment. Based on these arguments, the ZDH and the political
opposition demanded that the criteria for the choice of deregulated occupations should be
revised. Apart from potential health and safety risks for customers, most importantly, one
should also take into account the extent of apprenticeship training provided by the respective
crafts occupations.
Despite the above-mentioned controversies, the bill was passed by the German Bundestag
on 27. November 2003, and then, according to legislative procedure, was presented to the
Federal Council of Germany. However, due to opposition by some of the federal states
represented in the Federal Council, the proposed bill was directed towards the Mediation
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Committee (“Vermittlungsausschuss”) (Bundesrat (2003)), and a revised version of the bill
was passed both by the German Bundestag and by the Federal Council on 19. December
2003.9 As a result of the mediation process, in the final version of the law designed to reform
the German Crafts Code, the extent of apprenticeship training provided in a crafts occupation
was adopted as an additional criterion to identify those crafts occupations that should remain
subject to the master craftsman requirement. Correspondingly, the number of regulated crafts
occupations, which were listed in Appendix A of the Crafts Code, was only reduced from 94
to 41 – instead of an initially planned 29 occupations. For 53 crafts occupations the master
craftsman requirement was abolished and they were moved to Appendix B1 of the Crafts
Code.10 The reform came into force shortly afterwards on 1. January 2004.
4.3 Empirical Approach
The objective of this paper is to study how product market deregulation affects labor market
outcomes. We exploit the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code as a natural experiment to
study the interdependencies between product market deregulation and labor market outcomes
based on a differences-in-differences (DiD) design. In our analysis, we compare deregulated
(treatment) to non-deregulated (control) crafts occupations. Ideally, assignment into the
two groups should be random. However, given the background information in Section 4.2,
we cannot assume that assignment of crafts occupations into treatment was fully random.
Initially, assignment into treatment followed the relatively objective criterion of whether a
crafts occupation was related to potentially serious health and safety risks for customers.
Most importantly, it is plausible that this characteristic is not systematically related to the
profitability of doing business in the respective markets. The political debate between
proponents and opponents of the reform and, ultimately, the alterations proposed by the
Mediation Committee then led to the implementation of a second choice criterion: the extent
of apprenticeship training provided by the skilled crafts. Consequently, instead of the initially
planned 65 crafts occupations, firm entry into only 53 occupations was fully deregulated.
The fact, that through political negotiations 12 crafts occupations were reassigned from
becoming deregulated to staying regulated, leads us to assume that the respective occupations
were special. For example, this may have been the occupations where fighting for upholding
barriers to entry was most economically rewarding for incumbents.
As an illustration to the first choice criterion mentioned above, Figure 4.2 provides a rough
overview of two indicators from insurance claim statistics for the period 2007–2011 provided
to us by courtesy of the German Insurance Association (GDV). The data refers to the post-
9For a comprehensive overview of the major steps of the legislative process pertaining to this specific law see
Deutscher Bundestag (2016).
10Compare “Drittes Gesetzt zur Änderung der Handwerksordnung und anderer handwerksrechtlicher
Vorschriften” in its version of 24. December 2003 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I 2003, Nr. 66, 29.12.2003,
pp. 2934–2953).
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Figure 4.2: Average Insurance Claim Statistics by Group of Crafts Occupations Covering
the Period 2007–2011
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Average Claim Statistics by Group of Crafts Occupations
claim frequency claim cost
Source: data provided by courtesy of the German Insurance Association (GDV), own calculations.
Claim frequency is the number of claims divided by the total number of employees insured. Claim cost relates
cost to risk exposure, i.e. it is the average cost (payments made by the insurance companies) per employee
insured. The underlying indices are based on a comparison of similarly sized establishments. Indices are
normalized – a value of 100 corresponds to the outcome average across all crafts occupations. Graph based on a
subset of 5 control, 12 treatment and 4 reassigned occupations.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Three Groups of Crafts Occupations. Occupation-level
Averages Over the Pre-reform Period 2000–2003
Treatment Control Reassigned
Number of occupations: 53 29 12
Number of establishments:
mean 1450.3 14382.5 14768.6
standard deviation (2348.1) (18762.4) (19080)
min 33 116 292
max 12401 64146 65975
Apprenticeship graduates per establishment:
mean 8.1 17.5 15.5
standard deviation (6.1) (8.7) (11.2)
min 0 1.2 2.3
max 28.3 34.5 43.8
Number of master craftsman exams (including retakes):
mean 42.5 666.2 492.1
standard deviation (89.7) (939.8) (722.1)
min 0 0 3
max 570 3759 2590
Data Source: ZDH, own calculations.
reform period and only covers a subset of about 20 crafts occupations.11 Nevertheless, the
resulting picture is in line with what we would expect given the institutional background
information: Firstly, on average control occupations indeed exhibit a higher claim frequency
and claim cost than treatment and reassigned occupations. Secondly, the group of reassigned
crafts occupations appears to be more similar to the treatment occupations than to the control
occupations both with respect to claim frequency as well as with respect to claim cost.12
Although these graphical results are only based on a small sub-sample of the relevant crafts
occupations, and thus should be treated with caution, they suggest that the risk-related choice
criterion was properly applied.
Furthermore, Table 4.1 provides descriptives on the three different groups of crafts occupa-
tions for the pre-reform period 2000–2003. Interestingly, the group of reassigned occupations
is similar to the group of control occupations with respect to the average number of appren-
ticeship graduates per establishment. However, if we compare minima and maxima across
groups, it is apparent that some occupations in the treatment group actually produce more
apprenticeship graduates than the less active occupations in the reassigned group. Therefore,
the criterion relating to the provision of apprenticeship training seems to have been applied
11Identification of crafts occupations is very difficult in the insurance claims data due to the aggregation of
crafts occupations at the time of data collection. We were only able to identify approximately 5 control, 12
treatment and 4 reassigned occupations, and some groupings include non-crafts occupations.
12We are very grateful to the German Insurance Association (GDV), especially to Dr. Marco Lonsing, for
providing us with data on insurance claims in the German skilled crafts.
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in a somewhat arbitrary manner.
While we cannot assume random assignment of crafts occupations into treatment, being
able to observe the reassignment of crafts occupations through the legislative process at least
allows us to isolate the respective occupations. Therefore, in our differences-in-differences
analysis we consider as treatment occupations all 29 occupations that were always (starting
with the draft bill) chosen to be deregulated based on the criterion of being risky. The
control group consists of those 53 crafts occupations that were initially assigned to becoming
deregulated, and remained so in the amended version of the bill. However, from our analysis
we fully exclude those 12 crafts occupations that were reassigned from becoming deregulated
to staying regulated. They are not part of the control group. As the list of crafts occupations
provided in Table A.31 shows, the treatment and the control group now contain a number
of seemingly closely related occupation pairs. For example, the treatment group includes
optics technicians and precision opticians, while opticians are included in the control group.
Likewise, turners are included in the treatment group, while metalworkers are included in
the control group.
Based on this definition of treatment and control occupations, we estimate the average
effect of the deregulation of firm entry in the treatment occupations on labor market out-
comes such as the registered number of crafts businesses, self-employment, and dependent
employment. For this, we compare the difference in average outcomes between the treatment
and the control group after the reform with the corresponding difference before the reform.
Our analysis which uses individual-level data is based on the following base specification:
Yiot = α+ γt + δo +β3 ·PRt ·T Go +X ′itε+ uiot ,
where Yiot is the outcome of interest, which is a dummy variable. Index i refers to individuals,
o indexes occupations and t indexes years. α is the model constant. γt are year fixed effects
which we include in our model to control for systematic differences across survey waves.
Likewise, we include occupation fixed effects δo to control for any systematic variation in
the occupational composition of our treatment and our control group. Most importantly, β3 is
the coefficient of interest, with PRt representing a dummy indicating the post-reform period
and T Go representing a dummy indicating treatment occupations. The vector Xit then covers
a number of individual-level socio-demographic covariates, with ε being the corresponding
vector of regression coefficients.
In line with most of the related literature we use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
to implement our differences-in-differences approach, even in the case of binary outcome
variables. The estimation of linear probability models is appropriate in differences-in-
differences settings since most regressors are discrete and, therefore, fitted probabilities
that lie outside the 0–1 range are less of a concern (Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 102–
107; Wooldridge (2010), pp. 562–565). However, as a robustness check we also estimate
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corresponding non-linear Probit models for the most basic specifications without wave and
occupation fixed effects, and we then calculate average marginal effects for the interaction
term of interest (PRt ·T Go) (Ai and Norton (2003); Norton et al. (2004)). A comparison
reveals that the respective estimation results do not depend on the choice of the estimation
approach.
Throughout the analysis, in all differences-in-differences estimations based on individual-
level data we use standard errors clustered at the occupational level as recommended by
Bertrand et al. (2004), pp. 270–272 to deal with serial correlation in settings with a number
of clusters N ≥ 50. The inclusion of occupation fixed effects in the presence of clustered
standard errors presents us with a problem, since in the respective specifications the number
of parameters to be estimated exceeds the number of clusters. This may lead to unreliably
estimated standard errors. Therefore, in all individual-level regressions labeled “with oc-
cupation fixed effects” we actually perform a within-occupation transformation of the data.
We calculate means of all variables by occupation and deduct these means from both the
respective dependent and the respective independent variables. We then run the full set of
regressions on the de-meaned variables. The resulting point estimates are identical to those
in the model with dummy-occupation fixed effects, but since we do not need to explicitly
estimate the occupation fixed effects any more, we now obtain the correct standard errors
and the F-statistics.
In cases where individual-level data is not available, or when we explicitly want to study
aggregate outcomes at the occupational level, we run differences-in-differences estimations
on data aggregated at the occupation-year level. Based on the occupations panel, we use
OLS estimation with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to estimate the following
differences-in-differences base specification:
Yot = α+ γt + δo +β3 ·PRt ·T Go + uot ,
where Yot is the outcome of interest in levels. Instead of Yot , in some specifications we
use conventionally calculated growth rates
(
Yopost−Yopre
Yopre
)
as the outcome variable. α is the
model constant. γt are year fixed effects and δo are the occupation fixed effects δo. As
explained above, β3 is the coefficient of interest, with PRt representing a dummy indicating
the post-reform period and T Go representing a dummy indicating treatment occupations. We
do not include other occupation-level covariates in the specifications. Thereby, we assume
that over the period of observation all crafts occupations should be affected similarly by
macroeconomic events.
Another solution proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004), pp. 267–269 to the problem of
serial correlation, which is typically present in differences-in-differences designs, is the
aggregation of panel data covering multiple years into a simple two-period panel. As a
further check on our occupation-level results, we therefore collapse the occupations panel
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into a two-period panel of crafts occupations by taking the averages of all variables over the
pre-reform years (2000–2003) and the post-reform years (2005–2008), respectively. We then
calculate conventional growth rates to assess the pre-2004 versus post-2004 changes in all
relevant outcome variables. Finally, we estimate the following first-differences (FD) model:
(
Yopost −Yopre
Yopre
)
= α+β2 ·T Go + uo,
where Yopre is the average outcome of interest over the pre-reform period and Yopost is the
average outcome of interest over the post-reform period. α is the model constant. β2 is the
coefficient of interest, with T Go representing a dummy indicating treatment occupations.
We use OLS with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to estimate the above-described
model.
4.3.1 Plausibility of the Common Trends Assumption
The differences-in-differences approach chosen in this study relies on the common trends
assumption. We must assume that the outcomes of interest would have evolved along similar
trends in the treatment and control occupations had the 2003 reform of the German Crafts
Code not happened. Since the nature of this argument is counterfactual, we cannot explicitly
check whether the assumption holds. In this section we therefore provide graphical evidence
and discuss test results to investigate whether the outcomes of interest in the two groups of
crafts occupations evolved similarly over the pre-reform period. If we observed that the two
groups of crafts occupations evolved similarly until 2003, then it would be plausible that
they could also have evolved similarly afterwards.
As Figure 4.1, p. 72 has already shown, until 2003 the evolution of the total number of
registered establishments was parallel in the treatment and the control occupations. Figure 4.3,
p. 86 adds to this by plotting the average number of registered establishments both in levels
as well as in the form of an index with base year 2000. The index in the right panel of
Figure 4.3 shows that the evolution of the outcome of interest was very similar between both
groups during the pre-reform period. Figure 4.4, p. 87 shows the evolution of the average
number of self-employed in crafts occupations. Again, we observe that although the two
groups differ in terms of levels, the outcome of interest evolved similarly over the pre-reform
period, and then diverged starting in 2005.
Figure 4.5, p. 87 shows the evolution of dependent employment as reflected by full-time
equivalents in the skilled crafts based on survey data (Microcensus). In both groups, relative
changes in full-time equivalents, as reflected by the indices, followed a negative trend before
the reform, but the trends were not fully parallel.13 Furthermore, full-time equivalents did
13Rostam-Afschar (2014), p. 1071 argues that the years before 2002 could still be influenced by the aftermath of
previous changes in the regulatory regime and, therefore, should be excluded from the analysis. However, we
85
Hanna Sarah Zwiener
Figure 4.3: Average Number of Establishments in Crafts Occupations over the Period 1998–
2010
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Data source: ZDH, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average number of establishments
per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as relative to the base
year 2000 (right panel).
not evolve along parallel trends in absolute terms. A similar picture emerges when we plot
the evolution of the average number of dependently employed in Figure A.36. However,
the pre-reform trends in the indices look more parallel if we differentiate between full-time
and part-time employment. We observe that over the pre-reform period the average number
of full-time employed (compare Figure A.37) as well as the average number of part-time
employed (compare Figure A.38) evolved fairly similarly in relative terms, but not in absolute
terms.
Figure 4.6, p. 88 shows the evolution of dependent employment in the form of full-time
equivalents based on administrative data (SIAB). Full-time equivalents evolved similarly in
the two groups in relative terms but not in absolute terms. In addition to this, Figures A.39–
A.41 provide graphical evidence on the evolution of the average number of dependently
employed craftsmen in total, as well as separately for full-time and part-time employed
craftsmen. Again, a comparison of treatment and control occupations reveals that total
dependent employment and full-time employment evolved fairly similarly over the pre-
reform period in relative terms, but not in absolute terms. Furthermore, Figure A.41 indicates
that over the pre-reform period the average number of part-time employed evolved differently
in the two groups of crafts occupations. It decreased in the treatment occupations, while it
was rather volatile in the control occupations.
In addition to the graphical results provided above, we also plot the evolution of all
view this time cutoff as somewhat arbitrary, and we want to keep the number of sampled years in the pre-
and post-reform period symmetric.
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Figure 4.4: Average Number of Self-employed in Crafts Occupations over the Period 2000–
2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of self-employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well
as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure 4.5: Average Full-time Equivalents in Crafts Occupations over the Period 2000–2008
Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of average
full-time equivalents per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as
relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure 4.6: Average Full-time Equivalents in Crafts Occupations over the Period 2000–2008
Based on Administrative Data
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Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of average full-time
equivalents per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as relative to
the base year 2004 (right panel).
outcomes of interest used in the individual-level regressions. Furthermore, we perform statis-
tical tests to investigate whether the outcomes evolved along similar trends in treatment and
control occupations over the pre-reform period 2000–2003. Further graphs, an explanation
of the test specifications, and a detailed summary of the respective test results can be found
in Appendix 5.3.3. The graphical checks and trend estimations suggest that the common
trends assumption is plausible for most but not for all of the outcomes of interest. For three
individual-level outcomes we find statistically significant differences in pre-reform trends
between treatment and control occupations.14
A further way to investigate the plausibility of the common trends assumption is to test
for the effects of placebo reforms. We implement such tests where we treat the data as if
the reform had already come into force in the beginning of 2002 or in the beginning of
2003, respectively. Ideally, such placebo regressions should yield statistically insignificant
estimates that are close to zero in absolute size. Appendix 5.3.4 contains an explanation
of the placebo tests and a detailed discussion of the test results. Unfortunately, the placebo
tests corroborate the evidence that the two groups of crafts occupations did not evolve
similarly during the pre-reform period. Especially for the dependent employment outcomes
14In light of the discussion about whether or not to include the years 2000–2001 in the estimation sample, it is
worth mentioning that once we drop the year 2000 from the sample, only in the case of the probability of
entry into dependent employment we still find statistically significantly different pre-reform trends. At the
same time, the respective estimated effects of interest in the differences-in-differences estimations are robust
to dropping the year 2000 from the sample.
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the placebo tests yield problematic estimates. The same holds for the first-differences placebo
results on growth in the the number of self-employed craftsmen.
Overall, the graphical results and the test regressions indicate that over the pre-reform
period some labor market outcomes evolved differently across treatment and control occupa-
tions. Most importantly, the placebo tests indicate that there was considerable pre-reform
heterogeneity in the evolution of dependent employment outcomes across treatment and
control occupations. This indicates that we have to view our estimation results with caution.
We cannot interpret the regression results as reflecting the causal effects of the 2003 reform
of the German Crafts Code. We will come back to this in the consolidating discussion of the
estimation results in Section 4.4.5.
4.3.2 Potentially Confounding Factors
A common concern in differences-in-differences scenarios is that economic agents may
expect the upcoming regulatory change and may adapt their economic behavior accordingly
well in advance. This would then bias the estimated effects. Fortunately, the relatively short
time span of the legislative process (the reform plans were announced in March 2003 and the
law already came into force on 1. January 2004), and the considerable uncertainty created
by the political debate over choice criteria and the exact choice of deregulated occupations,
make such adaptive behavior very unlikely. Most importantly, one has to keep in mind
that the Mediation Committee did not present its recommended alterations to the bill to the
German Bundestag until 16. December 2003, only about two weeks before the law finally
came into force. Thus, pre-reform adaptive behavior is most likely not a concern in the
context of this reform.
Furthermore, one also has to consider how the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code
affected entry regulation in the control occupations that remained subject to the master
craftsman requirement after 1. January 2004. Apart from the complete abolishment of
the master craftsman requirement in the treatment occupations, the reform also partially
reduced barriers to firm entry into the control occupations. Firstly, the abolishment of the
so-called “Inhaberprinzip” implied that as of 1. January 2004 the owner of a crafts enterprise
operating in one of the regulated markets was no longer required to hold a master craftsman
certificate personally as long as he hired an operations manager who held a master craftsman
certificate.15
Secondly, the reform strengthened special exemptions from the master craftsman require-
ment for journeymen with long work experience. For this specific group of craftsmen, special
exemptions from the master craftsman requirement already existed before 1. January 2004,
but the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code was meant to further facilitate the application
of this so-called “Altgesellenregelung”. According to Müller (2006), p. 43, in 2004 and 2005
15Six crafts occupations (chimney sweepers and five health occupations) remained exempt from this rule for
safety reasons (compare §7b HwO in its version of 29.12.2003).
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about 8% of newly registered crafts businesses in the control occupations were registered
under the exemption for journeymen with long work experience. However, according to
Müller (2006) there is no data available regarding the application of the “Altgesellenregelung”
before 2004, so we cannot assess whether these numbers constitute an increase relative to
the pre-reform period. Furthermore, the new rules pertaining to journeymen with long work
experience were designed in a way that may have mediated the potential reform effect on
self-employment: Even after the 2003 reform, the respective journeymen still had to formally
apply for an exemption from the master craftsman requirement. Although there was some
regional variation, in many cases the relevant authorities were the crafts chambers themselves.
Therefore, it was often fellow craftsmen (i.e. incumbents) who decided in each individual
case whether an exemption from the master craftsman requirement should be granted.
Thirdly, in an additional smaller amendment to the German Crafts Code that came into
force on 30. December 2003, the German government introduced the concept of minor tasks
(“einfache Tätigkeiten”) which only required short-term training of up to three months, were
not a core business element of the related crafts occupation, and, thus, were to be freed from
the master craftsman requirement. Such easy tasks had to be narrowly defined. Entry into the
related crafts occupation with its full range of offered services remained subject to the master
craftsman requirement.16 The introduction of minor tasks was explicitly meant to facilitate
the creation of small business start-ups. It was meant to complement the introduction of
Me Inc. (“Ich AG”), a start-up subsidy for the unemployed introduced in the beginning
of 2003 and abolished in August 2006 (see, for example, Deutscher Bundestag (2003c),
pp. 4055–4056). However, as Müller (2006), pp. 58–59 points out, it appears that this smaller
amendment to the German Crafts Code turned out to be of little practical importance.
Despite the above-mentioned changes in the regulation of entry into the control occu-
pations, we are of the opinion that the relevant regulatory change to evaluate is the full
abolishment of the master craftsman requirement in what we defined above as the treatment
occupations. We therefore pool all control occupations into one control group, thereby sub-
suming the above-mentioned partial lowering of barriers to entry, and focus our analysis on
the labor market effects of the full abolishment of the master craftsman requirement relative
to the control occupations. That is, we intentionally do not choose an empirical design with
several treatments of different intensity as it has been implemented in Rostam-Afschar (2014)
and Runst et al. (2016), but follow an approach more similar to Damelang et al. (2016). If
anything, our choice for a two-group design should lead to an underestimation of reform
effects and it is, thus, a rather conservative way of approaching the evaluation of this reform.
Finally, proper application of the differences-in-differences approach also requires that
no other regulatory changes or economic events which may have influenced treatment and
control occupations differently occurred around the time of the reform. Indeed, in the context
of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code two such potential confounding factors exist.
16Compare “Gesetz zur Änderung der Handwerksordnung und zur Förderung von Kleinunternehmen” in its
version of 24. December 2003 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I 2003, Nr. 66 (29.12.2003), p. 2933).
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As mentioned above, in the beginning of 2003 the German government introduced Me Inc.,
a start-up subsidy for the unemployed (Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008)). In June 2006
the Me Inc. program was abolished, and a new start-up subsidy program was introduced
in August 2006 under the name “Gründungszuschuss” (Caliendo et al. (2009)). A concern
could be that the introduction of the Me Inc. start-up subsidy in 2003 may have caused
entries into deregulated crafts occupations which without the Me Inc. program would not
have taken place. This would then introduce an upward bias into our empirical analysis of the
effects of product market deregulation on the number of registered crafts enterprises and self-
employment. While we cannot rule this out for the overall effect on the number of registered
crafts enterprises, in Section 4.4.3 we perform robustness checks to ensure that our results on
self-employment are not driven by the existence of the Me Inc. subsidy. Furthermore, since
the start-up subsidy was mainly targeted at solo-entrepreneurs its existence should not have
any confounding influence on our analysis of dependent employment effects.
Another regulatory change that may confound our analysis of the effects of product market
deregulation on self-employment is the EU enlargement to the East in 2004. As of 1. May
2004, the German labor market was opened to self-employed from the new EU member
states. Under certain conditions they were allowed to take up residence and run a business in
Germany. As the results presented in (Brenke, 2008, p. 61) suggest, the subsequent inflow of
Eastern European self-employed into crafts occupations was more strongly directed towards
the treatment occupations. To check that this regulatory change does not confound our results
on self-employment, in Section 4.4.3 we perform robustness checks showing that our results
on self-employment are not driven by the EU enlargement to the East. It is also very unlikely
that this regulatory change could confound our analysis of dependent employment effects,
since the specific rules introduced in May 2004 only applied to the self-employed.
4.3.3 Data and Sampling
This study draws on three different sources of data to analyze the effects of product market
deregulation on labor market outcomes in the German skilled crafts. We use data provided
by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), by the Research Data Centers of the
German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States,
as well as by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the
Institute for Employment Research.
ZDH data
We use occupation-level data for the period 2000–2008 that is publicly available from the
German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH) through its statistics website17 to characterize
treatment and control occupations and to analyze the link between firm entry deregulation
17See http://www.zdh-statistik.de.
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and the number of registered crafts businesses. Since all crafts businesses are required by
law to register with the crafts chambers, the data provided by the German Confederation of
Skilled Crafts is ideal for our analysis. Apart from the number of registered crafts businesses,
this data also includes information on the number of apprenticeship graduates and the number
of master craftsman exams taken (including failed exams/repetitions). As the information is
provided by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts, we can easily identify all treatment
and control occupations in the data.
Survey data
Our analysis of the relationship between product market deregulation and self-employment,
as well as part of our analysis on dependent employment effects is based on the Microcen-
sus.18 The Microcensus is a yearly survey organized by the Federal Statistical Office of
Germany to provide official statistical information on the German population’s economic
and social conditions. Specifically, we use the Scientific Use File version of the Microcensus
waves 2000–2008, provided by the Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical
Office and the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States, for our analysis. The Scien-
tific Use File covers a 0.7% representative sample of all households in Germany. Answering
the extensive core questionnaire is mandatory for the selected households. The households
in the sample are periodically replaced by new ones and specific households or individuals
cannot be traced over subsequent waves (for details see Boehle and Schimpl-Neimanns
(2010)). For our analysis we create a sample of repeated cross sections covering the period
2000–2008. The base sample contains both male and female prime-aged (25–55 years)
individuals who report being either self-employed, employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force, and whose reported occupation belongs to either the treatment or the control
occupations.
Information on the current occupation (or, in the case of those currently unemployed
or out of the labor force, information on the most recent occupation) is provided by all
survey participants. The occupational information provided in the Microcensus is coded at
the 3-digit level according to the classification of occupations of 1992 (“Klassifikation der
Berufe 1992”), as provided by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt (1992)).
We identify treatment and control occupations by carefully matching those occupations
listed in the German Crafts Code with the occupations contained in the classification of
occupations of 1992 at the 3-digit level. However, in some cases matching remains imperfect
due to the grouping of occupations for anonymization purposes in the Microcensus. The
respective occupational groups may include other occupations alongside a certain crafts
occupation from either the treatment or the control group. We later perform robustness
18In this paper the terms self-employment and dependent employment refer to two separate groups of labor
market participants. The term “self-employment” refers to individuals who report that they are currently
self-employed – either as solo self-employed or as entrepreneurs with employees. In contrast to this, the term
“dependent employment” refers to the group of salaried employees and workers.
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checks to check whether our results are driven by certain treatment or control occupations.
In the few cases where control and treatment occupations are both contained in the same
grouping, the respective occupations are dropped from the sample and are, thus, completely
excluded from the analysis. Overall, out of the theoretically available 29 control occupations
and 53 treatment occupations, in the Microcensus data we are able to identify 25 control
occupations grouped into 23 occupation IDs, as well as 37 treatment occupations grouped
into 31 occupation IDs.
To increase comparability the base sample excludes civil servants, soldiers, apprentices,
persons in military service or alternative civilian service, and persons helping in the family
business, as well as all individuals holding a university degree or a university of applied
sciences degree. We also exclude all observations with missing educational information.
Overall, the base sample contains about 195,000 person-year observations. We do not use the
sampling weights provided with the Microcensus data. Furthermore, while the base sample is
used for some parts of the analysis, we also create a set of subsamples which are required for
specific aspects of our analysis. We also aggregate the individual-level data by occupations
to create an occupation-year panel. The Appendices 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 provide further technical
details on our use of the Microcensus survey data, with Tables A.20 and A.22 giving an
overview of all samples used in the analysis based on Microcensus data, and Tables A.21
and A.23 defining the most important variables used in the analysis.
Administrative data
For our analysis of the link between product market deregulation and dependent employment
in the skilled crafts, we additionally use German administrative data from the weakly
anonymized version of the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) provided
by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB). The data set is based on social security records and
contains a large random sample of employees and workers who were dependently employed
subject to social insurance contributions sometime during the period 1975–2008. It covers
the employment histories of about 1.5 million individuals, supplemented by data on their
benefits receipt. Employment spells also include information on the worker’s current 3-digit
occupation (see Dorner et al. (2011) for further details).
For our analysis we draw a sample of spells at the 30th of June of each year and thereby
create a person-year panel covering the period 2000–2008. The base sample contains both
male and female prime-aged (25–55 years) dependently employed individuals who work
either in a treatment or a control occupation. In the SIAB, the occupational information is
coded at the 3-digit level according to the classification of occupations of 1988 (“Klassifika-
tion der Berufe 1988”) as provided by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesanstalt für
Arbeit (1988)). At the 3-digit level this corresponds to 330 different occupations in the SIAB
which we carefully match to the crafts occupations listed in the German Crafts Code. As
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in the case of the Microcensus data, for some occupations matching remains imperfect due
to the grouping of occupations at the 3-digit level in the SIAB data. The respective 3-digit
occupations may include other 4-digit occupations alongside a certain crafts occupation
from either the treatment or the control group. We later perform robustness checks to check
whether our results are driven by certain treatment or control occupations. If control and
treatment occupations are both contained in the same 3-digit occupation, the respective
occupations are completely excluded from the analysis. In total, in the SIAB data we are
able to identify 24 control and 35 treatment occupations out of the existing 29 control and 53
treatment occupations.
Regarding the type of employment, the base sample contains full-time employed and
part-time employed, but it excludes apprentices and trainees, the marginally employed, home
workers, as well as all individuals holding a university degree or a university of applied
sciences degree. We further exclude all observations with missing information regarding the
current occupation, the type of employment, or the highest educational degree. Overall, the
base sample contains about 300.000 person-year observations over the period 2000–2008,
which we then aggregate by occupations to create an occupation-year panel. Table A.24
once more summarizes all sampling criteria applied to the SIAB data. Table A.25 defines the
most important variables used in the analysis based on administrative data.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Descriptives
Our estimation approach relies on the differential comparison of a set of treatment and control
occupations. Ideally, we would like the comparability of the two groups of occupations
to be reflected both in their average compositional characteristics and in the compositions’
evolution over time. In this section, we use the three data sets, which we introduced in
Section 4.3.3, to present descriptive statistics on the treatment and control occupations,
before turning to the presentation of our estimation results in the subsequent sections. We
find that during the pre-reform period the two groups of crafts occupations differed with
respect to the levels of their sample characteristics. Against this background, we run a series
of test regressions as described in Appendix 5.3.5 to ensure that the sample composition
of the two groups of crafts occupations did not evolve systematically differently over the
pre-reform period. We test the samples for systematic patterns of differential year-to-year
changes in compositional characteristics.
As the descriptives presented in Table 4.1, p. 82 show, in the pre-reform period 2000–
2003 the treatment occupations were smaller than the control occupations in terms of the
average number of registered establishments. They also exhibited a lower average number of
apprenticeship graduates, and a lower average number of master craftsman exams (including
exam retakes). Tables 4.2, 4.3, and A.32 give an overview of the main characteristics of
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Table 4.2: Descriptives Comparing Pre- and Post-reform Period Based on Survey Data
Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
A. All craftsmen
Self-employed 5.5 6.1 9.5 10.5
Dependently employed 81.5 68.3 81.2 72.0
Unemployed 5.4 12.5 6.5 11.4
Out of labor force 7.6 13.2 2.8 6.1
Age (mean) 41.1 42.4 39.3 40.7
Female 62.2 64.2 7.8 7.9
Foreign 14.4 17.4 6.6 6.8
East EU 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1
No vocational training 34.4 36.5 10.6 11.7
Vocational training degree 65.6 63.5 89.4 88.3
Master craftsman degree 5.1 4.0 15.6 15.0
N (total) 34800 40918 49247 48555
Sample share 41.4 45.7 58.60 54.30
B. Self-employed craftsmen only
Age (mean) 41.6 42.1 41.0 42.4
Female 30.5 33.1 2.8 2.5
Foreign 7.7 11.8 2.8 3.9
East EU 0.2 4.5 0.2 0.8
No vocational training 11.2 14.8 4.0 4.8
Vocational training degree 88.8 85.2 96.0 95.2
Master craftsman degree 33.1 24.2 58.1 52.3
With employees 43.2 35.2 61.8 57.3
Hours per week (mean) 45.4 43.1 51.9 50.6
Subsidies 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.6
N (total) 1909 2480 4658 5078
Sample share 29.1 32.8 70.9 67.2
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008. Reported numbers are given in % if not noted otherwise. Pre-reform
period refers to the years 2000–2003, post-reform period refers to the years 2005–2008. East EU refers to four
new EU member states of 2004: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
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our treatment and control occupations, comparing the pre-reform to the post-reform period,
based on individual-level data. Table 4.2, Panels A, B and Table 4.3, Panel C are based
on survey data (Microcensus), while Table A.32, Panel D is based on administrative data
(SIAB). Panel A describes the composition of the base sample containing self-employed,
dependently employed, and unemployed craftsmen, as well as craftsmen who are currently
out of the labor force. Panel B describes the sub-sample of self-employed craftsmen only,
and Panel C describes the respective sub-sample of dependently employed craftsmen. Both
over the pre-reform period and over the post-reform period we observe that treatment
and control occupations differ in the levels of their average sample characteristics. The
treatment occupations exhibit a relatively higher share of female craftsmen, and also a higher
share of craftsmen with foreign citizenship. The share of unskilled craftsmen is higher in
the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations, and the share of craftsmen
holding a master craftsman certificate is lower. Over the pre-reform period the share of
self-employed craftsmen was lower in the treatment occupations, but the gap is much smaller
in the post-reform period. In both periods the shares of dependently employed craftsmen
are fairly similar in the two occupation groups. Additionally, Panel B of Table 4.2 reveals
that the share of self-employed with employees is higher in the control occupations, while
the receipt of start-up subsidies is more frequent in the treatment occupations. The fact
that the share of self-employed from new EU member states rose strongly over time in
the treatment occupations, but not in the control occupations, emphasizes the importance
of applying suitable robustness checks for the EU expansion to the East to our estimation
results. Furthermore, Panel C of Table 4.3 shows that dependently employed craftsmen in
the treatment occupations work less hours per week on average. Correspondingly, the share
of part-time employment is relatively higher in the treatment occupations. This holds for
both measures of part-time work: the one based on self-assessed part-time status, as well as
the one based on the number of hours typically worked per week.19 Table A.32, Panel D
provides supplementary information on the sample of dependent employees used to construct
the occupations panel based on administrative data (SIAB). The share of part-time working
craftsmen in the treatment occupations is much lower in the administrative data relative to
the survey data. The same holds for the share of female craftsmen. However, comparing
treatment and control occupations over the pre-reform period, the main insights obtained
from survey data also apply to the administrative data. The treatment occupations exhibit
a relatively higher share of female craftsmen, and also a higher share of craftsmen with
foreign citizenship. The share of unskilled craftsmen is higher in the treatment occupations
relative to the control occupations, and the share of craftsmen holding a master craftsman
certificate is lower. Again, the share of part-time working craftsmen is higher in the treatment
occupations relative to the control occupations.
While we observe differences in the levels of sample characteristics across the two groups
19For the sake of simplicity, in the individual-level regressions we therefore only use the hours-based part-time
measure to differentiate between the effects on full-time and part-time employment. However, we consider
both measures in the occupation-level regressions.
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Table 4.3: Descriptives Comparing Pre- and Post-reform Period Based on Survey Data
(Table 4.2 Continued)
Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
C. Dependently employed craftsmen only
Age (mean) 41.0 42.3 39.0 40.2
Female 61.3 61.4 7.8 7.3
Foreign 14.8 16.1 6.9 6.6
No vocational training 34.6 34.5 10.5 10.6
Vocational training degree 65.4 65.5 89.5 89.4
master craftsman degree 3.7 3.1 11.6 11.8
Hours per week (mean) 28.1 27.1 38.3 38.5
Part-time (self-assessed) 44.6 49.3 3.1 5.0
Part-time (≤ 30 hours) 45.5 49.6 3.6 5.2
N (total) 27720 27209 39481 34569
Sample share 41.2 44.0 58.8 56.0
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008. Reported numbers are given in % if not noted otherwise. Pre-reform
period refers to the years 2000–2003, post-reform period refers to the years 2005–2008.
of crafts occupations, our estimation approach mainly relies on the assumption that the
two groups would have evolved similarly in the absence of the reform. We cannot test this
counterfactual scenario, but we run a series of tests as described in Appendix 5.3.5 to check
whether the composition of the two groups of crafts occupations evolved similarly over the
pre-reform period. According to the summary of test results provided in Appendix 5.3.5,
we only find a few systematic differences between treatment and control occupations in the
absolute and relative year-to-year changes of a wide range of compositional characteristics
– the most important difference being that in the base sample shown in Table 4.2, Panel
A the share of part-time working craftsmen increased significantly more strongly in the
treatment occupations than in the control occupations in 2000–2001 and in 2001–2002 (for
further details see Appendix 5.3.5). Overall, we observe that while the treatment and control
occupations differed with respect to the levels of their compositional characteristics, the two
groups’ compositional characteristics evolved fairly similarly over the pre-reform period.
4.4.2 Number of Registered Establishments
The main objective of the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into crafts occupations was to
foster entrepreneurship and firm entry into the deregulated markets. We therefore begin our
analysis of the effects of product market deregulation on labor market outcomes by studying
the relationship between the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code and growth in the
number of registered crafts establishments.
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Table 4.4: Occupation-level Estimation Results on Growth in the Number of Registered
Establishments in Crafts Occupations
Differences-in-differences estimation FD estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TG*PR 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.086*** 0.060*** 0.068***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Treatment group -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.217***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.074)
Post-reform period 0.010***
(0.003)
Year fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes –
Occupation fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes –
Wave 2004 included no no no yes no yes no
Check: EU expansion no no no no yes yes yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
N 574 574 574 656 518 592 74
Adj. R2 0.214 0.260 0.594 0.521 0.580 0.580 0.061
Data source: ZDH, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01. All
estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. DiD estimations based on occupations panel, wave 2004
excluded except in specifications (4) and (6), dependent variable: yearly growth rate of number of establishments,
robust standard errors. Occupation fixed effects “yes” indicates that we have performed the respective
within-transformation. Check: EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude treatment occupations with a high
share of newly registered establishments coming from new Eastern EU member states: Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. FD estimation based on two-period panel, dependent variable: growth rate of
number of establishments (comparing pre- and post-reform period), wave 2004 excluded, robust standard errors.
Table 4.4 provides the estimation results of our differences-in-differences estimations based
on an occupations panel. The coefficient on T G∗PR reflects the reform effect. According to
column (1), on average the abolishment of the master craftsman requirement was associated
with an increase in yearly growth in the number of registered crafts establishments by about
6.9 percentage points relative to the control occupations. The estimate barely changes if
we control for year and occupation fixed effects in columns (2) and (3). This estimate is
economically large given that the average yearly growth rate in the number of registered
crafts establishments in the treatment occupations was negative and amounted to -2.6% over
the pre-reform period 2000–2003. An estimated effect of about 6.9 percentage points would
roughly correspond to a total of about 5,300 additionally registered crafts establishments per
year. If we include the year 2004 in our estimation sample, the coefficient even increases to
8.6 percentage points and remains highly statistically significant.
However, one has to keep in mind the potentially confounding factors which we mentioned
in Section 4.3.2. According to Müller (2006) and Brenke (2008), the EU enlargement to the
East may at least partly explain the large estimates. As Müller (2006), pp. 64–65 reports
for the post-reform years 2004 and 2005, the inflow of entrepreneurs from the new EU
member states into German crafts occupations was focused on certain specific treatment
occupations, and it barely affected the control occupations at all. If we drop from our
estimation sample those two treatment occupations that are responsible for about 90% of all
newly registered crafts businesses from the new EU member states, the coefficient of interest
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actually increases to about 7.5 percentage points (not reported in Table 4.4). Column (5) in
Table 4.4 reports a stricter version of this robustness check where we exclude from the sample
all treatment occupations that in 2004 and 2005 had substantial shares of newly registered
establishments from the new EU member states of more than about 3% according to Müller
(2006), p. 186. Here, we find that the estimate reduces to about 6.0 percentage points, but
remains highly statistically significant. If we then, again, also include the year 2004 in our
estimation sample, the estimated growth differential amounts to 6.8 percentage points. Thus,
even if we control for the inflow of entrepreneurs stimulated by the EU expansion to the
East, we still find that the abolishment of barriers to firm entry in the treatment occupations
was associated with a substantial increase in growth in the average number of registered
crafts establishments by about 6.0–6.8 percentage points. This would roughly correspond
to a total of about 2600–3000 additionally registered crafts establishments per year. These
results are also largely robust to sequentially excluding single years or occupations from
the estimation sample. When we exclude the year 2003 from the estimation sample, the
estimated coefficient drops to its lowest value at 5.5 percentage points .
As recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004), we also run first-differences estimations
on a two-period version of our occupations panel to compare average pre- versus post-
reform growth rates in the number of registered crafts establishments. The coefficient on the
treatment group dummy in column (7) gives us the effect of interest. We find that the average
growth in the number of registered crafts establishments was about 21.7 percentage points
higher in the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations. The effect is highly
statistically significant and it is mostly robust to sequentially excluding single occupations
from the estimation sample. In one case, if we exclude the treatment occupation container
and apparatus makers from the estimation sample, the estimate drops to 16 percentage points
but remains highly statistically significant.
4.4.3 Self-employment
The occupation-level results presented in the previous section suggest that the lowering of
barriers to firm entry led to increased growth in the number of registered crafts establishments
in the treatment relative to the control occupations. However, so far we have not been able
to exclude one further potentially confounding factor from our analysis: The introduction
of the start-up subsidy Me Inc. in 2003 may explain at least part of the estimated relation-
ship. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out this latter potentially confounding factor based on
aggregate ZDH data. In this section, we perform individual-level as well as occupation-level
regressions to study the relationship between the abolishment of barriers to firm entry and
self-employment in the skilled crafts. In Germany, self-employed who offer their services in
one of the markets regulated by the German Crafts Code have to register their business with
the crafts chambers. Therefore, this labor market outcome should be the one most closely
related to our analysis of growth in the number of registered crafts businesses. Furthermore,
99
Hanna Sarah Zwiener
Table 4.5: Occupation-level Differences-in-differences Results on the Number of Self-
employed in Crafts Occupations
Differences-in-differences estimation on occupations panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TG*PR 0.722 2.978 2.978** 2.728** 2.062* 3.061** 2.145*
(9.723) (7.409) (1.389) (1.308) (1.229) (1.375) (1.216)
Treatment group -32.955*** -34.083***
(6.497) (5.765)
Post-reform period 4.565
(8.943)
Year fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no yes no no no
Check: EU expansion no no no no yes no yes
Check: Subsidies no no no no no yes yes
Dependent variable in – levels –
N 400 400 400 450 400 400 400
Adj. R2 0.107 0.096 0.975 0.976 0.979 0.975 0.979
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on occupations panel as
described in Table A.20, dependent variable: number of self-employed, wave 2004 excluded, robust standard
errors. Check: EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals coming from four new Eastern EU
member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Check: Subsidies “yes” indicates that we
exclude individuals who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
the use of individual-level data allows us to run robustness checks for the receipt of start-up
subsidies.
At the occupational level, we consider the relationship between the reform and the number
of self-employed craftsmen. At the individual level, we analyze several outcomes: the
probability of being self-employed among all employed craftsmen, as well as the probability
of being self-employed among all employed craftsmen, unemployed craftsmen and those
craftsmen who are currently out of the labor force. In addition, we consider the probability
of entry into self-employment, as well as the probability of exit out of self-employment. We
also study how the reform relates to the probability of being newly self-employed among all
self-employed craftsmen. We consider as “newly self-employed” all those craftsmen who
just started their current self-employment in the year in which the survey was taken. All
results on self-employment are based on survey data from the Microcensus SUF 2000–2008.
The technical Appendix 5.3.1 provides detailed information on the definitions of outcome
variables and samples. It also provides an overview of further important variables used in the
analysis.
Table 4.5 provides the estimation results of our differences-in-differences estimations
based on an occupations panel. The coefficient on T G ∗ PR describes the relationship
between the lowering of barriers to entry into crafts occupations and the number of self-
employed. The specification with year and occupation fixed effects in column (3) indicates
that, on average, the abolishment of the master craftsman requirement was associated with an
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increase in the number of self-employed craftsmen by about 3 persons relative to the control
occupations.20 If we include the year 2004 in our estimation sample, the estimate reduces
to about 2.7 and remains statistically significant. In contrast to what we observed in the
previous section regarding the 2004 increase in the number of registered establishments, this
reduction suggests that while the reform came into force on 1. January 2004, it took some
time for craftsmen to react to the regulatory changes. However, one has to keep in mind that
the Microcensus survey data was collected in spring 2004, which may explain that we do
not observe a substantial rise in the number of self-employed in 2004 based on Microcensus
data. Furthermore, to check whether the estimates are confounded by the 2003 introduction
of the Me Inc. start-up subsidy, we construct a dummy variable that indicates the presumable
receipt of Me Inc. start-up subsidies (for details on the variable definition see Table A.21).21
As a robustness check, we can now drop all self-employed who presumably receive the Me
Inc. start-up subsidy from the estimation sample. If we implement checks both for the EU
expansion to the East and for receipt of the Me Inc. start-up subsidy, the estimate reduces
to about 2.1 in column (7). Compared to the average number of self-employed craftsmen
per treatment occupation, which amounted to about 18.4 over the pre-reform period, the
estimated effect roughly corresponds to a relative increase by about 12%. If we sequentially
exclude single occupations from the estimation sample, we find that in some cases the effect
of interest further decreases in size and turns statistically insignificant. This also happens if
we exclude either the year 2000 or the year 2008 from the estimation sample.
At the occupational level, we additionally perform first-differences estimations on a
two-period version of our occupations panel to compare growth in the average pre- versus
post-reform numbers of self-employed craftsmen. The coefficient on the treatment group
dummy in Table 4.6, p. 102 gives us the effect of interest. When we compare the average
growth rates spanning the reform period between treatment and control occupations, we
find that growth in the deregulated crafts occupations was about 25.5 percentage points
higher in the treatment occupations, on average. The effect is statistically significant at the
10%-level. According to Table 4.6, if we apply checks for the EU expansion to the East and
the Me Inc. subsidies, the estimated coefficient only slightly diminishes to 24.1 percentage
points and remains statistically significant at the 10%-level. However, when we sequentially
exclude single occupations from the estimation sample, we find that the magnitude of the
estimates varies in the range of about 15–30 percentage points, and in many of the robustness
regressions the estimates of interest are statistically insignificant at significance levels of
mostly 11–15%. In the most extreme case, when we exclude the treatment occupation
decorative metalworkers from the estimation sample, the estimate drops to 0.153 and turns
statistically insignificant.
20Due to a few year-occupation cells with zero self-employed, we cannot calculate yearly growth rates. Therefore,
we present results for the outcome variable in levels. This is feasible, since Figure 4.4 shows that the number
of self-employed in the treatment and the control occupations followed similar trends over the pre-reform
period even if one considers the outcome in levels (see left panel of Figure 4.4).
21This is a modified version of the subsidies variable used in Rostam-Afschar (2014).
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Table 4.6: Occupation-level First-differences Results on Growth in the Number of Self-
employed in Crafts Occupations
First-differences estimation on occupations panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group 0.255* 0.257* 0.239* 0.241*
(0.142) (0.143) (0.140) (0.141)
Year fixed effects – – – –
Occupation fixed effects – – – –
Wave 2004 included no no no no
Check: EU expansion no no yes yes
Check: Subsidies no yes no yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
N 50 50 50 50
Adj. R2 0.039 0.039 0.033 0.034
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All FD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on two-period panel,
dependent variable: growth rate of number of self-employed (comparing pre- and post-reform period), wave
2004 excluded, robust standard errors. Check: EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals coming
from four new Eastern EU member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Check: Subsidies
“yes” indicates that we exclude individuals who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
At the aggregate level, the results suggest that the abolishment of barriers to firm entry
into crafts occupations had a positive effect on self-employment. However, with the weak
robustness of the results in mind, we now turn to the individual-level analysis. Table 4.7
gives an overview of the results of differences-in-differences estimations based on individual-
level data. The coefficient on PR∗T G describes the relationship between the 2003 reform
of the German Crafts Code and individual-level self-employment outcomes. Surprisingly,
in column (1) we find no relationship between the reform and the probability of being
self-employed among all employed craftsmen. When we turn to the probability of being
self-employed in a sample consisting of craftsmen who are self-employed, dependently
employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force, the results in column (2) also suggest that
the reform was neutral. The results for the probability of entry into or out of self-employment
are similarly neutral. Our results on these four outcome variables are largely robust against
a number of robustness checks, such as sequentially excluding single years, occupations,
federal states, or five-year age groups from the estimation sample. Furthermore, the results
presented in columns (1)–(4) already incorporate the robustness checks regarding the EU
expansion to the East and the start-up subsidy Me Inc.
Additionally, we estimate differences-in-differences-in-differences (DiDiD) specifications
by interacting dummy variables for certain individual-level characteristics with the terms PR,
T G and PR∗T G, respectively. Table A.33 shows selected results of the DiDiD-estimations,
with columns (1) and (4) repeating the differences-in-differences results from Table 4.7.
We observe a few cases of effect heterogeneity for female craftsmen and for self-employed
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Table 4.7: Individual-level Differences-in-differences Results on Self-employment in Crafts
Occupations
Differences-in-differences estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Probability Entry Exit New self-employment
TG * PR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 0.019**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.027) (0.008)
Female -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.009*** 0.106** 0.021**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.002) (0.052) (0.008)
Age 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.002*** -0.021*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign -0.011** -0.010** -0.000 0.038*** 0.022*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013)
No vocational training -0.025** -0.025*** -0.003** 0.046*** 0.014*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.015) (0.008)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no no no
Check: EU expansion yes yes yes no yes
Check: Subsidies yes yes yes no yes
Dependent variable in – levels –
N 145,153 173,294 128,120 9,050 13,663
Adj. R2 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.028 0.021
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on individual-level data,
different estimation samples as described in Table A.20, dependent dummy variables: see column title and
description in Table A.21, wave 2004 excluded, standard errors clustered at occupation level. Other controls
include age, age2, dummy variables for foreign citizenship, no vocational training. Occupation fixed effects
“yes” indicates that the model has been within-transformed with respect to occupation-specific means. Check:
EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals coming from four new Eastern EU member states:
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Check: Subsidies “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals
who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
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craftsmen with employees. Table A.33, column (2) suggests that female craftsmen profited
from the reform relative to male craftsmen regarding the probability of being self-employed
(see the coefficient on Female * TG * PR). Furthermore, according to column (3) the prob-
ability of being self-employed increased more strongly for self-employed with employees
relative to that of solo self-employed (see the coefficient on With empl. * TG * PR). How-
ever, these differential effects are only statistically significant in the specifications where
we incorporate the checks for the EU expansion to the East and for the Me Inc. start-up
subsidy. If we loosen our sampling restrictions, the respective coefficients turn statistically
insignificant. Interestingly, Table A.33, column (5) indicates that the probability of entry into
self-employment decreased more strongly for self-employed with employees relative to that
of solo self-employed. This differential effect is statistically significant whether or not we
incorporate the other robustness checks for the EU expansion to the East and the start-up
subsidy Me Inc. However, this seems to contradict the differential results we just presented
for the probability of being self-employed. Unfortunately, due to data limitations we cannot
perform similar DiDiD regressions for the probability of exit out of self-employment.
While the results in Table 4.7 suggest that the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code
was neutral with respect to many individual-level self-employment outcomes, the table’s
last column displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the probability of
being newly self-employed. In addition to this, Table 4.8 provides detailed regression results
on the probability of being newly self-employed. Column (4) shows the base specification
with an estimated effect of about 2 percentage points that is statistically significant at the
α = 5% level. The application of robustness checks for the EU expansion to the East and
the start-up subsidy Me Inc. slightly reduces the estimated coefficient in size. The coefficient
also decreases if we include the wave 2004 in our estimation sample, but the estimate
remains statistically significant. We find no statistically significant differential effects across
demographic subgroups.
An estimated effect of 1.9 percentage points would actually be sizable. Given the average
pre-reform share of new self-employment of about 3.6% in the treatment occupations, an
additional increase by 1.9 percentage points would correspond to a relative increase by
about 53%. However, when we conduct a series of robustness checks, such as sequentially
excluding single years, occupations, federal states, five-year age groups, or demographic
subgroups from the estimation sample, we find that this estimation result is less robust than
the other results presented above in Table 4.7. When we exclude either the federal state of
Lower Saxony or the year 2005 from the estimation sample, the estimate even drops as low
as 0.015 and turns statistically insignificant.
To sum up our results on self-employment, at the aggregate level we find that the abolish-
ment of barriers to firm entry into the skilled crafts was associated with a both economically
and statistically significant increase in the number of self-employed craftsmen in the treatment
occupations relative to the control occupations. However, this occupation-level relationship
is hardly reflected in the individual-level analysis of self-employment probabilities. We
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Table 4.8: Individual-level Differences-in-differences Results on the Probability of Being
Newly Self-employed in Crafts Occupations
Differences-in-differences estimation for new self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TG*PR 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.020** 0.019** 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Treatment group -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010)
Post-reform period 0.005
(0.006)
Female 0.022*** 0.021** 0.021***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Age -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign citizenship 0.032* 0.022* 0.034**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
No vocational training 0.010 0.014* 0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Year fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no no no yes
Check: EU expansion no no no no yes no
Check: Subsidies no no no no yes no
Dependent variable in – levels –
N 13,886 13,886 13,886 13,886 13,663 15,526
Adj. R2 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.023 0.021 0.023
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on individual-level data,
estimation sample new self-employment as described in Table A.20, dependent dummy variables: new
self-employment as described in Table A.21, wave 2004 excluded, standard errors clustered at occupation level.
Occupation fixed effects “yes” indicates that the model has been within-transformed with respect to
occupation-specific means. Check: EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals coming from four
new Eastern EU member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Check: Subsidies “yes”
indicates that we exclude individuals who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
only observe a non-zero relationship between the reform and the probability of being newly
self-employed. However, we must keep in mind that the checks regarding the credibility of
the common trends assumption revealed a statistically significant difference in pre-reform
trends for exactly this outcome variable.
4.4.4 Dependent Employment
The proponents of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code argued that the barriers to firm
entry created by the master craftsman requirement distorted competition, which, ultimately,
also had adverse effects on dependent employment in the skilled crafts. Accordingly, the
proponents of the reform expected that the abolishment of the master craftsman requirement
should lead to higher levels of dependent employment in the deregulated markets. As
we have mentioned in Section 4.1, this expectation is also in line with economic theory.
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Table 4.9: Occupation-level Differences-in-differences Results on Growth in Dependent
Employment Outcomes in Crafts Occupations Based on Survey Data
Differences-in-differences estimation on occupations panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total FTE FTE Full-time Full-time
(SIAB) (> 30 h) (self-rep.)
TG*PR -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 -0.006
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no no no
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
N 357 357 357 357 357
Adj. R2 -0.048 -0.039 -0.022 -0.039 -0.043
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on occupations panel as
described in Table A.22, dependent variables: yearly growth rate of respective variable (see column title and
description in Table A.23), wave 2004 excluded, robust standard errors.
In this section, we therefore study how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into the
treatment occupations was related to a wide range of measures of dependent employment.
Most results on dependent employment are based on survey data from the Microcensus.
The technical Appendix 5.3.2 explains the definition of the respective outcome variables,
important covariates, and samples. We supplement our occupation-level results on dependent
employment by providing further empirical evidence based on administrative data (SIAB).
Details on the definition of the respective outcome variables and samples can also be found
in the technical Appendix 5.3.2.
Table 4.9 provides differences-in-differences estimation results on growth in dependent
employment outcomes which have been aggregated at the occupational level. All outcome
variables are measured in conventional growth rates, and the coefficient on T G∗PR reflects
the effect of interest. We consider how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into the
treatment occupations was related to growth in the total number of dependently employed
craftsmen (including both part-time and full-time employed) in column (1). Furthermore,
we run the estimations for growth in two different kinds of full-time equivalents: In col-
umn (2), full-time equivalents are based on weighting observations by the exact number of
self-reported typical weekly working hours. In column (3), we use full-time equivalents con-
structed to mimic the weighting procedures underlying the SIAB-based full-time equivalents.
In addition to this, we consider growth in the number of full-time employed craftsmen: In
column (4), the full-time measure is based on the worker-specific typical weekly working
hours, whereas in column (5) full-time status is self-reported.22 For the wide range of
22Unfortunately, we cannot provide results on growth in part-time employment. We cannot compute growth
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Table 4.10: Occupation-level First-differences Results on Growth in Dependent Employment
Outcomes in Crafts Occupations Based on Survey Data
First-differences estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total FTE FTE Full-time Full-time
(SIAB) (> 30 h) (self-rep.)
Treatment group 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.008 0.005
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Year fixed effects – – – – –
Occupation fixed effects – – – – –
Wave 2004 included no no no no no
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
N 51 51 51 51 51
Adj. R2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All FD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on two-period panel,
dependent variables: growth rate of respective variable (comparing pre- and post-reform period), wave 2004
excluded, robust standard errors.
aggregate employment outcomes presented in Table 4.9, we find no statistically significant
reform effects. The estimated effects on growth in the total number of dependently employed,
in full-time equivalents, and in full-time employment are negative and very small in absolute
size. All estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. We also apply a series of
robustness checks to these regressions. When we include the year 2004 in our estimation
sample, all estimated coefficients are even closer to zero and remain statistically insignificant.
The results are largely robust to the exclusion of single years or single occupations from the
estimation sample. In some cases, the robustness checks yield very small positive but still
statistically insignificant coefficients.
In addition to this, we run first-differences estimations on a two-period version of our
occupations panel to compare growth in average pre- versus post-reform dependent em-
ployment outcomes. The coefficient on the treatment group dummy in Table 4.10 gives us
the effect of interest. We find that for a wide range of outcomes growth rates spanning the
introduction of the reform were similar in the treatment and the control occupations. The
coefficients of interest for the total number of dependently employed, the two measures of
full-time equivalents, and the two measures of full-time employed, are all positive but rather
small in absolute size and statistically insignificant. These results are, again, largely robust
to sequentially excluding single occupations from the estimation sample.
rates due to a number of year-occupation cells with zero part-time employees. Furthermore, we cannot
present estimation results on the part-time variables in levels, since the graphical evidence summarized in
Section 4.3.1 clearly indicates that the dependent employment outcomes only followed parallel pre-reform
trends in relative terms (right panels of graphs) but not if we consider absolute levels (left panels of graphs).
However, part-time employment enters the analysis both through the total number of dependently employed
craftsmen, as well as through the two different types of full-time equivalents.
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Table 4.11: Occupation-level Estimation Results on Growth in Dependent Employment
Outcomes in Crafts Occupations Based on Administrative Data
Differences-in-differences estimation First-differences estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total FTE Full-time Total FTE Full-time
TG*PR -0.027* -0.029* -0.033**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
TG -0.052* -0.056* -0.064**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes – – –
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes – – –
Wave 2004 included no no no no no no
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
N 413 413 413 59 59 59
Adj. R2 -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 0.029 0.034 0.044
Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; ***
p< 0.01. All estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. DiD estimations based on occupations
panel as described in Table A.24, dependent variables: yearly growth rate of respective variable (see column title
and description in Table A.25), wave 2004 excluded, robust standard errors. FD estimation based on two-period
panel as described in Table A.24, dependent variables: growth rate of respective variable (comparing pre- and
post-reform period), wave 2004 excluded, robust standard errors.
Table 4.11 provides further occupation-level results on growth in dependent employment
outcomes based on administrative data (SIAB). Again, all outcome variables are measured
in conventional growth rates. In column (1), we run a differences-in-differences regression
to analyze how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into the treatment occupations
was related to growth in the total number of dependently employed craftsmen (including
both part-time and full-time employed). Furthermore, we run differences-in-differences
estimations for growth in full-time equivalents in column (2), and for growth in the number of
full-time employed craftsmen in column (3). Columns (4)–(6) contain the corresponding first-
differences estimation results. The estimated differences-in-differences results on growth
in the total number of dependently employed, in full-time equivalents, and in the number
full-time employed are negative and statistically significant. The results indicate that growth
in dependent employment was about 3 percentage points lower in the treatment occupations
relative to the control occupations. Given that during the pre-reform period the average
yearly growth rates in the respective outcome variables were negative and amounted to
about -3.2% in the treatment occupations, the differences-in-differences results are sizable.
The estimates are also qualitatively robust to including the year 2004 in the estimation
sample. According to Table 4.11, the first-differences estimates are more pronounced than
the respective differences-in-differences results. The results in columns (4)–(6) also suggest
negative effects of the abolishment of barriers to firm entry on dependent employment.
However, if we sequentially exclude single occupations from the estimation sample, the
first-differences estimates decrease in absolute size to a minimum of about -4 percentage
points and turn statistically insignificant in several cases.
At the individual level, we analyze how the abolishment of barriers to firm entry was related
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Table 4.12: Individual-level Differences-in-differences(-in-differences) Results on Depen-
dent Employment in Crafts Occupations Based on Survey Data
Differences-in-differences(-in-differences) estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probability Probability Entry Entry Exit New employment
TG*PR -0.046*** -0.065* -0.008* -0.007** 0.017*** -0.002 -0.006*
(0.015) (0.034) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Part-time * TG* PR 0.062* -0.039 -0.031
(0.034) (0.026) (0.025)
Part-time * TG 0.252*** -0.015 -0.050***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.014)
Part-time * PR 0.096*** 0.049* 0.046*
(0.011) (0.026) (0.025)
Part-time 0.254*** 0.143*** 0.084***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.014)
Female -0.026 -0.144*** 0.007* -0.024** -0.015 -0.007 -0.025*
(0.037) (0.020) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Age 0.008** 0.004 -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign -0.018** -0.003 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
No vocational training -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.006 -0.004 0.007*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no no no no no
Dependent variable in – levels –
N 173,520 173,520 128,314 128,314 90,243 127,015 127,015
Adj. R2 0.027 0.162 0.005 0.041 0.004 0.010 0.015
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on individual-level data,
different estimation samples as described in Table A.22, dependent dummy variables: see column title and
description in Table A.23, wave 2004 excluded, standard errors clustered at occupation level. Occupation fixed
effects “yes” indicates that the model has been within-transformed with respect to occupation-specific means.
to dependent employment probabilities. We consider the probability of being dependently
employed, the probability of entry into dependent employment, as well as the probability
of exit out of dependent employment based on the survey data set Microcensus. We also
study the probability of being newly dependently employed among all dependently employed
craftsmen. We define as “newly employed” all those employees who just started their current
job in the year in which the survey was taken. As far as possible, we also analyze whether
there are differential effects for part-time employed craftsmen (based on the 30-hours-cutoff
version of the part-time dummy).23
Table 4.12 provides an overview of the main individual-level differences-in-differences
results on dependent employment. According to column (1), the probability of being
dependently employed significantly decreased by 4.6 percentage points in the treatment
occupations relative to the control occupations. Given that the average pre-reform probability
23We do not have sufficient information on the employment conditions one year before the time of the survey to
study interaction effects for the probability of exit out of dependent employment.
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of being dependently employed in the crafts occupations was 81.5% (compare Table 4.2,
Panel A), this is roughly equivalent to a relative decrease of about 5.6%. This negative
estimate on the probability of being dependently employed corresponds to a 0.8 percentage
point decrease in the entry probability in column (3), as well as a 1.7 percentage point
increase in the exit probability in column (5). We do not observe a statistically significant
effect on the probability of being newly dependently employed in the deregulated markets.
Our results on these four outcome variables are largely robust to a number of robustness
checks, such as sequentially excluding single years, occupations, federal states, or five-year
age groups from the estimation sample. If we include the year 2004 in the estimation sample,
the estimation results become a bit less pronounced but do not change statistical significance.
Furthermore, DiDiD estimation results suggest that the negative entry effect was even more
pronounced for foreigners, and that the exit effect was more pronounced for female craftsmen
(estimates not reported in tables).
In a further set of DiDiD regressions, we include interactions with the part-time dummy to
allow for differential effects for part-time employees. We find that the estimated coefficients
on T G∗PR, which then reflect the relationship between the abolishment of barriers to firm
entry and dependent employment probabilities for full-time employed, are qualitatively
similar to the results described above. Furthermore, we find a statistically significant differ-
ential effect for part-time employed in the case of only one outcome. The results provided
in Table 4.12, column (2) suggest that for part-time employees the probability of being
dependently employed decreased much less than for full-time employees. Unfortunately, due
to data limitations we cannot investigate effect heterogeneity for the probability of exit out
of dependent employment.
4.4.5 Discussion of Empirical Results
In the previous sections we have presented estimation results on the relationship between the
abolishment of barriers to firm entry into crafts occupations and the number of registered
crafts establishments, as well as a wide range of employment outcomes at both the individual
level and the occupational level. The initial objective of our analysis was to identify the
causal effects of product market deregulation on individual labor-market outcomes based
on a differences-in-differences analysis. The crafts occupations included in the treatment
and the control group were all subject to the same regulatory framework until the end of
2003. This should have made them largely comparable and, thus, suitable for the application
of a differences-in-differences approach. However, as extensive checks have revealed, the
common trends assumption implied by the differences-in-differences approach is not fully
plausible for the crafts occupations in our sample. This is reflected by graphical evidence
on the pre-reform period, as well as by statistically significantly different pre-reform trends
in some of the outcomes variables. Most importantly, the placebo test regressions reveal a
substantial degree of pre-reform heterogeneity in the evolution of employment outcomes
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in the treatment and control occupations. Furthermore, both for self-employment and for
dependent employment we observe different, even partially contradictory results when we
compare occupation-level and individual-level estimates. This further complicates the overall
interpretation of our results.24
In addition to these findings, our insights into the institutional background of the 2003
reform of the German Crafts Code contribute to the view that the treatment control occupa-
tions are not sufficiently comparable. As we have explained in Section 4.2, the deregulated
occupations constitute a non-random sample of all crafts occupations. We take account of
this by fully excluding from the analysis those 12 crafts occupations which were reassigned
from becoming deregulated to remaining regulated in 2003. However, this sampling rule
cannot fully solve the potential distortion of results arising from non-random assignment into
treatment. If, for example, reassignment was achieved for those 12 crafts occupations for
which the negotiation efforts were most economically rewarding through the upholding of
incumbents’ economic rents, then the remaining 53 treatment occupations would constitute
a negative selection. These 53 occupations would then be the occupations with relatively
worse prospects of economic performance – or these could be the occupations where barriers
to firm entry induced by the master craftsman requirement were relatively less binding
or economically less relevant during the pre-reform period. Although both scenarios are
hypothetical, they illustrate how non-random assignment into treatment could distort our
estimation results.
Given the problems revealed both by our investigation of the institutional background of
the reform and by the extensive empirical checks, we must conclude that we cannot interpret
the results presented in the previous sections as reflecting the causal effects of the abolishment
of barriers to firm entry on labor market outcomes in the German skilled crafts. This paper
therefore mainly documents our analysis of the reform, and we are very careful with the
overall interpretation of our results. However, the estimation results are still suggestive of a
certain direction of the reform effects. We find that after the abolishment of barriers to firm
entry, growth in the number of registered crafts establishments was significantly higher in
the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations. This result is robust to taking
account of the EU expansion to the East in 2005. Our analysis in Section 4.4.3 suggests
that at the aggregate level the increase in the number of registered crafts establishments
translated into an increase in the number of self-employed craftsmen. This holds even if we
include robustness checks for two potentially confounding factors: the receipt of start-up
subsidies, as well as the EU expansion to the East in 2005. However, at the individual level
the differences-in-differences estimations suggest that the reform was largely neutral with
respect to self-employment probabilities and the self-employment share. Only the probability
of being newly self-employed shows a statistically significant positive coefficient of interest,
but the respective pre-reform trend regression and further robustness checks cast doubts on
24These differences between occupation-level and individual-level results continue to exist even if we consider
individual-level specifications that do not include any other covariates besides year and occupation fixed
effects.
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the reliability of this specific result.
Our individual-level results on self-employment differ from the results provided in Rostam-
Afschar (2014) and Runst et al. (2016), who, based on the same data set, find a positive
reform effect on the probability of being self-employed, as well as on the probability of
entry into self-employment. However, one has to keep in mind that our empirical design
differs substantially from that chosen by Rostam-Afschar (2014) and Runst et al. (2016) –
for example with respect to the definition of treatment and control groups and the period of
observation. Similar to Damelang et al. (2016), we group all crafts occupations that remained
subject to the master craftsman requirement into one control group, irrespective of whether
or not these occupations experienced a partial lowering of barriers to firm entry trough the
strengthening of exemptions from the master craftsman requirement for journeymen with
long work experience. Interestingly, similar to Runst et al. (2016) our analysis suggests a
positive reform effect on the probability of being newly self-employed, which can be seen an
alternative measure of entry into-self-employment. However, as we have mentioned above
the estimate is not fully reliable. Furthermore, previous research on the effects of product
market deregulation has found that the lowering of barriers to firm entry tends to foster
so-called “marginal self-employment”. This means that the new entrepreneurs are typically
less well prepared, less well educated, and their start-ups are typically smaller and survive
for shorter time periods (Branstetter et al. (2013)). In our analysis of self-employment, we
check for effect heterogeneity with respect to the individual-level characteristics of the self-
employed. In contrast to Rostam-Afschar (2014), we do not find differential reform effects
for low-skilled self-employed, which would be suggestive of a tendency towards marginal
self-employment. However, our results suggest that female craftsmen profited from the
reform relative to their male counterparts regarding the probability of being self-employed.
This also corresponds to a higher post-reform share of female self-employed craftsmen in
the treatment occupations. Regarding our results on entrepreneurship and self-employment,
we conclude that while we cannot interpret the empirical results causally, the analysis at
least partially corroborates the evidence provided by Rostam-Afschar (2014) and Runst et al.
(2016) that the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into the German skilled crafts fostered
entrepreneurship and self-employment in the deregulated markets. However, related studies
indicate that these new entrepreneurs in the deregulated crafts occupations tended to be
less well educated (Rostam-Afschar (2014); Runst et al. (2016)) and that their firms were
relatively smaller and had lower survival rates (Müller (2016)).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide detailed estimation results
on the relationship between the abolishment of barriers to firm entry into crafts occupations
through the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code and dependent employment in the
German skilled crafts. At the occupational level, estimation results based on survey data sug-
gest that the reform was neutral with respect to growth in dependent employment outcomes
such as total dependent employment, full-time employment, and full-time equivalents. The
individual-level results, which are also based on survey data, even suggest that the reform
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effects on dependent employment probabilities were negative. Supplementary occupation-
level results, which we obtain based on administrative data, also indicate that after the reform
growth in dependent employment outcomes was significantly lower in the treatment occupa-
tions relative to the control occupations. One has to keep in mind that the test regressions,
especially the placebo tests, reveal substantial pre-reform heterogeneity in the evolution of
dependent employment outcomes in the treatment and the control occupations. Nevertheless,
our estimation results at least suggest that the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code did
not have a positive effect on dependent employment in the deregulated markets. This is also
in line with the conclusions recently drawn from a descriptive analysis by Müller (2016).
Such a result would not necessarily contradict the predictions made by economic theory.
Theoretical papers on the labor market effects of product market deregulation typically
predict positive long-run effects on dependent employment in the respective markets. Our
period of observation may simply be too short to observe such positive long-run effects.
However, Müller (2016) provides further graphical evidence which suggests that even over
the extended post-reform period 2005–2013 dependent employment did not evolve more
positively in the deregulated crafts occupations relative to the regulated ones.25
4.5 Conclusions
Economic theory predicts that product market deregulation, such as the lowering of barriers
to firm entry, should affect market competition and industry dynamics, as well as labor
market outcomes. Cross-country comparison studies have, indeed, found that stricter product
market regulations are associated with reduced entry of new firms and lower employment
rates, among others. More recently, economists have exploited product market reforms within
certain countries as natural experiments to study the effects of product market deregulation on
labor market outcomes based on micro data. Our empirical study contributes to this second
strand of the economic literature. We exploit the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code as a
natural experiment to study the relationship between the abolishment of barriers to firm entry
into a substantial number of the German skilled crafts and the number of registered crafts
businesses, self-employment, as well as dependent employment outcomes in the respective
markets. While the labor market effects of the 2003 reform of the German Crafts Code
have been studied before, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to provide detailed
estimation results on dependent employment outcomes. Our study differs from the most
closely related papers (Rostam-Afschar (2014); Runst et al. (2016)), which also evaluate
the labor market effects of the respective reform, with respect to important aspects of the
empirical design.
A close investigation of the institutional background and extensive empirical checks cast
25The stronger employment growth in the deregulated occupations, which Müller (2016) observes for the years
2010–2012, vanishes once the author excludes the deregulated occupation building cleaners from the sample
(compare Figure 5 in Müller (2016), p. 11).
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doubts on the comparability of treatment and control occupations. We conclude that the
assumption of common trends is not fully plausible. There are substantial differences not only
in the average levels, but also the in pre-reform evolution of some of the outcome variables.
The view that regulated and deregulated crafts occupations are not sufficiently comparable
is also in line with a very recent paper by Müller (2016). We therefore cannot interpret the
estimation results causally, and we are careful with the overall interpretation of the results.
We find that after the reform, the number of registered crafts establishments as well as the
number of self-employed craftsmen increased more strongly in the deregulated occupations.
The opposite holds for the number of dependently employed craftsmen. Individual-level
estimations suggest a positive effect on the probability of being newly self-employed among
all self-employed, and negative effects on dependent employment probabilities. While we
cannot interpret the empirical results causally, our analysis at least partially corroborates
the evidence provided by other recent empirical studies that the abolishment of barriers to
firm entry into the German skilled crafts fostered entrepreneurship and self-employment in
the deregulated markets (Rostam-Afschar (2014); Runst et al. (2016)) – although in light of
recent findings in the related literature (Rostam-Afschar (2014); Runst et al. (2016); Müller
(2016)) many of the additionally created firms were most likely marginal. Furthermore, the
abolishment of barriers to firm entry seems not to have had a positive effect on dependent
employment in the German skilled crafts.
Until the reform of the German Crafts Code came into force in the beginning of 2004,
the treatment and control occupations in this analysis were subject to the same regulatory
framework that strictly regulated firm entry into the respective markets through the master
craftsman requirement. This initially led us to expect that the treatment and control occu-
pations should be sufficiently comparable. Given the issues with the empirical approach,
which only became apparent later on during our work on the research project, this study is
illustrative of the difficulties which empirical researchers face time and again when striving
to provide causal evidence on economic interdependencies.
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5.1 Appendix to Chapter 2: Mobility Across Firms and
Occupations Among Graduates from Apprenticeship
5.1.1 Data Appendix 1: Matching of Instrumental Variables Across
Different Spatial Classifications
For reasons of data anonymization, regional information in the IABS regional file is not
coded at the original level of administrative districts (Kreise), but at a slightly aggregated
level (grouped districts) which ensures that the dataset only contains regional units of at
least 100.000 inhabitants. We aggregate all instrumental variables which are provided at
the original administrative district (Kreise) level to the grouped-district level. In this, we
weight districts by their relative size in terms of the number of inhabitants. The required key
matching administrative districts to grouped districts is provided in Drews (2008), pp. 69–78.
Additionally, some of the instrumental variables, such as the labor market tightness
measure, are only available at the level of employment agency districts (Agenturbezirke).
This creates a problem, since administrative districts and agency district may overlap. Some
administrative districts actually belong to four different agency districts. This is farther
complicated by the grouping of administrative districts in the IABS regional file. Taking
all these complications and spatial overlaps into account, based on the comparison of maps
of administrative districts and agency districts we create a key matching agency districts
and grouped districts in the IABS regional file. For simplification, in the case that an
administrative district strongly overlaps with several agency districts, we assume that the
administrative district is equally distributed across all relevant agency districts. The key
takes into account changes at the administrative district level during the period 1988–2011.
Furthermore, we checked that no major changes in agency districts occurred during the
period 1988–2011 – changes were few and insignificant.
For the regional Probit Analysis in stage zero we define 26 districts based on the German
regional policy districts (Regierungsbezirke). We assign each grouped administrative district
in the IABS data to the corresponding government district (see table A.1). Due to missing
variation for the city districts Hamburg and Bremen, and small sample size, we group the
initial 30 government districts into 26 regions.
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Table A.1: Regional Districts for Probit Analysis in Stage Zero.
District Description #Obs.
1 Schleswig-Holstein 502
2 Lueneburg and Hamburg 632
3 Weser-Ems and Bremen 772
4 Hannover 469
5 Braunschweig 372
6 Muenster 586
7 Detmold 539
8 Duesseldorf 1044
9 Arnsberg 800
10 Koeln 785
11 Kassel 331
12 Giessen 211
13 Darmstadt 643
14 Koblenz 300
15 Trier and Saarland 311
16 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 359
17 Karlsruhe 544
18 Stuttgart 926
19 Tuebingen 391
20 Freiburg 507
21 Unterfranken 377
22 Oberfranken and Oberpfalz 648
23 Mittelfranken 452
24 Niederbayern 391
25 Schwaben 519
26 Oberbayern 823
14234
117
Hanna Sarah Zwiener
5.1.2 Data Appendix 2: Data Cleaning Procedures and Identification
of Completed Apprenticeships
To identify an individual’s first completed apprenticeship training, we apply a set of data
cleaning procedures and restrictions to the IABS data. In order to identify whether an
apprenticeship was successfully completed we need to observe a change in the education
variable. Due to certain deficiencies of the education information provided by the IABS we
use an imputed education variable based on imputation strategy ip1 proposed by Fitzenberger
et al. (2006).
An apprenticeship episode observed in the data is identified as a person’s first completed
apprenticeship training if the following conditions are met. Figure A.1 provides a summary
of these conditions.
1. During the apprenticeship period, the individual is still observed as holding no voca-
tional degree.
2. The information on the training occupation is non-missing in the last training spell.
3. The duration of training is at least one year. Also, we allow for a maximum duration
of four years. For the observation period, the scheduled training duration lies between
two and three and a half years (depending on the occupation) with an average of about
three years. However, the training duration could be further shortened due to previous
educational attainments such as holding a high-school diploma (Abitur). During the
observation period about 19% of apprenticeship durations were shortened per year
(see Uhly et al. (2006), figures 7.1 and 7.2).
4. Age at completion of training may not be more than 25 years for persons with no more
than secondary education (Hauptschulabschluss or Realschulabschluss) and 28 years
for persons with high school diploma (Abitur).
5. The education information changes to the status “holding vocational degree” within
a period of two years after graduation from apprenticeship. This two-year window
is long enough to allow us to observe changes in the education variable also for
individuals doing military or civilian service right after their vocational training. At the
same time, limiting the analysis to a two-year window makes it very unlikely that after
graduation from apprenticeship the individual obtained a second vocational degree in
a different occupation through types of training unobservable to us. Most importantly,
fully school based vocational training would be unobservable to us. However, during
the observation period most trainees in fully school based vocational training were
female.1 Another form of training unobservable to us would be further training
programs, in which case participants could apply to the employment agency for a
training allowance (Unterhaltsgeld). Thus, as a further restriction, during the two-year
1According to (Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, 1997, p. 67) during
the years 1992–1995 about 80% of persons in fully school based vocational training (learning an occupation
outside the dual system) were female.
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period individuals should not have received more than one year of training allowance.
Figure A.1: Sampling Conditions
apprenticeship first job
in sample:
not in sample:
duration 1-4 years full-time employment
1.1.1994
6 months
30.6.1993
apprenticeship first job
more than 2 years
30.6.1993 1.1.1996
first jobapprenticeship
max. 2 years gap,
max. 1 year of UHG
max. age at graduation:
25/28 years
Furthermore, the following individuals are excluded from the sample:
1. Individuals whose training occupation of identified as “occupational code 130”, since
according to (Drews, 2008, p. 85) this category is also used for individuals whose
training occupation is not defined yet.
2. Individuals who show earlier apprenticeship episodes lasting for longer than one year in
a different occupation before the start of the main completed apprenticeship. (Shorter
previous apprenticeship spells are allowed for, since they may well be internship spells
that have been misclassified as apprenticeship training.)
3. Individuals for whom we observe further apprenticeship spells after graduation from
apprenticeship.
4. Individuals who complete tertiary education (university degree, technical college
degree) sometime during their further career.
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5.1.3 Table Appendix
Table A.2: Definition of Four Mobility Groups (Number of Apprenticeship Graduates Sam-
pled per Group in Parentheses)
Change of firm
no yes
Change of
3-digit
occupation
no
stayer job switcher
(n=6865) (n=1961)
within-firm job-and-
yes
occupation switcher occupation switcher
(n=1001) (n=2187)
Table A.3: Distribution of Person-year Observations in the Wage Panel Across Four Mobility
Groups by Year of Employment
Year of employment
Mobility type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
stayer 58.41 57.72 58.46 58.98 59.13 59.16 59.29 60.11
job switcher 15.64 16.38 15.93 15.74 15.54 15.53 15.24 14.94
within-firm occ. switcher 8.41 8.33 8.46 8.44 8.48 8.48 8.65 8.80
job-and-occ. switcher 17.53 17.57 17.15 16.83 16.84 16.83 16.82 16.16
Total (N) 14225 12103 12251 12202 12141 12134 11971 11561
Notes: Sample share in the respective year of employment. Year of employment 0 refers to the year during
which graduation occurred.
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Table A.4: Coefficient Estimates for IV Procedure without Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
(Standard Errors Clustered at Region-year-of-graduation Level)
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0-2) Long term (3-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.109*** -0.0429*** -0.123*** -0.0373*
[0.0269] [0.0165] [0.0304] [0.0193]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.232*** 0.143*** 0.238*** 0.124***
[0.0297] [0.0213] [0.0358] [0.0256]
Job-and-occ. switch -0.0241 -0.0333 -0.0327 -0.0305
[0.0284] [0.0209] [0.0304] [0.0234]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 13378 13378
Adj. R-sq 0.011 0.186 0.026 0.131
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at region-
interacted with year-of-graduation-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell; Other controls
include age at job entrance and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship
missing and a constant.
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Table A.5: Overidentification Tests: Number of Rejections at 1% Significance Level among
26 Regions (Standard Errors Clustered at Individual Level)
No. IVs Short term (0-2) Long term (3-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0. Original set of 22 IVs
13 8 5 7
A. 12 IVs
5 4 5 2
B. 9 IVs
2 3 1 0
C. 7 IVs
1 2 3 0
Fixed effects for
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Notes: Results of the overidentification test described in section 2.4.5 for the specifications discussed in Tables
2.6 and 2.7. 7 IV’s: polynomial in unemployment rate, unemployment below 25, polynomial in labor market
tightness. 9 IV’s: 7 IV’s plus share of low-skilled and high-skilled employees. 12 IV’s: 9 IV’s plus exit rate from
employment into unemployment, indicator small cells, interaction mobility zero. 22 IV’s: 12 IV’s plus further
mobility shares, interaction mobility zero, indicator small cells
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Table A.6: Pooled OLS Estimates Accounting for Upward and Downward Mobility
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0-2) Long term (3-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.0347*** -0.0249*** -0.0379*** -0.0220***
[0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0066] [0.0063]
Within-firm occ. switch up 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.0970*** 0.0990***
[0.0100] [0.0093] [0.0112] [0.0110]
Within-firm occ. switch down 0.0430*** 0.0534*** 0.0398*** 0.0470***
[0.0110] [0.0096] [0.0128] [0.0115]
Job-and-occ. switch up -0.0123 0.00563 -0.0243** -0.00455
[0.0087] [0.0084] [0.0101] [0.0100]
Job-and-occ. switch down -0.0615*** -0.0653*** -0.0680*** -0.0654***
[0.0077] [0.0074] [0.0086] [0.0083]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 13378 13378
R-sq 0.063 0.196 0.068 0.136
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell.
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Table A.7: Coefficient Estimates for Two-step IV Procedure (no Heterogeneous Treatment
Effects) Distinguishing Upward and Downward Occupational Mobility
Dependant variable: log(wage) Short term (0-2) Long term (3-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch -0.108*** -0.0407*** -0.124*** -0.0374**
[0.0229] [0.0155] [0.0268] [0.0185]
Within-firm occ. switch UP 0.267*** 0.175*** 0.264*** 0.159***
[0.0268] [0.0189] [0.0324] [0.0223]
Within-firm occ. switch DOWN 0.113*** 0.0655*** 0.112** 0.0509*
[0.0367] [0.0230] [0.0438] [0.0282]
Job-and-occ. switch UP 0.0383 0.0674*** 0.00559 0.0227
[0.0350] [0.0244] [0.0389] [0.0293]
Job-and-occ. switch DOWN -0.0472 -0.0808*** -0.0341 -0.0635**
[0.0323] [0.0220] [0.0342] [0.0250]
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 13378 13378
Adj. R-sq 0.024 0.188 0.037 0.134
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Standard errors clustered at
person-level; Observations weighted by length of employment spell; Other controls include age at job entrance
and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant.
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Table A.8: OLS Regression of Predicted Probabilities of Mobility on the Local Labor Market
Conditions at the National Level (Pooling 26 Regions) Accounting for Upward
and Downward Mobility
Dependent variable: Job switch Within-firm Within-firm Job-and- Job-and-
Predicted probability of occ. switch up occ. switch down occ. switch up occ. switch down
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment rate 0.0346*** -0.0157*** 0.0120** 0.00549 0.0217***
[0.0070] [0.0054] [0.0053] [0.0055] [0.0058]
Unemployment rate2 -0.00371*** 0.00142*** -0.000787 -0.000553 -0.00139**
[0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006]
Unemployment rate3 0.000114*** -0.0000407** 0.0000281* 0.0000234 0.0000413**
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Unemployment rate < 25 years 0.00565*** -0.0000687 -0.00375*** -0.00142** -0.00210***
[0.0008] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Labor market tightness -0.00180*** -0.000238 0.00138*** 0.000337 0.000914**
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Labor market tightness2 0.0000492*** 0.00000598 -0.0000353*** 0.0000146* -0.00000723
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Labor market tightness3 -0.000000274*** -4.23e−08 0.000000208*** -0.000000120*** -1.35e−08
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Share low qualified -0.000840** -0.000365 0.000276 -0.000348 0.000372
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
Share highly qualified 0.00295*** -0.000435 0.00128*** 0.00110*** 0.00321***
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004]
Mobility shares
Unemployment -0.000214 -0.00155*** -0.00213*** 0.000727* -0.000347
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Job switch -0.00277*** 0.00220*** 0.00101*** 0.000754* 0.00125***
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Within-firm occ. switch 0.00236*** -0.000794*** -0.000794*** 0.000701*** 0.00209***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Job-and-occ. switch 0.00190*** -0.00287*** -0.000718*** 0.000362 -0.000381
[0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Further instrumental variables
Interaction effects indicating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
small cells for mobility shares
Interaction effects indicating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
mobility share zero
Fixed effects
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14225 14225 14225 14225 14225
Adj. R-sq 0.283 0.123 0.110 0.165 0.199
F-test excl. IVs 25.78 25.87 14.71 8.50 27.87
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01; Other controls include age at job
entrance and dummies for high-school diploma, foreign citizenship, foreign citizenship missing and a constant;
Year and year of employment dummies are not required since only one observation per apprenticeship graduate
is included.
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Table A.9: Key Performance Measures for First Stages of IV Estimates without Heteroge-
neous Treatment Effects Accounting for Upward and Downward Occupational
Mobility
F-Test excl. IVs Short term (0-2) Long term (3-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job switch 160.54 301.56 151.51 287.11
Within-firm occ. switch up 84.76 159.83 89.69 177.86
Within-firm occ. switch down 58.51 166.39 55.81 156.63
Job-and-occ. switch up 82.67 150.25 83.42 148.64
Job-and-occ. switch down 89.61 183.95 91.01 183.21
Fixed effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of graduation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit training occupation No Yes No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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5.1.4 Figure Appendix
Figure A.2: Apprenticeship and First Employment Spell with Interruption
apprenticeship first job
30.6.1993
1.1.1994
1.12.1993
1993 1994
training occupation
and establishment id
current occupation
and establishment id
Notes: This example shows the measurement of occupation and establishment ID for an apprentice who
graduated in June 1993. His first job held after apprenticeship starts in December 1993 and, thus, lies within the
required two-year window after graduation.
Figure A.3: Distribution of Mobility Shares Showing Spikes at Zero for Each of the Four
Mobility Groups
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Notes: Upper panel, left: mobility share unemployment duration of at least 3 months. Upper panel, right:
mobility share within firm occupational switch. Lower panel, left: mobility share job switch. Lower panel, right:
mobility share job-and-occupation switch.
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Figure A.4: Regional Distribution of Probability Scores for Job Switches (Resulting from
Step 1 of IV Procedures, Short Run, Weighted)
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Figure A.5: Regional Distribution of Probability Scores for Within-firm Occupation Switches
(Resulting from Step 1 of IV Procedures, Short Run, Weighted)
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Figure A.6: Regional Distribution of Probability Scores for Job-and-occupation Switches
(Resulting from Step 1 of IV Procedures, Short Run, Weighted)
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Figure A.7: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated at Deciles of the Group-specific Distri-
bution of Wages in the Training Occupation (Showing 95% Confidence Bands)
-.1
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Notes: Calculations based on results from 3-step IV estimation controlling for 2-digit training occupations.
Figure A.8: Relative Frequency of Wage Position of Training Occupation by Mobility Group
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Notes: Occupations ranked from lowest paid (0) to highest paid (100).
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5.2 Appendix to Chapter 3: Occupational Mobility in the
West German Labor Market
5.2.1 Data Appendix 1: Full-time Versus Part-time Employment
The average share of part-time workers in the main sample is about 8.8% – rising from
about 7.1% in 1982 to about 11.0% in 2008. On average over the period 1982–2008 about
92% of part-time workers are female, while women only make up about 26% of full-time
employment.
Figure A.9: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Type of Employment
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Across-firm occupational mobility in West Germany
Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Figures A.9 and A.10 show the development of occupational mobility rates by type
of employment (full-time versus part-time). At the beginning of the observation period
across-firm occupational mobility was lower among part-time workers than among full-time
workers. However, as Table A.10 shows part-time workers exhibit a steeper linear trend
in across-firm occupational mobility than full-time workers and have, in terms of yearly
across-firm occupational mobility rates, actually caught up with full-time workers over time.
These findings are basically in line with the findings presented in Isaoglu (2010a) based on
data from the German Socioeconomic Panel. The author shows that once part-time workers
are included in the sample, overall 4-digit occupational mobility rates increase, especially in
the second half of the observation period. For occupational mobility within firms Table A.10
reveals a comparably less pronounced negative trend among part-time workers.
As a further robustness check, I exclude all person-year observations in part-time employ-
ment from the main sample, and then re-run all analyses on the reduced full-time sample. For
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Figure A.10: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Type of Employment
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Table A.10: Trends in Log Mobility Rates over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany by
Type of Employment
occupational mobility mobility across firms
across firms within firms
A. Main analysis (full sample)
1-digit 0.0222*** -0.0233***
2-digit 0.0189*** -0.0246***
3-digit 0.0170*** -0.0276***
0.0180***
B. Full-time employment only
1-digit 0.0208*** -0.0235***
2-digit 0.0173*** -0.0249***
3-digit 0.0156*** -0.0280***
0.0169***
C. Part-time employment only
1-digit 0.0481 *** -0.0062
2-digit 0.0423 *** -0.0154 ***
3-digit 0.0389 *** -0.0175 ***
0.0335 ***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of log(yearly mobility rates). Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated
coefficients need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
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the sample of full-time workers only, the positive trend in across-firm occupational mobility
is less pronounced, but statistically significant, at all digit levels. Apart from this, the main
results of the paper presented above are largely robust to restricting the sample to full-time
workers.
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5.2.2 Table Appendix
Table A.11: Classification of Career Episodes
type (ID) description
No intermittent employment in East German establishment:
0 employment in West Germany without interm. unemployment
1 employment in West Germany with interm. unemployment
less than 365 days
4 employment with total of intermittent days in unemployment >= 365 days
5 employment with total of intermittent days missing from data set >= 365 days
Intermittent employment in East German establishment:
6 employment in West Germany with interm. employment in East Germany
7 employment in East Germany (also on 30th of June) leading up to
employment in West Germany
8 employment with total of intermittent days in unemployment >= 1 year
9 employment with total of intermittent days missing from data set >= 1 year
Note: Berlin counts as East Germany.
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Table A.12: Overview of 1-digit and 2-digit Classifications of Occupations Used in the
Analysis
ID description
A. List of 1-digit occupations:
1 Agricultural occupations
3 Occupations in manufacturing; occupations in mining
4 Technical occupations
5 Service Occupations
B. List of 2-digit occupations:
1 Farmers, animal breeders, occupations in fishing
2 Miners, mineral extractors, occupations in processing of stones,
manufacturers of building materials
4 Ceramics workers, glass makers
5 Chemical workers, plastics processors
6 Paper makers, products makers, printers
7 Wood preparers, wood product makers and related occupations
8 Metal producers, workers
9 Locksmiths, mechanics and assigned occupations
10 Electricians
11 Assemblers and occupations in metal n.e.c.
12 Occupations in textile- and leather-making and -processing
14 Occupations in food-production and -processing
15 Occupations in building construction
16 Building-, interior decorator, upholsterers; carpenters, model makers
18 Painters, lacquerers and related occupations
19 Goods examiners, dispatchers
20 Assistants (no further specification)
21 Machinists and related occupations
22 Engineers, chemists, physicists, mathematicians
23 Technicians, technical specialists
24 Management assistants in trade, other sales personnel
25 Bankers, insurance salespersons, management assistants in logistics,
real estate agents and related occupations
26 Occupations in traffic
27 Occupations in organization, public administration, office
28 Occupations in safety and security
29 Occupations in editorial work and journalism, in artisan craft work and fine arts,
in the performing arts and entertainment
30 Occupations in health care
31 Occupations in social services and education, n.e.c. occupations in humanities
and natural sciences
32 General service occupations
Table A.13: Share of Missings in the Occupation Variable (%) for the Period 1982–2008
raw data person-year-panel basic sampling rules full sampling rules
(employment spells)
share in 1982 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.04
share in 2008 1.93 1.24 1.01 0.40
average share 1.68 0.57 0.44 0.17
Note: Full sampling rules still exclude all sampling rules related to missings in occupation variable.
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Table A.14: Comparison of Linear and Quadratic Trends in Log Mobility Rates over the
Period 1982–2008 in West Germany.
occupational mobility mobility across firms
across firms within firms
A. Linear trend (main analysis)
1-digit 0.0222*** -0.0233***
2-digit 0.0189*** -0.0246***
3-digit 0.0170*** -0.0276***
0.0180***
B. Quadratic trend
1-digit t 0.0705*** -0.0143*
t2 -0.0017*** -0.0003
2-digit t 0.0605*** - 0.0223**
t2 -0.0015*** -0.001
3-digit t 0.0564*** -0.0273***
t2 -0.0014*** -0.00001
t 0.0534***
t2 -0.0013***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with a constant. Regressions performed on time series of log(yearly
mobility rates). Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated coefficients need to
be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
Table A.15: Average Yearly Occupational Mobility Rates (%) at the 3-digit Level over the
Period 1982–2008 in West Germany by Gender, Education, and Age
Male workers Female workers
across firms within firms across firms within firms
A. No degree or only highschool degree
20-24 years 17.05 3.09 13.16 2.30
25-34 years 7.80 2.59 6.91 2.33
35-44 years 3.46 2.37 4.07 1.78
45-54 years 1.86 2.30 2.20 1.66
55-60 years 0.90 1.91 0.85 1.43
B. Vocational training degree (with or without highschool degree)
20-24 years 14.24 2.86 10.27 1.87
25-34 years 9.01 2.75 7.37 1.93
35-44 years 4.87 2.39 4.80 1.88
45-54 years 3.00 2.14 2.97 1.73
55-60 years 1.64 1.87 1.55 1.76
C. Technical college or university degree
20-24 years 21.80 4.47 16.88 2.43
25-34 years 10.82 2.68 11.18 2.38
35-44 years 5.88 2.33 5.74 2.21
45-54 years 3.48 2.00 3.33 1.76
55-60 years 2.05 1.88 1.85 1.45
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Table A.16: Trends in Log Across-firm Mobility Rates over the Period 1982–2008 in West
Germany by Gender, Education, and Age
Male workers Female workers
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit
A. No degree or only high school degree
20-24 years 0.0534*** 0.0409*** 0.0389*** 0.0542*** 0.0489*** 0.0468***
25-34 years 0.0541*** 0.0441*** 0.0439*** 0.0559*** 0.0517*** 0.0513***
35-44 years 0.0556*** 0.0442*** 0.0418*** 0.0499*** 0.0409*** 0.0428***
45-54 years 0.0386*** 0.035*** 0.0302*** 0.0375*** 0.0364*** 0.0378***
55-60 years 0.0311*** 0.0361*** 0.0309*** 0.034* 0.0355*** 0.0425***
B. Vocational training degree (with or without high school degree)
20-24 years 0.0242*** 0.016*** 0.0136*** 0.0145** 0.0209*** 0.0147***
25-34 years 0.0227*** 0.0199*** 0.0179*** 0.0282*** 0.0281*** 0.0212***
35-44 years 0.0233*** 0.0171*** 0.0139*** 0.0303*** 0.026*** 0.019***
45-54 years 0.0241*** 0.0202*** 0.0164*** 0.0282*** 0.0234*** 0.0177***
55-60 years 0.0417*** 0.0332*** 0.0306*** 0.0266*** 0.0288*** 0.029***
C. Technical college or university degree
20-24 years 0.0374*** 0.0255** 0.0294*** 0.029** 0.0279*** 0.0307***
25-34 years 0.037*** 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 0.0268*** 0.0301*** 0.0246***
35-44 years 0.0171*** 0.0185*** 0.0202*** 0.029** 0.0269*** 0.0163**
45-54 years 0.0145** 0.0143*** 0.0184*** 0.0267** 0.0442*** 0.028***
55-60 years 0.0342*** 0.0404*** 0.0463*** 0.02 -0.0098 0.0188
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of yearly mobility rates. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated coefficients
need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
Table A.17: Trends in Log Within-firm Mobility Rates over the Period 1982–2008 in West
Germany by Gender, Education, and Age
Male workers Female workers
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit
A. No degree or only high school degree
20-24 years -0.0241** -0.0361*** -0.0383*** -0.0091 -0.0174** -0.0203***
25-34 years -0.0293*** -0.0321*** -0.0312*** -0.0056 -0.0215*** -0.0197***
35-44 years -0.0267*** -0.027*** -0.0305*** -0.0224*** -0.0284*** -0.0285***
45-54 years -0.0392*** -0.0334*** -0.0371*** -0.0328*** -0.0325*** -0.0341***
55-60 years -0.0564*** -0.0416*** -0.0394*** -0.0347*** -0.0314*** -0.0302***
B. Vocational training degree (with or without high school degree)
20-24 years -0.0167*** -0.0188*** -0.0232*** -0.0136** -0.0164*** -0.0279***
25-34 years -0.0205*** -0.0209*** -0.0249*** -0.0154*** -0.0202*** -0.0291***
35-44 years -0.0173*** -0.0165*** -0.0216*** -0.0181*** -0.0247*** -0.0303***
45-54 years -0.0241*** -0.0212*** -0.0238*** -0.0268*** -0.0357*** -0.0388***
55-60 years -0.0335*** -0.0345*** -0.0353*** -0.0257*** -0.04*** -0.0425***
C. Technical college or university degree
20-24 years 0.002 -0.0106 -0.0269* -0.0235*** -0.0216 -0.0284**
25-34 years -0.0149*** -0.0157*** -0.0175*** -0.0312*** -0.0182*** -0.0178***
35-44 years -0.0263*** -0.0267*** -0.0275*** -0.0409*** -0.0318*** -0.0274***
45-54 years -0.0244*** -0.0239*** -0.0236*** -0.0395** -0.0155 -0.0238**
55-60 years -0.0299*** -0.0323*** -0.0274*** -0.0302 -0.0607*** -0.0477***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of yearly mobility rates. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated coefficients
need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
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Table A.18: Trends in Log Firm-to-firm Mobility Rates over the Period 1982–2008 in West
Germany by Gender, Education, and Age
Male workers Female workers
A. No degree or only high school degree
20 - 24 years 0.0397*** 0.0459***
25-34 years 0.0432*** 0.0489***
35-44 years 0.0423*** 0.0406***
45-54 years 0.0357*** 0.037***
55-60 years 0.0349*** 0.0328***
B. Vocational training degree
(with or without high school degree)
20 - 24 years 0.0106*** 0.0165***
25-34 years 0.0161*** 0.0227***
35-44 years 0.0134*** 0.0205***
45-54 years 0.0175*** 0.0191***
55-60 years 0.029*** 0.0232***
C. Technical college or university degree
20 - 24 years 0.0213*** 0.0162***
25-34 years 0.0254*** 0.0181***
35-44 years 0.0199*** 0.0137***
45-54 years 0.0224*** 0.0373***
55-60 years 0.0328*** 0.0497***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of yearly mobility rates. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated coefficients
need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
Table A.19: Trends in Log Mobility Rates (%) by Type of Career Episode over the Period
1982–2008 in West Germany
occupational mobility mobility across firms
across firms within firms
A. Employment in West Germany without interm. unemployment
1-digit 0.0220*** -0.0243***
2-digit 0.0198*** -0.0256***
3-digit 0.0181*** -0.0285***
0.0214***
B. Employment in West Germany with interm. unemployment
1-digit 0.0198*** -0.0057
2-digit 0.0150*** -0.0092**
3-digit 0.0133*** -0.0142***
0.0102***
C. Intermittent days in unemployment >= 365 days
1-digit 0.0077** -0.0371*
2-digit 0.0062*** -0.0323**
3-digit 0.0040*** -0.0306**
0.0019***
D. Intermittent days missing from data set >= 365 days
1-digit 0.0258*** -0.0125***
2-digit 0.0209*** -0.0199***
3-digit 0.0189*** -0.0230***
0.0147***
Estimation results from OLS estimations with trend variable and constant. Regressions performed on time series
of log(yearly mobility rates). Statistical significance: * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Estimated
coefficients need to be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
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5.2.3 Figure Appendix
Figure A.11: Share of Missings in the Occupation Variable
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Figure A.12: Mobility across Establishments over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Figure A.13: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level and GDP Growth
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Figure A.14: Mobility Across Establishments and GDP Growth
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Figure A.15: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level and GDP Growth
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Figure A.16: Robustness Check: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level
when Making Different Assumptions on the Meaning of Missings in the Occu-
pation Variable
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Note: Mobility rate estimates obtained from OLS regression,
showing 95% confidence bands.
Figure A.17: Robustness Check: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level
when Making Different Assumptions on the Meaning of Missings in the Occu-
pation Variable
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Figure A.18: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree and Gender
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Figure A.19: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree and Gender
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Figure A.20: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree and Age Groups
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Figure A.21: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level by Highest Educational
Degree and Age Groups
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Figure A.22: Net Occupational Mobility over the Period 1982–2008 in West Germany
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Figure A.23: Across-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level and Share of Upward
Mobility by Type of Career Episode
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l m
ob
ili
ty
 ra
te
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
.3
5
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
.6
sh
ar
e 
of
 u
pw
ar
ds
 m
ob
ili
ty
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
empl. w/o unempl. empl. w/ unempl.
unempl. >= 1 year other >= 1 year
by type of career episode
Across-firm occupational mobility
at 3-digit level in West Germany
149
Hanna Sarah Zwiener
Figure A.24: Within-firm Occupational Mobility at the 3-digit Level and Share of Upward
Mobility by Type of Career Episode
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5.3 Appendix to Chapter 4: Product Market Deregulation
and Labor Market Outcomes in the German Skilled
Crafts and Trades
5.3.1 Data Appendix 1: Technical Details on Analysis of
Self-employment
In Section 4.4.3, we study the link between product market deregulation and the total number
of self-employed, as well as on a wide range of self-employment probabilities. All results on
self-employment are based on survey data from the Microcensus SUF 2000–2008 provided by
the Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices
of the German Federal States. Table A.20 describes all samples used in our analysis of self-
employment. Our differences-in-differences analysis of the total number of self-employed
(head count) is based on an occupations panel. For the respective first-differences estimations,
we then compute averages over the pre-reform and post-reform period, respectively, to create
the required two-period panel. The other outcomes are analyzed at the individual level. The
estimations for the probability of being self-employed among all employed craftsmen, which
should be strongly related to the self-employment share, are based on a sample comprising
all self-employed and employed craftsmen (self-employment share sample). The effects
on the probability of being self-employed are based on the base sample, which contains
all craftsmen who are currently employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. For our
analysis of the probability of entry into self-employment we use the entry sample. The
effects on the exit probabilities are estimated using the self-employment exit sample that
only contains craftsmen who were self-employed 12 months ago. In our analysis of the
probability of being self-employed, as well as of entry and exit probabilities, the definition
of the dependent variables and the samples chosen are similar to those in Rostam-Afschar
(2014). Lastly, the estimation sample for the probability of being newly self-employed among
all self-employed craftsmen consists of currently self-employed craftsmen only. Runst et al.
(2016) analyze two alternative measures of entry into self-employment, the second of which
is very similar to our new self-employment outcome variable. Table A.21 defines the most
important variables used in our analysis: outcome variables, covariates, and variables used in
the robustness checks.
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Table A.20: Overview of All Samples Used in the Analysis of Self-employment Based on
Survey Data (Microcensus)
Individual-level data:
Base scope: all self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of
the labor force during the period 2000–2008 with reported occupation
belonging to control or treatment occupations
sampling criteria: male and female, aged 25–55, no institutionalized
persons, no missing information in educational variable, no university or
technical college degree; no civil servants, soldiers, apprentices, persons
in military service or alternative civilian service, or persons helping in
the family business
number of observations: about 195,000 observations in 23 control and
31 treatment occupations (about 43% of observations in treatment group)
Entry scope: self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force
additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation on their labor market status and (if applicable) type of employ-
ment 12 months ago*
New self-
employment
scope: only currently self-employed individuals
additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation regarding the year in which the current professional activity was
started
Self-employment
(exit)
scope: self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force, who report that they were self-employed 12 months ago
additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation on their labor market status and type of employment 12 months
ago*
Self-employment
(share)
scope: only currently self-employed and dependently employed individ-
uals
additional sampling criteria: none
Occupation-level data:
Occupation-year
panel
obtained by aggregating individual-level data by year and occupation
Note: * Questions regarding labor market activities 12 months before the interview were only posed to a 0.45%
subsample of the population in the survey waves 2000–2004, and answering them was never mandatory.
“Additional sampling criteria” mentions all sampling criteria implemented on top of the base sampling criteria.
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Table A.21: Definition of Important Variables Used in the Analysis of Self-employment
Based on Survey Data (Microcensus)
Variable Description
Individual-level variables:
Self-employment A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and reports
being self-employed with/without employees.
Entry into self-
employment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and reports
being self-employed with/without employees, but was not self-employed
with/without employees (either not working or dependently employed) 12
months ago. The latter condition is constructed using information on the
individual’s labor market activities 12 months ago. In the survey waves
2000–2004, this information was only collected for a subsample of 0.45% of
the population, and answering the respective question wasn’t mandatory over
the whole period 2000–2008. With about 50% the share of missings is high,
but they are proportionally distributed over treatment and control group.
Exit out of self-
employment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently not self-employed
with/without employees (either not working or dependently employed), but
was reported as working and being self-employed with/without employees
12 months ago. The latter condition is also constructed using information on
the individual’s labor market activities 12 months ago (see details above).
New self-
employment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and reports
being self-employed with/without employees, and the current job was started
in the year in which the survey was taken. The latter condition is constructed
using information on the starting year of the current job, which exhibits a
share of missings of about 1.7%. Missings are proportionally distributed over
treatment and control group.
No vocational train-
ing
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person does not hold a vocational training
degree.
Vocational training A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person does at least hold a vocational
training degree (including persons holding a master craftsman certificate).
Master craftsman de-
gree
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person holds a master craftsman certifi-
cate.
East EU A dummy variable equal to 1 if the self-employed is a citizen of one of the
following new member countries of the EU expansion to the East in 2004:
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. These are the countries which
we can identify individually. According to Müller (2006), p. 68 the by far
largest influx of new crafts entrepreneurs into Germany came from Poland.
Subsidies A dummy variable equal to 1 if the self-employed (i) receives public transfers
starting in 2003 or sometime after 2003, which are not child benefits (no
eligible children in household), (ii) pays contributions to statutory pension
insurance (“GRV”), (iii) earns less than about 25,000 Euros per year, (iv)
and has started his current job no more than 3 years ago. Criteria (ii)–(iv)
mimic the specific rules applying to recipients of the start-up subsidy Me Inc.
as closely as possible. The variable is a modified version of the subsidies
variable used in Rostam-Afschar (2014).
Solo self-employed A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person currently works and reports being
self-employed without employees.
Self-employed with
employees
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person currently works and reports being
self-employed with employees.
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5.3.2 Data Appendix 2: Technical Details on Analysis of Dependent
Employment
In Section 4.4.4, we study the link between product market deregulation and dependent
employment based on a broad set of individual-level and occupation-level outcomes. All
individual-level results on dependent employment, as well as some of the occupation-level
results, are based on survey data from the Microcensus SUF 2000–2008 provided by the
Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices
of the German Federal States. These results are supplemented by occupation-level results
obtained from the weakly anonymized version of the administrative data set SIAB provided
by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB). Table A.22 describes all samples and respective sampling
rules used in our analysis of dependent employment based on survey data (Microcensus).
Table A.24 contains the respective information for the administrative data (SIAB). Table A.23
complements Table A.21 and defines further variables constructed for the analysis based on
Microcensus data. Table A.25 contains the respective information on important SIAB-based
variables.
At the individual level we investigate the link between the reform and the probability
of being dependently employed, the probability of entry into dependent employment, the
probability of exit out of dependent employment, as well as the probability of being newly
dependently employed among all dependently employed craftsmen. Estimations for the
probability of being dependently employed are based on the base sample which contains
all craftsmen who are currently employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. For our
analysis of the probability of entry into self-employment we use the entry sample. The effect
on the exit probabilities is estimated using the dependent employment exit sample, which only
contains craftsmen who were self-employed 12 months ago. Lastly, the estimation sample for
the probability of being newly dependently employed consists only of dependently employed
craftsmen for whom information regarding the starting year of the current job is available.
To obtain differences-in-differences estimates at the occupational level, we aggregate
the outcome variables accordingly. For the first-differences estimations, we then compute
averages over the pre-reform and the post-reform period, respectively, to create the required
two-period panel. Based on Microcensus data, the occupation-level outcomes are the number
of dependently employed (head count) and the number of full-time employed (head count).
Firstly, we identify full-time work based on the number of weekly working hours, and
secondly, based on self-assessed part-time status. We also consider two kinds of full-time
equivalents as described in more detail in Table A.23. Based on administrative data (SIAB),
the occupation-level outcomes are the number of dependently employed (head count) and
the number of full-time employed (head count). We also compute full-time equivalents that
are based on full-time and part-time employed who are weighted according to the weighting
scheme described in Table A.25.
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Table A.22: Overview of All Samples Used in the Analysis of Dependent Employment Based
on Survey Data (Microcensus)
Individual-level data:
Base Scope: all self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of
the labor force during the period 2000–2008 with reported occupation
belonging to control or treatment occupations
Sampling criteria: male and female, aged 25–55, no institutionalized
persons, no missing information in educational variable, no university or
technical college degree; no civil servants, soldiers, apprentices, persons
in military service or alternative civilian service, or persons helping in
the family business
Number of observations: about 195,000 observations in 23 control and
31 treatment occupations (about 43% of observations in treatment group)
Entry Scope: self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of
the labor force
Additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation regarding their labor market status and (if applicable) type of
employment 12 months ago*
New dependent
employment
Scope: only currently dependently employed individuals
Additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation regarding the year in which the current professional activity was
started
Dependent em-
ployment (exit)
Scope: self-employed, dependently employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force, who report that they were dependently employed 12 months
ago
Additional sampling criteria: only individuals with non-missing infor-
mation regarding their type of employment 12 months ago *
Occupation-level data:
Occupation-year
panel
Obtained by aggregating individual-level data by year and occupation
Note: * Questions regarding labor market activities 12 months before the interview were only posed to a 0.45%
subsample of the population in the survey waves 2000–2004, and answering them was never mandatory.
“Additional sampling criteria” mentions all sampling criteria implemented on top of the base sampling criteria.
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Table A.23: Definition of Further Important Variables Used in the Analysis of Dependent
Employment Based on Survey Data (Microcensus)
Variable Description
Individual-level variables:
Dependent employ-
ment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and
reports being dependently employed.
Entry into dependent
employment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and
reports being dependently employed, but was not dependently em-
ployed (either not working or self-employed) 12 months ago. The
latter condition is constructed using information on the individual’s
labor market activities 12 months ago. In the survey waves 2000–2004,
this information was only collected for a 0.45% subsample of the pop-
ulation, and answering the respective question wasn’t mandatory over
the whole period 2000–2008. With about 50% the share of missings is
high, but they are proportionally distributed over treatment and control
group.
Exit out of dependent
employment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently not dependently
employed (either not working or self-employed), but was reported as
working and being dependently employed 12 months ago. The latter
condition is also constructed using information on the individual’s
labor market activities 12 months ago (see details above).
New dependent em-
ployment
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is currently working and
reports being dependently employed, and the current job was started
in the year in which the survey was taken. The latter condition is
constructed using information on the starting year of the current job,
which exhibits a share of missings of about 1.7%. Missings are pro-
portionally distributed over treatment and control group.
Part time (self-
assessed)
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person reports that she works part
time. The part-time status is based on the survey participants’ self-
assessment, i.e. we do not condition on the number of hours typically
worked per week.
Part time (≤ 30
hours)
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person reports that she typically
works 30 or less hours per week. This variable is based on information
regarding the number of hours typically worked per week.
Occupation-level variables:
Full-time equivalents A weighted sum of all dependently employed individuals belonging
to the respective occupation-year cell, where we use the individual
weekly working hours divided by 40 as individual weights.
Full-time equivalents
(SIAB)
In the SIAB data, we have no exact information about the hours
worked. To create a version of the full-time equivalents variable that
is comparable to the SIAB results, we therefore assign the following
weights: full time (> 39 hours) is weighted by 1, large part time (> 17
and ≤ 39 hours) is weighted by 2639 , and small part time (≤ 17 hours)
is weighted by 1739 .
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Table A.24: Overview of All Samples Used in the Analysis Based on Administrative Data
(SIAB)
Individual-level data:
SIAB base Scope: dependently employed (full-time and part-time) working in an
occupation belonging to control or treatment group during the period
2000–2008
Sampling criteria: male and female, aged 25–55; no missings in cur-
rent occupation, type of employment, or highest educational degree; no
apprentices, trainees, or home workers; no university or technical college
degree
Number of observations: about 300.000 person-year observations in
24 control and 35 treatment occupations (about 19.3% of person-year
observations in treatment group)
Occupation-level data:
SIAB occupation-
year panel
Obtained by aggregating individual-level data by year and occupation
Table A.25: Definition of Important Variables Used in the Analysis of Dependent Employ-
ment Based on Administrative Data (SIAB)
Variable Description
Individual-level variables:
No vocational train-
ing
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person does not hold a vocational
training degree.
Vocational training A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person does at least hold a voca-
tional training degree (this is assumed to be true for all persons holding
a master craftsman degree or working as a foreman).
Master crafts-
man/foreman
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is a master craftsman or
works as a foreman.
Part time A dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is classified as working
either large (> 17 and ≤ 39 hours) or small part time (≤ 17 hours).
Occupation-level variables:
Full-time equivalents In the SIAB data we have no exact information about the hours worked.
Employed individuals are classified as working full time (> 39 hours),
large part time (> 17 and ≤ 39 hours) or small part time (≤ 17 hours).
We therefore follow a weighting scheme according to which we assign
the following weights: full time is weighted by 1, large part time is
weighted by 2639 , and small part time is weighted by
17
39 .
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5.3.3 Data Appendix 3: Further Descriptive Evidence on Pre-reform
Period
In this appendix, we provide further graphical evidence to check whether the outcomes of
interest evolved similarly in the treatment and control occupations over the pre-reform period
2000–2003. Furthermore, we perform tests to check for statistically significant differences in
pre-reform trends. That is, we run OLS estimations for the pre-reform period 2000–2003
according to the following model:
Y(i)ot = α+β2 ·T Go +β5 · trendt +β6 ·T Go · trendt + u(i)ot ,
where Y(i)ot is the outcome of interest and index i only applies if the estimation is run on
individual-level data. The outcome variable can be either in levels, logs, or conventional
growth rates. T Go indicates the treatment occupations, trendt is a linear trend variable, and
the coefficient β6 on the interaction thereof is our coefficient of interest. If we run the checks
on individual-level data, we cluster standard errors at the occupation level. If we run the tests
on the occupations panel, we use robust standard errors.
Checks Regarding the Evolution of the Number of Registered
Establishments
To investigate the comparability of treatment and control occupations during the pre-reform
period 2000–2003, we run a series of regressions as described above to test for differences in
pre-reform trends in the number of registered establishments, the number of apprenticeship
graduates, the number of apprenticeship graduates per establishment, the number of master
craftsman exams taken (including retakes), as well as the number of master craftsman exams
per establishment. We run tests for the levels, the logs, and the yearly growth rates of these
outcome variables, and we find no statistically significant differences in pre-reform trends.
Checks Regarding the Evolution of Self-employment
In addition to the graphical evidence provided in Section 4.3.1, here we present further graphs
that show the evolution of the self-employment outcomes in more detail. Figures A.25–
A.30 compare the respective outcomes between treatment and control group. According
to Figure A.25, the share of self-employment in overall employment increased similarly in
both groups of crafts occupations until 2004, and it increased relatively more strongly in the
treatment occupations over the post-reform period. The probability of being self-employed,
as shown in Figure A.26, grew similarly in both groups of crafts occupations over the whole
period 2000–2008. In contrast to the previously described outcomes, the graphs on the
probabilities of entry into self-employment, as shown in Figure A.27, and of exit out of self-
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employment, as shown in Figure A.28, are less smooth, and the probabilities are especially
volatile in the case of the treatment group. This makes it difficult to identify clear patterns
from graphical inspection. The probability of exit out of self-employment seems to have
decreased in both groups over the pre-reform period. In both cases, testing for differences
in the linear time trends over the pre-reform period based on individual-level data reveals
no statistically significant differences in pre-reform trends across the two groups of crafts
occupations.
Figure A.29 shows the evolution of the average number of newly self-employed, and Fig-
ure A.30 shows the evolution of the share of new self-employment in overall self-employment.
Apart from the spike in the number of newly self-employed in the control occupations in
2003, both graphs provide the picture that until 2004 the outcome evolved similarly in the
treatment and the control occupations. It increased strongly in the treatment group during
the post-reform period, and then dropped again in 2008.2 However, we find a statistically
significant difference in pre-reform trends: The share of newly self-employed in overall
self-employment (in the self-employment share sample) increased significantly less in the
treatment than in the control occupations over the pre-reform period. We obtain a linear
trend estimate of 0.005**, and an estimated coefficient of -0.008** on the interaction term
between the linear trend variable and the treatment group dummy. If we exclude the year
2000 from the estimation sample, the difference in trends turns statistically insignificant.
2As Figure A.31 shows, the 2003 spike does not vanish even if we exclude from the sample all self-employed
craftsmen who presumably received the start-up subsidy Me Inc., which was introduced in 2003.
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Figure A.25: Share of Self-employed in Overall Employment in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
share of self-employed craftsmen in overall employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels
(left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.26: Probability of Self-employment in Crafts Occupations over the Period 2000–
2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of self-employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as
relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.27: Probability of Entry into Self-employment in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of entry into self-employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as
well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.28: Probability of Exit out of Self-employment in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of exit out of self-employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as
well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.29: Average Number of Newly Self-employed in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of newly self-employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel),
as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.30: Share of New Self-employment in Overall Self-employment in Crafts Occupa-
tions over the Period 2000–2008
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
share of new self-employment in overall self-employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels
(left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.31: Average Number of Newly Self-employed in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008 Excluding Presumed Recipients of Start-up Subsidiy Me
Inc.
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Average Number of Newly Self-employed in Crafts Occupations
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of newly self-employed in overall self-employment per occupation in the treatment versus control
occupations in levels (left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel). Presumed recipients of
start-up subsidy Me Inc. have been excluded from the data.
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Finally, based on the occupations panel we also run trend regressions for the number
of self-employed to check whether there is a statistically significant difference in trends
between treatment and control occupations over the pre-reform period. We only consider the
outcome in levels, since taking logs or computing growth rates is not feasible due to a few
occupation-year-cells with zero self-employed. Out of 450 occupation-year-cells over the
period 2000–2008, 10 cells contain no self-employed at all. We do not find a statistically
significant difference in the linear pre-reform trends.
Checks Regarding the Evolution of Dependent Employment
In addition to the graphical evidence provided in Section 4.3.1, here we provide further
graphs that show the evolution of the dependent employment outcomes. Figures A.32–A.35
compare the respective dependent employment outcomes between treatment and control
group. According to Figure A.32, the probability of being dependently employed evolved
similarly in both groups of crafts occupations until 2004. However, when we test for
differences in pre-reform trends, we find a small but statistically significant difference in
trends: Over the pre-reform period, the probability of being dependently employed decreased
significantly less in the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations. We obtain a
linear trend estimate of -0.01***, and an estimated coefficient of 0.009*** on the interaction
term between the linear trend variable and the treatment group dummy. However, the
difference in trends turns statistically insignificant if we exclude the year 2000 from the
estimations. The probability of entry into dependent employment, as shown in Figure A.33,
is more volatile. It is not clear whether the two groups really followed similar pre-reform
trends. When we test for differences in pre-reform trends, we find that the probability of
entry into dependent employment decreased significantly more strongly in the treatment than
in the control occupations over the pre-reform period. We obtain a linear trend estimate of
-0.0004, and an estimated coefficient of -0.005** on the interaction term between the linear
trend variable and the treatment group dummy. In this case, the difference in trends does
not lose statistical significance if we exclude the year 2000 from the estimations. In contrast
to this, as Figure A.34 shows, the probability of exit out of dependent employment evolved
similarly in both groups over the pre-reform period. Figure A.35 shows the evolution of the
share of new dependent employment in overall dependent employment. Again, we observe a
small spike in the share of newly dependently employed in the control occupations in 2003.
Apart from this, the graph indicates that until 2004 the outcome evolved similarly in the
treatment and the control occupations.
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Figure A.32: Probability of Being Dependently Employed in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of being dependently employed in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as
well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.33: Probability of Entry into Dependent Employment in Crafts Occupations over
the Period 2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of entry into dependent employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel),
as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.34: Probability of Exit out of Dependent Employment in Crafts Occupations over
the Period 2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
probability of exit out of dependent employment in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel),
as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.35: Share of New Dependent Employment in Overall Dependent Employment in
Crafts Occupations over the Period 2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
share of new dependent employment in overall dependent employment in the treatment versus control
occupations in levels (left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Overall, the trend estimations based on individual-level survey data from the Microcensus
indicate that the common trends assumption is only plausible with respect to some of
the employment-related outcomes. In addition to this, we also run trend regressions on
the occupations panel. We consider a wide range of dependent employment outcomes in
levels, logs, and conventional growth rates: the total number of self-employed, the total
number of hours worked, full-time equivalents, full-time equivalents that are comparable
to the SIAB-results, and the total number of full-time employed. Due to a number of
empty occupation-year-cells in the case of the part-time employment variables, we can only
perform the trend estimations for the part-time employment variables in levels. For all of
the aforementioned outcome variables, we do not find statistically significant differences
between treatment and control occupations in the linear pre-reform trends. We also perform
similar tests on the occupations panel obtained from administrative data (SIAB). We consider
several dependent employment outcomes in levels, logs, and conventional growth rates:
the total number of self-employed, full-time equivalents, and the total number of full-time
employed. Again, due to a number of empty occupation-year cells in the case of the part-time
employment variable, we can only study the pre-reform trends in this outcome variable in
levels. As was the case with the Microcensus survey data, for all of the aforementioned
outcome variables we do not find statistically significant differences in the linear pre-reform
trends between treatment and control occupations.
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5.3.4 Data Appendix 4: Placebo Tests
As a further check on the plausibility of the common trends assumption, we estimate the
effects of placebo treatments which correspond to the main results provided in the various
regression tables in Section 4.4. For all differences-in-differences models, we analyze two
placebo scenarios:
i. We recode the post-reform dummy (PR) and treat the data as if the reform had already
come into force on 1. January 2002. The estimation sample then includes the years
2000–2001 as the pre-reform years, and the years 2002–2003 as the post-reform years.
ii. In a second version of this test, we treat the data as if the reform had already come into
force on 1. January 2003. The estimation sample then includes the years 2000–2002
as the pre-reform years, and the years 2003–2004 as the post-reform years.
For the first-differences estimations, which are based on a two-period panel, we implement
the following placebo test:
iii. We treat the data as if the reform had come into force on 1. January 2002. The two-
period panel is constructed accordingly: The pre-reform period averages the years
2000 and 2001, whereas the post-reform period averages the years 20002 and 2003.
If the treatment and control occupations evolved similarly over the pre-reform period,
the placebo regressions should yield statistically insignificant effects of interest with point
estimates that are close to zero. This should hold especially for the versions (i) and (iii) of
the placebo tests, since they do not include any of the actual post-reform years 2004–2008 in
the estimation samples.
In this appendix, five tables provide an overview of the placebo estimation results. Ta-
ble A.26 provides placebo test results for the regressions on growth in the number of
registered establishments (compare to Table 4.4 in Section 4.4.2). Panel A shows that in
the case of the differences-in-differences estimations, the placebo reform in 2002 yields the
expected insignificant results. The placebo reform in 2003 yields significant positive results.
However, this test still includes the year 2004, which is part of the post-reform period. The
results of the 2002 test are of higher relevance. The first-differences placebo test shown in
Panel B yields small but statistically significant negative results, while the first-differences
estimation shown in Table 4.4 yields a large positive reform effect. The latter result suggests
that the two groups of crafts occupations did not evolve fully similarly over the pre-reform
period with respect to relative changes in the number of registered establishments – although
the placebo first-differences estimate is of comparatively small magnitude relative to the true
first-differences estimate.
Table A.27 provides placebo regression results on self-employment based on occupation-
level data (compare to Tables 4.5 and 4.6). The placebo differences-in-differences regressions
in Panel A lead to small and statistically insignificant estimates. However, the placebo test
for the first-differences estimations displayed in Panel B is problematic. While the effect of
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interest is statistically insignificant, the point estimate is quite large. This suggests that with
respect to relative changes in the total number of self-employed, the two groups of crafts
occupations evolved differently over the pre-reform period.
Table A.28 provides placebo regression results on dependent employment outcomes based
on occupation-level data from the survey data set Microcensus (compare to Tables 4.9
and 4.10). Panel A shows that in the case of the differences-in-differences estimations, the
placebo reform in 2002 yields statistically insignificant negative results that are almost of
the same magnitude as the real reform effects displayed in Table 4.9. The other placebo
results in Panel A and Panel B are less problematic. In addition to this, Table A.29 provides
placebo regression results on dependent employment outcomes based on occupation-level
data from the administrative data set SIAB (compare to Table 4.11). These tests reveal the
same problematic pattern: The differences-in-differences estimations for the placebo reform
in 2002 yield statistically significant negative results that are almost of the same magnitude
as the real reform effects displayed in Table 4.11. Again, the other placebo results in Panel A
and Panel B are less problematic, but all in all the placebo tests indicate that there was a lot
of pre-reform heterogeneity in the evolution of dependent employment outcomes between he
two groups of crafts occupations.
Table A.30 summarizes all placebo test results regarding the individual-level regressions.
All individual-level results on self-employment and dependent employment are based on
Microcensus survey data (compare to Tables 4.12 and 4.12). Panel A shows the test results
on self-employment. Here, the tests yield small and statistically insignificant estimates of
interest. Panel B shows the test results on dependent employment. Both placebo tests for
the probability of entry into dependent employment yield statistically significant estimates
that are even more pronounced than the estimates in Table 4.12. Similar results hold for the
placebo test of type (ii) on the share of new employment. This indicates that the respective
outcomes evolved significantly differently between treatment and control occupations over
the pre-reform period. Again, this reveals considerable pre-reform heterogeneity in the
evolution of dependent employment outcomes between the two groups of occupations.
To sum up our findings, the placebo tests indicate that there was considerable pre-reform
heterogeneity in the evolution of labor market outcomes between treatment and control
occupations. This holds especially for the dependent employment outcomes, but the first-
differences placebo estimation for self-employment also yields problematic results.
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Table A.26: Occupation-level Placebo Results on Growth in the Number of Registered
Establishments in Crafts Occupations
(1) (2)
A. Differences-in-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
N 246 222
Adj. R2 0.603 0.563
Placebo reform in 2003 0.067*** 0.041***
(0.018) (0.012)
N 328 296
Adj. R2 0.293 0.322
Year fixed effects yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes
Check: EU expansion no yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
B. First-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 -0.031*** -0.036***
(0.012) (0.012)
N 82 74
Adj. R2 0.064 0.098
Check: EU expansion no yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
Data source: ZDH, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; *** p< 0.01. All
estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. Panel A: DiD estimations based on occupations panel,
dependent variable: yearly growth rate of number of establishments, robust standard errors. “Placebo reform
2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2002 – the estimation sample includes only
years 2000–2003, with years 2002–2003 being the post-reform period. “Placebo reform 2003” treats the data as
if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2003 – the estimation sample includes only years 2000–2004, with years
2003–2004 being the post-reform period. Wave and occupation fixed effects included. Panel B: FD estimation
based on two-period panel, dependent variable: growth rate of number of establishments (comparing pre-and
post-reform period), robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into
force on 1.1.2002 – the two-period panel aggregates years 2000–2001 versus years 20002–2003. Check: EU
expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude treatment occupations with a high share of newly registered
establishments coming from new Eastern EU member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
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Table A.27: Occupation-level Placebo Results on the Number of Self-employed in Crafts
Occupations
(1) (2)
A. Differences-in-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 0.703 0.812
(1.500) (1.507)
N 200 200
Adj. R2 0.987 0.987
Placebo reform in 2003 -0.159 0.002
(1.463) (1.471)
N 250 250
Adj. R2 0.986 0.986
Year fixed effects yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes
Check: EU expansion no yes
Check: Subsidies no yes
Dependent variable in – levels –
B. First-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 0.319 0.320
(0.223) (0.223)
N 50 50
Adj. R2 0.015 0.016
Check: EU expansion no yes
Check: Subsidies no yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. Panel A: DiD estimations based on
occupations panel as described in Table A.20, dependent variable: number of self-employed, robust standard
errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2002 – the estimation
sample includes only years 2000–2003, with years 2002–2003 being the post-reform period. “Placebo reform
2003” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2003 – the estimation sample includes only
years 2000–2004, with years 2003–2004 being the post-reform period. Wave and occupation fixed effects
included. Panel B: FD estimation based on two-period panel, dependent variable: growth rate of number of
self-employed, robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force
on 1.1.2002 – the two-period panel aggregates years 2000–2001 versus years 20002–2003. Check: EU
expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude treatment occupations with a high share of newly registered
establishments coming from new Eastern EU member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
Check: Subsidies “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
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Table A.28: Occupation-level Placebo Results on Growth in Dependent Employment Out-
comes in Crafts Occupations Based on Survey Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total FTE FTE Full-time Full-time
(SIAB) (> 30 h) (self-rep.)
A. Differences-in-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 -0.074 -0.081 -0.075 -0.080 -0.083
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
N 153 153 153 153 0.036
Adj. R2 -0.080 -0.088 -0.084 -0.123 (0.039)
Placebo reform in 2003 0.019 0.018 0.030 0.020 0.018
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
N 204 204 204 204 204
Adj. R2 -0.179 -0.167 -0.168 -0.171 -0.165
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
B. First-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.013
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
N 51 51 51 51 51
Adj. R2 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. Panel A: DiD estimations based on
occupations panel as described in Table A.22, dependent variables: yearly growth rate of respective variable (see
column title), robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force
on 1.1.2002 – the estimation sample includes only years 2000–2003, with years 2002–2003 being the
post-reform period. “Placebo reform 2003” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2003 – the
estimation sample includes only years 2000–2004, with years 2003–2004 being the post-reform period. Panel B:
FD estimation based on two-period panel, dependent variables: growth rate of respective variable (comparing
pre-and post-reform period), robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had
come into force on 1.1.2002 – the two-period panel aggregates years 2000–2001 versus years 20002–2003.
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Table A.29: Occupation-level Placebo Results on Growth in Dependent Employment Out-
comes in Crafts Occupations Based on Administrative Data
(1) (2) (3)
Total FTE Full-time
A. Differences-in-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 -0.028 -0.031 -0.038
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
N 177 177 177
Adj. R2 -0.039 -0.021 -0.008
Placebo reform in 2003 -0.010 -0.014 -0.019
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
N 236 236 236
Adj. R2 -0.038 -0.046 -0.063
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
B. First-differences regressions:
Placebo reform in 2002 0.005 0.007 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
N 59 59 59
Adj. R2 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015
Dependent variable in – growth rates –
Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ; ***
p< 0.01. All estimation results from OLS estimation with constant. Panel A: DiD estimations based on
occupations panel as described in Table A.24, dependent variables: yearly growth rate of respective variable (see
column title), robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force
on 1.1.2002 – the estimation sample includes only years 2000–2003, with years 2002–2003 being the
post-reform period. “Placebo reform 2003” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2003 – the
estimation sample includes only years 2000–2004, with years 2003–2004 being the post-reform period. Panel B:
FD estimation based on two-period panel, dependent variables: growth rate of respective variable (comparing
pre-and post-reform period), robust standard errors. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had
come into force on 1.1.2002 – the two-period panel aggregates years 2000–2001 versus years 20002–2003.
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Table A.30: Individual-level Placebo Differences-in-differences Results Based on Survey
Data
Differences-in-differences estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Probability Entry Exit New (self-)employment
A. Self-employment:
Placebo reform in 2002 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.027 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.022) (0.008)
N 74,943 84,047 42,440 2,708 6,456
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016 0.001 0.043 0.018
Placebo reform in 2003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.014 -0.012
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.024) (0.009)
N 92,142 103,827 52,700 3,409 8,096
Adj. R2 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.041 0.020
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes
Check: EU expansion no no no no no
Check: Subsidies no no no no no
Dependent variable in – levels –
B. Dependent employment:
Placebo reform in 2002 0.009 -0.012** 0.005 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
N 84,047 42,440 30,608 66,188
Adj. R2 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.008
Placebo reform in 2003 0.013 -0.010** -0.004 -0.013**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
N 103,827 52,700 37,686 81,235
Adj. R2 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.009
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent variable in – levels –
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on individual-level data,
dependent dummy variables: see column title and panel title, as well as descriptions in Tables A.21 and A.23,
standard errors clustered at occupation level. Other controls include age, age2, dummy variables for foreign
citizenship, no vocational training. “Placebo reform 2002” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on
1.1.2002 – the estimation sample includes only years 2000–2003, with years 2002–2003 being the post-reform
period. “Placebo reform 2003” treats the data as if the reform had come into force on 1.1.2003 – the estimation
sample includes only years 2000–2004, with years 2003–2004 being the post-reform period.
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5.3.5 Data Appendix 5: Changes in the Sample Composition Over the
Pre-reform Period
Tables 4.2, 4.3, and A.32 show that treatment and control occupations differ with respect
to the levels of many sample characteristics. In this appendix, we check whether the
demographic composition of the treatment and the control group evolved systematically
differently over the pre-reform period as well. For example, we check for differences in the
probability of being a female craftsman based on individual-level data, and for differences in
the share of female craftsmen at the occupational level. Firstly, based on individual-level
data we run OLS estimations on a limited sample of only two subsequent waves t−1 and t
according to the following model:
Yiot = α+β2 ·T Go +β7 ·wave_tt +β8 ·T Go ·wave_tt + u(i)ot ,
that is, we implement pairwise comparisons of subsequent waves for the waves 2000–2003.
wave_tt is a dummy variable indicating wave t. β8 is the coefficient of interest. Since the
dependent variable Yiot is in levels, we analyze absolute changes in the respective outcome
variable. When we run test regressions on individual-level data, we use standard errors
clustered at the occupational level. In the case of the ZDH data, which is only available at
the occupational level, we run regressions on an occupations panel using robust standard
errors. Additionally, we also analyze relative changes by using growth rates as the dependent
variable. We aggregate individual-level data at the occupation-year level and compute
year-to-year growth rates for the outcomes of interest. The model then simplifies to:
(
Yot −Yot−1
Yot−1
)
= α+β2 ·T Go + uot ,
where, again, we implement pairwise comparisons of subsequent waves for the waves
2000–2003 with robust standard errors. This allows us to implement simple tests for
differential year-to-year changes in the compositional characteristics of the two groups of
crafts occupations. Below, we summarize the main test results.
ZDH data
Based on data provided by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts, we first test for
differential year-to-year changes in the number of apprenticeship graduates, the number of
apprenticeship graduates per establishment, the number of master craftsman exams taken
(including retakes), as well as the number of master craftsman exams per establishment. We
find no systematic statistically significant differences in absolute and relative yearly changes
of the above-mentioned characteristics during the pre-reform period.
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Survey data (Microcensus)
We next consider the samples presented in Table 4.2, Panels A and B, and Table 4.3, Panel
C, which are all based on survey data (Microcensus). While we observe differences in
the levels of characteristics across the two groups of crafts occupations, we do not find
systematic differences between treatment and control occupations in the absolute and relative
year-to-year changes of a wide range of compositional characteristics. These characteristics
include the shares of self-employed, dependently employed, and unemployed craftsmen, as
well as the share of craftsmen currently out of the labor force, the share of female craftsmen,
the average age, the shares of five-year age groups, the share of low-skilled craftsmen, the
shares of federal states, and the share of part-time working craftsmen. These test results
hold for both the base sample as well as for the sub-samples – the exception being that in
the base sample (Panel A) the share of part-time working craftsmen increased significantly
more strongly in the treatment occupations than in the control occupations in the years
2000–2001 and 2001–2002. Also, both in the base sample (Panel A) and in the sub-sample
of dependently employed (Panel C) the share of craftsmen aged 25–30 years increased
significantly more strongly in the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations in
the years 2001–2002 and 2002–2003. Furthermore, in the dependent employment sample
(Panel C) the share of observations from the federal state of “Saxony” changed significantly
differently in the treatment occupations relative to the control occupations in the years
2000–2001 and 2002–2003.
Administrative data (SIAB)
We also run a series of tests to check whether the composition of the two groups of crafts
occupations did evolve systematically differently over the pre-reform period in the dependent
employment sample based on administrative data. We again consider the share of female
craftsmen, the average age, the shares of five-year age groups, the share of craftsmen with
foreign citizenship, the share of low-skilled craftsmen, the shares of federal states, and
the share of part-time working craftsmen. While we observe differences in the levels of
characteristics across the two groups of crafts occupations, we find almost no systematic
differences between treatment and control occupations in the absolute and relative year-
to-year changes of these sample characteristics – the exception being that in the sample
presented in Table A.32, Panel D the share of observations from the federal state of “Lower
Saxony” changed significantly differently in the treatment occupations relative to the control
occupations in the years 2001–2002 and 2002–2003. The share of observations from the
federal state of “Bavaria” changed significantly differently in the years 2000–2001 and
2002–2003.
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5.3.6 Table Appendix
Table A.31: Overview of Treatment, Control, and Reassigned Crafts Occupations
53 treatment occupations:
Accordion and concertina makers, Basket weavers, Bookbinders, Bow makers, Brew-
ers and maltsters, Cast stone and terrazzo makers, Cleaners, Clockmakers, Container
and apparatus makers, Coopers, Custom tailors, Cutting tool mechanics, Decorative
metalworkers, Electroplaters, Embroiderers, Engravers, Flexographers, Founders and
bell founders, Furrier, Gilders, Glass and porcelain painters, Glass finishers, Gold-
and silversmiths, Hatters, Interior Decorators, Metal wind instrument makers, Millers,
Model makers, Optics technicians/precision opticians, Organ and harmonium makers,
Parquet recliners, Photographers, Piano and harpsichord makers, Plucked instrument
makers, Potters, Precious stone cutters and engravers, Printers, Printers, roller shutters
and blinds fitters, Saddlers and bag makers, Sail makers, Screed Layers, Shoemakers,
Sign and neon sign makers, Textile cleaners, Tile, slab and mosaic layers, Turners,
ivory sculptors and wooden toy makers, Violin makers, Wax chandlers, Weavers, Wine
cellarmen, Wood sculptors, Wooden wind instrument makers
29 control occupations:
Agricultural machinery mechanics, Automotive technicians, Boat- and shipbuilders,
Bricklayers and concretors, Carpenters, Chimney sweepers, Coachbuilders, Cooling
systems fitters, Dental technicians, Electrical machine building, Electricians, Glass
blowers and glass apparatus makers, Glaziers, Hearing aid acousticians, Installers
and heating fitters, Joiners/cabinet makers, Mechanics for tires and vulcanization,
Metalworkers, Motorcycle and bicycle mechanics, Opticians, Orthopedic shoemakers,
Orthopedic technicians, Plumbers, Precision mechanics, Road builders, Roofers,
Ropemakers, Scaffolders, Stove heating and hot air heating fitters
12 reassigned occupations:
Bakers, Butchers, Gunsmiths, Hairdressers, Information technicians, Painters and lac-
querers, Pastry bakers, Plasterers, Stonemasons and stone carvers, Surgical instrument
makers, Thermal and acoustic insulation fitters, Well sinkers
Note: Due to data limitations not all of the above-listed treatment and control occupations enter the estimation
samples. Reassigned occupations are fully excluded from the analysis.
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Table A.32: Descriptives Comparing Pre- and Post-reform Period Based on Administrative
Data
Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
D. Dependently employed craftsmen only
Age (mean) 40.2 41.3 38.9 40.1
Female 34.2 31.9 4.2 4.6
Foreign 12.0 11.1 5.9 5.2
No vocational training 19.3 16.5 3.9 3.3
Vocational training degree 80.7 83.5 96.1 96.7
Master craftsman/foreman 2.1 2.3 5.4 5.4
Part-time 10.6 11.4 1.3 1.7
N (total) 29,288 24,118 121,083 101,648
Sample share 19.5 19.2 80.5 80.8
Data source: SIAB 2000–2008. Reported numbers are given in % if not noted otherwise. Pre-reform period
refers to the years 2000–2003, post-reform period refers to the years 2005–2008.
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Table A.33: Selected Individual-level DiD(iD) Results on Self-employment in Crafts Occu-
pations
Differences-in-differences(-in-differences) estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probability Probability Probability Entry Entry
PR * TG -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.032*** -0.009*** -0.004**
(0.012) (0.019) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Female * TG * PR 0.017*
(0.010)
Female * TG 0.013
(0.024)
Female * PR -0.023***
(0.006)
With empl. 0.944*** 0.107***
(0.010) (0.008)
With empl. * TG * PR 0.015* -0.023*
(0.008) (0.014)
With empl. * TG -0.081** 0.002
(0.031) (0.018)
With empl. * PR -0.007*** 0.005
(0.002) (0.008)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Wave 2004 included no no no no no
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes
Check: EU expansion yes yes yes yes yes
Check: Subsidies yes yes yes yes yes
N 173,294 173,294 173,294 128,120 128,120
Adj R2 0.017 0.017 0.505 0.001 0.036
Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. Statistical significance: * p< 0.10 ; ** p< 0.05 ;
*** p< 0.01. All DiD estimation results from OLS estimation with constant based on individual-level data,
different estimation samples described in Table A.20, dependent dummy variables: see column title and
description in Table A.21, wave 2004 excluded, standard errors clustered at occupation level. Occupation fixed
effects “yes” indicates that the model has been within-transformed with respect to occupation-specific means.
Check: EU expansion “yes” indicates that we exclude individuals coming from four new Eastern EU member
states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Check: Subsidies “yes” indicates that we exclude
individuals who presumably receive Me Inc. start-up subsidies.
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5.3.7 Figure Appendix
Figure A.36: Average Number of Dependently Employed in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of dependently employed (full-time and part-time) per occupation in the treatment versus control
occupations in levels (left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.37: Average Number of Full-time Employed in Crafts Occupations over the Period
2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of full-time employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as
well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.38: Average Number of Part-time Employed in Crafts Occupations over the Period
2000–2008 Based on Survey Data
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Data source: Microcensus SUF 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average
number of part-time employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel),
as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.39: Average Number of Dependently Employed in Crafts Occupations over the
Period 2000–2008 Based on Administrative Data
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Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average number of
dependently employed (full-time and part-time) per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in
levels (left panel), as well as relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
Figure A.40: Average Number of Full-time Employed in Crafts Occupations over the Period
2000–2008 Based on Administrative Data
0
25
0
50
0
75
0
10
00
12
50
15
00
nu
m
be
r o
f f
ul
l-t
im
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
2000 2004 2008
year
Control Treatment
Levels
.5
.7
5
1
1.
25
1.
5
1.
75
2
in
de
x 
(2
00
4 
= 
1)
2000 2004 2008
year
Control Treatment
Index (2004 = 1)
Average Number of Full-time Employed in Crafts Occupations
Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average number of
full-time employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as
relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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Figure A.41: Average Number of Part-time Employed in Crafts Occupations over the Period
2000–2008 Based on Administrative Data
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Data source: SIAB 2000–2008, own calculations. This graph shows the evolution of the average number of
part-time employed per occupation in the treatment versus control occupations in levels (left panel), as well as
relative to the base year 2004 (right panel).
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